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There is a huge gap in the historiography of the Great Patriotic War. This is the 1948 campaign. The reason for the silence is often that the Red Army lost almost all the battles with the Wehrmacht. Trying to turn the tide of the war with its offensives, the Red Army survived several "Steel players on the contrary", lost over 5 million soldiers and a huge amount of military equipment, retreated to the Volga and the Caucasus Mountains.

For the first time, a Russian writer will describe in sufficient detail and reliably the course of the hostilities of that period. He extracted the necessary information mainly from the memoirs of the direct participants in the events that took place 60 years ago, from October at the same time. comes the name d; they explained som for a while: they only chupilis "to wag!"

Kinga is intended for a wide range of readers. interested in national history, as well as the history of wars and art,

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Introduction

"The history of the Great Patriotic War is
absolutely correct... This is not the history that
was, but history. which is written. It reflects the
spirit of modernity. Who should be glorified, ©
who should be kept silent ...

Marshal G.K. Zhukov

"Indeed, many military writers, generals and marshals distort the
history of the Patriotic War in such a way that sometimes only a
general background, scheme, skelst remains of the actual history,
and the content is so "concocted" that you often don't understand
when and where it happened" , - Zhukov once said in an interview with
Literaturnaya Gazeta,

To paraphrase an old sophism, one can sum it up: if
the most important marshal of that war said that the marshals were
lying (distorting history), was he telling the truth?

In fact, no one was interested in this question. The main thing in
writing the history of the Patriotic War of 1941-1945 was to prove
the great advantages of the socialist system, the fallibility of the
political leadership, the perspicacity and skill of the generals, the
power of the Soviet Army, which almost single-handedly saved the
world from the "brown plague", the monolithic unity of the
communist party and the people and the readiness of the latter to
defend the "conquests of October".

And here we have a story "that is written", but "absolutely
untrue", In a popular presentation

for mass consumption, it is a lubok compiled from Zhukovsky's
memoirs, Ozsrov's film epics, and Stadiyuk's novels. Myths are
firmly rooted in the minds of compatriots from how the principled
Zhukov warned Stalin and saved Leningrad, About the "28
Panfilovites" and "Chernomorsk sailors",

sharpness, the famous "searchlight" attack and without the body of the allies. Whom it is necessary (mostly themselves) - glorified, about whom iado - kept silent. After the death in 1982 of the last "outstanding commander" L.I. Brezhisva, the work was finished - there was more baking to add. In this story, created under the auspices of the department of military history at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, both the personal ambitions of the participants and the ideological demands intertwined. Moreover, the latter, of course, stood in the first place, and our "history" was the orulism of the struggle against the "bourgeois falsifiers":

Another 15 years ago, officers of the Soviet Army and Navy were forced to write an essay on the natsmu "Why I hate American imperialism" services).

"The world has changed a lot since then. Deprived of the possibility of spreading the "bacilli of Bolshevism" to other peoples, the "world system of socialism" collapsed under its own weight, the "most advanced" teaching of Marx-Lenin finally took shape, and "averinos the face of imperialism" turned into "friend Bill" and "friend Kolsem ".

Nothing has changed only in the history of the Patriotic War. We still storm the Reichstag and tell our children how we saved the world. Although for our children the events of the past are as ancient as Tsushima and the fall of Port Arthur were for the Moscow generation.

Textbooks, books, articles, polys of ideological clichés from the "Red Star" lexicon of the nineteenth century: "fascist eagles", "possessed Fuhrer", "Hitler's vultures", "White Finns", "treachery of the allies", "Japanese militarists", etc. Here, for example, an article was published, signed by a candidate of historical sciences, with the subtitle: "June 22 will mark 60 years (70. 80, 100? - Auth.) Sodja of the barbaric attack of Fischist Germany on the USSR." Ntuzhs pi fascist Germany (which was never "fascist", which the candidate should have known about), pi the USSR, but the article is directly a summary of the Soviet Formburo. Things reach the point of absurdity: on May 9, 2001, the German delegation was not allowed to lay flowers on the mass grave of Soviet soldiers in the Brest Fortress memorial complex in order to touch the feelings of our veterans, which, however, prevented the latter, after the end of the rally, from gratefully accepting "fascists" financial assistance.

Perhaps it is time to realize that this war is over. And also remember that 70% of the world's population fought with us for the Victory. It's time to count

to commemorate the fallen and at the same time think about why the ego was not made early and why the losses turned out to be so incredible, considering the "advantages of the socialist system" and the presence of a galaxy of "outstanding commanders". Whether these were not advantages, roofing felts - not generals?

In the official version, the initial period of the war is described as follows: "The war of fascist Germany against the USSR began under favorable conditions for the German troops and unfavorable for the Soviet troops. At the first stage of the war, the Nazi army, in view of the sudden and treacherous attack on the USSR, had some temporary advantages over the Red Army. These advantages consisted in the fact that fascist Germany, gradually preparing for a war against our country, transferred all

economy for the service of the front, created a quantitative superiority in shoes and aviation. The German army was fully mobilized for the start of the war. In addition, she had a certain experience of modern warfare with the use of large masses of tanks, aircraft, automatic weapons, received by her in the war with Poland, Belgium, France, Greece and Yugoslavia. It is understandable, therefore, that in the first months of the war the Red Army was forced to retreat and leave part of the Soviet territory.

In a word, we didn't prepare for war, didn't expect a treacherous attack, didn't mobilize, had neither numerical superiority nor combat experience (but at the same time, "strengthening our defense capability", we managed to carry out aggression against six states in a year and a half),

The last thesis was apparently supported by "scientifically" sucked-out numbers, which should testify to the overwhelming superiority of the German army in people and equipment, coupled with terrible details of how Soviet soldiers heroically threw themselves under tanks, having one wiptow for three (even with rifles not enough!). Today it is no secret to anyone that the Wehrmacht never had a quantitative superiority over the Red Army. The first German ground forces on the Eastern Front did not exceed 3.4 million people (the total number of all military personnel in the best of times reached 4.3 million). Between tcm in the Soviet Union in 1941 alone, about 10 million were mobilized into the armed forces, which, by the way, was more than twice the time of the war and the ability of the people's commissariat of defense to train and equip them. Therefore, conscripts and militias were thrown into battle - untrained and unarmed. exactly from here - one scroll. for three persons.

These millions, once again nameless, stopped

Germans near Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov. And what

6

happened afterwards? What do we know about the events of 1942? Even a schoolboy will say that there was Stalingrad. And how did the German army turn out to be? The main thing is why? After all, in 1942 Stalin planned to end the war victoriously and fiercely argued with the Anglo-American allies about the recognition of the western borders of the USSR. Huge territories were again given over to the enemy, one and a half dozen Soviet armies were smashed to smithereens (the 51st Army alone - three times), the losses of the Red Army turned out to be the highest in the entire war.

Traditional explanations for the failures of 1942 were proposed by Stalin. The main one, besides the "superiority of the enemy," which goes without saying, was that: forces for an offensive on the Soviet-German front ... In fact, the Soviet Army continued to fight alone against the entire fascist coalition. There is something to be said about this

Firstly, the forces were not so large. In any case, there are fewer of them than there were in June 1941, when, moreover, the "accompanying" factor of suddenness was at work.

Secondly, today these accusations sound, at least, indecent. It means that when we helped Hitler to fight with England, which was fighting alone at that time against the entire fascist coalition, we took care of our own safety. When England herself was the first to lend us a helping hand, without which the war could not be won, we accused her of "treacherous politics". We do not want to know that the war was not only Patriotic, but also world, because we so want to believe in our "decisive contribution."

Thirdly, this explanation does not explain anything, Hitler could also complain that Japan is from the wing of the second front in the Far East, therefore

7

The Red Army had the same opportunity to concentrate forces wherever it pleased. But she has not concentrated, or has concentrated her where it should be, or has used them in the right way.

This raises another question: how

la our "defeated and legendary", what did the EU commanders think, armed with the most advanced military science in the world? [generals everywhere, especially nobles, often complain about superiors, mistakes of subordinates, lack of strength or favorable weather conditions. Soviet marshals also widely use all these arguments. But besides that, they came up with a completely ridiculous excuse for their failures: it turns out that in 1942 they still didn't know how to fight. All the same, they are the leaders of the Fronts, the commanders of the armies, and the chiefs of staff, with childish directness, report that they have only studied so far, looked closely at the enemy, have they accumulated experience! And that it cost 48 mln of a civilian population that survived the occupation, and 6-7 mln (the figure is still being specified) of dead soldiers are the costs of training. By the way, "success in studies" is not impressive,

Zakharov, in his last romance, thought a lot about this phenomenon and only shrugged it off; "When you think about Stalin's favorites, who were entrusted with power by millions of our soldiers, then the question involuntarily rises up: how did we win this war with Germany in general?"

Good question. But, thank God, we were not alone.

NEW YEAR -
NEW HOPES

In principle, the fact that we retreated far from the border and gave the enemy the opportunity to back off and ruin the Ukraine, Belarus, part of the Russian Federation, was the result of miscalculations and inept leadership. Probably, the people who were entrusted with the business were quite primitive.

N.S. Khrushchev

At the end of 1941, after a series of catastrophic defeats, the Red Army was able to conduct major offensive operations near Rostov and Tikhvin, and also "dispel the myth of the invincibility of the German army" in the fields of the Moscow region. The Soviet troops achieved significant results, pushing the enemy back 150-300 km to the west and inflicting significant losses in manpower, and especially in technical forces.

To the Supreme Commander-in-Chief I.V. Stalin's confidence began to return. Prudovsky cri-

zis near Moscow, he considered that the war 'now went on the same track as in 1812: the enemy was defeated, the time for his pursuit and final defeat past.

Such an analogy was very correct for Stalin, and already then historians in uniform began to develop a true half-tributary theory from that, as "the greatest commander of our time, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin", like the "brilliant Kutuzov" (but using the unmistakable Marxist method), lured Hitler to Moscow, where and "ruined" his best troops.

"Soviet military science, created by Comrade Stalin, has anew developed and successfully applied ... the counteroffensive ... Stalin's doctrine of counterattack

9

offensive was the greatest acquisition of the Soviet military plow," wrote Colonel P.A. Zhilin in his work. dedicated to... Feldmartial M.I. Kuguzov. The comrade understood all the rules. how to make such an academician

All in all. The Supreme Chief Cleaver "defeatable and legible" came to his senses after the pokdown. The change in the readings of Stalin's "barometer" is clearly traced in the development of mutual relations with the newly acquired apadis and sokhiiks, in particular on the issue of the second front.

For the first time the government of the USSR raised the question in less than a month after the German attack. There was something: by that time, the armies of Kuzispov and Pavlov suffered a great defeat, and Smolensk fell. Wehrmacht gtsiks rushed to Leningrad, Moscow and Kyiv. The Soviet Geissian, who was still awkwardly preparing "a great liberation in the course of the goal of liberating the interethnic proletarians from the landlords, capitalists, policemen and all other bastards," had to ask for help to exterminate the class enemies - the English bourgeois. In a message to the British Prime Minister, dated July 18, 1941, it was said:

".. The current position of the Soviet Union, as well as Great Britain, would be significantly improved if a froit against Hitler were created in the west (Northern France) and in the north (Arctic). Fro in northern France could not only cut off Hitler's forces from the East, but would also make it impossible for Hitler to invade Aiglia ... The easiest way to create such a front is precisely now, when Hitler's forces are diverted to the east and when with the positions occupied in the east.

Churchill did not even begin to meddle with his questions.

dreamy, and immediately replied that the creation of a front in France is currently an unrealistic enterprise.

Yu

On September 3, at the time of the new aggravation of the situation on the Soviet-German front, when the BOP was already marching near Kiev, and the tank group of Guderiaia went to the rear of the troops of General Kirponos, Stalia again rejected his proposal "... to create a second front this year .

Jaspo, Churchill is a bastard, an old prag of the Soviet government and wants "our weakening". November 6, 194] in a solemn speech that had to be delivered in the underground hall of the Moscow metro. Stalin ambiguously laid the blame for his military defeat on Aitlia and the USA.

He stated: "One of the reasons for the failure of the Red Army was the absence of a second front in Europe and 18 German fascist troops. The fact is that at present there are no armies of Great Britain and the United States of America on the European continent that would wage war on the German troops of the Fatists ... The situation is now such that our country is waging a war of liberation alone, without anyone cry for help..."

The leader, to put it mildly, was cunning,

Firstly, on June 22, 1941, Churchill proposed "to provide Russia and the Russian people with all the help that we can." in debt, and] October 194}, a protocol was signed in Moscow, according to which the Western powers undertook to supply the USSR with 400 self-propelled guns, 500 tap kopecks every month. a large number of trucks and much more. So the Red Army received an increase in homogeneity and volumes of gray growth

Secondly, why would they suddenly pledge themselves to the continuance of those "armies" of the Common States of a state that does not fight Russia?

And thirdly, it is England that uncompromisingly fights

huddled with Hitler and his allies for two years (1939-1941), the last year alone. England lost ships, planes, soldiers, started the battle for Britain and the battle for the Atlantic, fought in Egypt, France, Greece and Norway, hunted the Bismar

ka "and suffered defeat near Duikerk and on Crete. Its cities were subjected to devastating bombardments, which killed tens of thousands of civilians and huge material losses. All this is the time of the Sopstsky Union. having stipulated his "zone of influence" in the 1939 pact, he supplied friendly Germany with strategic raw materials, sheltered German ships in his bases, led the Führer's "corsairs" and Britaisks of communications through the Northern Sea Route, and our comrade V.M. Molotov tapped into Berlin congratulatory messages for the capture of the European capitals. The island fought in the grip of an underwater blockade, and Comrade Stalin sent comrade Hitler echelons with grain, timber, nixls, chromium, margaits, tsik, rubber. cotton - we are what the military factories of the Third Reich needed.

Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on May 13, 1940, declared: "... You ask, what is our policy? I will answer: she is there. to wage war on the sea, on land and in the air, and to use for this all our might and all our strength, which only the memory of Tospod can give; wage war against a monstrous tyranny, which has no equal in the gloomy and deplorable speech of human crimes. You ask. what is our goal? I can give the answer in one word: victory! Win any chain! Victory, looking at all the horror! Victory, no matter how long and rough the path to it was, for without victory there can be no life ... "

Amolotov at that time explained to the deputies of the Supreme Soviet that "... it is not only senseless, but also criminal to wage such a war as the war for the "extinction of Hitlerism", and congratulated Ambassador Schulenburg on "the victories of the German armies."

Now, when Comrade Stalin was pressed down, he began to demand from the British a second front, and immediately, and "pull" 30-40 divisions from the Soviet-German Froit - this is in addition to those 38 Wehrmacht divisions that were stationed in France Belgium.

Carrying out an amphibious operation of this magnitude required gigantic material resources, a huge number of transport and special ships (England had already lost more than 2,000 ships), gaining dominance in the sea and in the air, overwhelming superiority in manpower and military equipment (there were 39 divisions in the mother country). , and the British fleet was able to provide the transfer of the line "six of them). Hitler, having poured in a lack of forces and means, did not dare to jump across the English Channel, Churchill had even less chance of success in the autumn of 1941, which he directly stated to the Soviet ambassador in London, I.M. Maisky.

After the Soviet victory near Moscow, the question of a second front lost its relevance for Stalin. This is yav-

comes from his conversations with British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden from 16 to 20 December. The latter arrived in Moscow to conclude an agreement on an alliance in the war with Germany and post-war cooperation. Stalin made it clear that he was much more interested in the problem of the future borders of the USSR. He insistently demanded that Eden recognize the 1941 boundaries of the Soviet Union in the treaty, declaring: "Our troops may in the near future again occupy the Baltic states.

stva".

The leader was so convinced of the strength of his position that, in the form of a concession for the recognition of the western borders of the Anslys, the USSR was ready to withdraw the demands for the opening of a second front. Now he was more concerned with the confirmation by the Western democracies of the territorial acquisitions obtained as a result of collusion by Hitler (!), including the partition of Poland, due to

The second Great Britain, in fact, got involved in this war, Eden, referring to the Atlaitic Charter. refused to make specific commitments on this issue. "What sss "charter"? — were indignant in the Kremlin. "After all, it is clear that the corresponding territorial changes were made in accordance with the will of the authorities of the dapiy erni gorii." That's it: the British government "stands for the dismemberment of the Soviet state"! And just like that, Stalin declared, then there was no agreement

S

To Idsn's question about the assistance of the Soviet Union to the war with Japan, Stalin replied that the USSR was still ready for this: "It would be much better if Japan attacked the USSR. This would create a more favorable political and moral atmosphere in our country. ..." The Supreme Commander added that "I would be ready to resume the conversation of the era © of the Far Eastern situation in the future. Perhaps, of course, what the Japanese themselves attack (the USSR earlier, then the position will become clear by itself." Thus, meeting the new 19-49 year. Staliy felt himself capable of finishing off Pggler even without the help of the allies, Eidsi left Moscow and with that, the negotiations were not completed "due to Aiglia's refusal to recognize the western border of the SSS

SOVIET PLANNING

His assessment of the changed situation in the war, Stalin refutes in terms of the general offensive of the Red Army, which was discussed at Headquarters on January 5, 1942. The essence of the plan was outlined by him personally in a letter dated January 10, 1942. It stated: "The Germans want ... to buy time and get Persians-

ku. Our task is to give the Germans this respite, to sleep them to the west without stopping. to force them to use up their reserves before spring, when we will have new large reserves, the Aupemians will use

14

there will be more reserves. and thus ensure the complete defeat of the Nazi troops in 1942 (Italics share. - Am.>.

This decision was supported by all the commanders of the front: we, at the same time, they reported on their grandiose successes, asked for reserves and promised to beat someone. The Commander-in-Chief of the South-Western Direction Timoshenko was going to attack Kharkov and defeat the 6th German Army, Meretskov wanted to surround Kuchler's 18th Army, Konev - Model's 9th Army, and Zhukov proposed to liquidate the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead almost the entire Army Group Zepr.

The atmosphere of the most rosy cases that has developed since 1942 in the highest vospio-political circles was commented on by Colonel-General P.I. Belov: "The defeat of the fascists near Moscow, the successful pursuit of the retreating Nazis, gave rise to an exaggerated idea of the capabilities of our troops among some military leaders and led to an ideological assessment of the enemy.

At Headquarters, the critical attitude toward the situation had weakened, much was presented in too rosy a color. The desire to conduct major operations increased, although the possibilities for this were far from always present.

Developing gigantic plans, the Headquarters sometimes, apparently, did not take into account reality, "

In Zhukovsky's way, the diapka was at full strength for everyone then.

By mid-January, the Red Army went on the offensive with nine fronts in the 1000-kilometer space of the Baltic to the Black Seas. "As a result of this offensive," confirms Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky, - the troops of the Leningrad, Volkhov and right wing of the North-Western Fronts, with the assistance of the Baltic Fleet, were to defeat the main forces of Army Group North and liquidate

15

blockade of Leningrad;; Kalipinsky and Zapadny

the phroites in the influence of the armies of the North-West Bryansk gon, the phroites were obliged to surround and defeat the main forces of the army group "Zepr"; The Southern and South-Western fronts had the task of inflicting defeat on the Army Group "South" and liberating the Donbass; The Caucasus Front, together with the Black Sea Fleet, was to liberate Crimea from the enemy during the winter.

Stalin seriously planned to start a war in 1942. At the same time, he was so confident in his abilities that he considered it possible to take a proud posture in front of the Western allies. On January 20, Litvinop asked Moscow: "... should we put a direct request for direct military assistance by creating a second front on the European conflict site?" To which Molotov replied in the following code: "We would welcome the creation of a second front in our Europe our allies, But you know that we have already received a refusal three times for our proposal to create a second front (but then this overwhelming task for the dog was to be solved by Britain alone; with the accession of the United States to the Kaz-Tigizler coalition, the arrangement radically changed, the more the Kremlin portrays an insult to the blue innocence; italics is ours. - Auth), and we want the couple to be called for the fourth refusal. Therefore, you must raise questions about the second front with Roosevelt. In the rain of momsnit, when, perhaps, with these allies will raise this question tified yami (our italics. - Auth) ".

Meanwhile, the Soviet winter offensive developed quite successfully at first. In the festive at kaza No. 55 dated February 23, 1942, the defense park brought to the attention of the personnel of battalions, batteries and squadrons:

"Now let's stun the Germans of that military superiority that they had in the first months of the war in the republic

6

the result of perfidious and sudden papalsnia. The moment of suddenness and surprise, as a reserve of German Ko-rashist troops, was completely used up. In this way, the inequality in the conditions of the war, which was created by the viciousness of the German fascist attack, was liquidated. Now the fate of the war will be decided by such an incidental moment as the moment of viability, but by constantly acting factors: the strength of the rear, the morale of the army, the number and quality of divisions, the armament of the armies, the organizational methods of the position of the commanding staff of the army. In this case, one circumstance should be taken into account: it was worth the moment of sudden disappearance of the way of the Ismants' warsenale, so that the German fascist army would not face a catastrophe.

.. The initiative is now in our hands, and the attempts of ra: Hitler's
dangling rusty car cannot be restrained

reap the flag of the Red Army. Not far is the day when

The Red Army with its mighty blow will cast aside

old enemies from Lspipgrad, clear the cities from them

and villages of Belarus and Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia, Esto

research institutes and Karelia, liberate the Soviet Crimea, and throughout

Soviet land spova will victoriously roar red

banners."

There are no words for defense here, only "reject", "cleanse", "liberate".

However, by the end of February, the offensive fizzled out, and in
March a spring thaw began, which brought with it a lull. Both opposing
sides have exhausted their possibilities, the situation in front of the
front has stabilized. None of the Soviet operations of the PS achieved
the set decisive goals; the losses of the Red Army in the first quarter of
1942 amounted to almost 1,800 thousand people.

Eperal Tippleskirch writes about this period: "Only the unwavering
stamina of the German troops, which this winter exceeded all
expectations, of course, would not be enough to frustrate the plans of the
Russians. Exactly the same way as Hitler did when attacking"

17

The Soviet Union, now the Russian commando overestimated its
strength and underestimated the strength of the resistance of the
enemy troops. The bold plan to destroy two German army groups
exceeded the capabilities of the weakened Russian armies and led
to the fragmentation of forces.

The Germans managed to resist.

Before the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command
(SVGK) there was a ridiculous question about the combat plan for
1942. At the same time, no one had any doubts that, having received a respite,
Hitler would try to seize the strategic initiative.

According to the official Soviet version and the statements of our
textbook commanders, the Supreme Plaviokomaplovanis (VGK) this
time prudently decided to switch to strategic defense "on the frontier of
prepared lines", but Pikak could not decide on one question - where
to expect,

hitting the enemy, in tsitre or pa yuks? At the same time, in order to "sit idly by" and "improve the operational position of the troops," the Air Force was supposed to conduct "a number of private offensive operations near Lenigral, in the Demyansk region, in the Smolensk, Lgov-Kursk directions, in the Kharkov region and in the Crimea." Marshal Vasilevsky after the war, "critically assessing" this play, considered the decision to "simultaneously defend and retreat" as the most vulnerable link. However, when looking at the map and not understanding, on what sector of the Soviet-German front was it planned to "strategically defend" and where were these "prepared lines"? Until today, no one had seen these defensive plans (as well as the defensive plans of May 1941).

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It was not in vain that Stalin said, "Pop large reserves," which will be his support. Despite the pas of almost 2 million losses during the winter offensive, in April 1942 the strength of the active army was

18

not only restored, but also increased by one and a half million people, reaching 5600 thousand soldiers and commanders. On ten fronts, 48 general poisk armies and 3 operational groups included 293 rifle and 34 cavalry divisions, 121 rifle and 56 separate tank brigades. In the rear, strategic reserves were continuously formed and deployed.

Enterprises evacuated to the east gained momentum at full capacity, and Soviet industry was completely transferred to a military footing.

The output of automatic weapons and anti-tank guns in the first half of 1942 increased in comparison with the second half of 1941 by almost 6 times, mortars by 3 times, artillery by 1.8 times, tanks by 2.3 times. At the same time, out of 11,178 bolss 6000 tanks (50.8%) fired during this period, there were medium (4414 "thirty-four") m heavy (1663 "Voroshilov"), which had no equal in the world. mortars (excluding the artillery of the Moscow defense zone, the Moscow air defense guard and 50-mm company mortars, of which there were more than 21 thousand pieces), 1,720 BM-1\$ and BM-8 sharp artillery installations, 4,065 tanks, 3,855 aircraft. all this - not counting the reserves of the Headquarters.

At the same time, the higher command and control of the troops was reorganized; the corps link was restored again, and from the beginning of the year they began to form-

Xia guards rifle corps, by the summer there were already ten of them. At the same time, guards of the sour army were created, which were distinguished by a stronger composition,

The changes also affected rifle divisions, they began to be equipped with a significantly larger number of fire weapons, especially anti-tank ones. Each rifle unit now had an anti-tank company. Improved artillery. Army anti-aircraft artillery regiments and divisions, anti-tank regiments and brigades appeared.

5

frontal reserve divisions, regiments and formations of active artillery and artillery divisions of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK).

The growth in the production of armored vehicles made it possible to solve the problem of recreating large armored formations, taking into account the accumulated experience, "this was also required by the nature of the operations carried out by the Soviet troops." Therefore, in March 1942, the formation of the first four tank corps began, which included a management, three tank heights and one motorized rifle brigade. According to this state, the corps should have had 7800 men, 168 tanks (of which 70 are light), 32 guns (caliber 45 and 76 mm), 20 anti-aircraft guns (caliber 37 mm), 44 mipomets (caliber 82 and 120 mm), viyuls knim a guards battalion of 250 men and 8 rocket launchers, reconnaissance and motorcycle battalions were added. Since May, they began to create such powerful operational formations as tank armies of mixed composition: three tank corps, a tank brigade reserve, one or two rifle divisions, and artillery units.

In addition to tank corps and armies, separate tank subunits and units—battalions and brigades—were formed to support the infantry. A separate tank brigade with 53 tanks and 1038 personnel. Separate tank battalions were created in two types: twenty-nine tanks (nine among them and twenty light) and thirty-six slippers (five KV, eleven T-34, twenty T-60). As of May 1, 1942, the tank troops already had 25 tank corps and 114 separate brigades.

The production of self-propelled planes steadily increased. In February, the Air Force received 822 vehicles, in March - 1352, in April - 1423. In May, a decision was made to liquidate army aviation. At the same time, in order to increase the use of aviation, began

20

The formation of the first eight air armies from the front and reserve formations, as well as the Long-Range Aviation (ADD), subordinated directly to the Headquarters, was to be formed.

"All this spoke of the creation of an army capable of solving major military tasks... The Soviet tank troops, like the entire Red Army, were preparing for active military operations," the history of the Soviet tank forces will tell. That's it! All this suggests that Stalin did not intend to give a strategic initiative, moreover, he was not going to wait for an Ismet strike. The situation remained the same: end the war in 1942.

None of the Soviet commanders objected to this in principle. It's just that each commander wanted the main blow to be dealt by his troops (this promised generous replenishment, and in case of success - glory, ranks, orders), only this was the essence of the disagreements that arose in Stavks, (operational of the army of the Civil Code. Zhukov proposed to "deliver powerful strikes in the Western strategic direction in order to defeat the enemy's Vyazma-Rzhev grouping. These attacks were to be carried out by the forces of the Western and Kalinin Fronts and partly by the forces of the North-Western Front, as well as by the air defense aviation of Moscow and other fronts, which clearly gravitated not to a private, but to a full-scale strategic operation. And Marshal S.M. Tymoshenko promised not only to take Kharkov away from the Germans, but also to liberate all of Ukraine. Vosnyi sovet of the South-Western direction reported on March 22: "The enemy is undermined by the active actions of our troops to such a state that without an influx of large strategic reserves and significant replenishment of people and materiel, he is not able to undertake operations with a decisive goal ... the troops of the South-Western direction in during the spring-summer campaign should strive to achieve the main strategic goal - to defeat the opposing forces

21

enemy and reach the middle Dnieper (Gomel, Kyiv, Cherkassy) and further to the Cherkassy, Pervomaisk, Nikolaev front (our italics. —. Auth.)". Stalin gave preference to the proposals of Tymoshenko and Khrushchev, who "vouched with their heads" for success and achieved greater successes than Zhukov and Konev in the offensive. But the Supreme Commander did not put all his eggs in one basket.

The Kharkov operation, by no means private, was only to begin the defeat of the Wehrmacht. This

confirms Marshal Moskalev: "... many of us assumed that the Red Army was already in a position to immediately throw the invaders from Soviet soil. The envisaged ... series of strikes against the enemy in order to push him away from Diepra was, pesomneino, conceived as the beginning of the expulsion of the invaders from the territory of our Motherland (our italics. - Auth.)".

At the same time, an operation in the Crimea would follow, also with very decisive ideas. The troops of the Crimean Front were to unite with the defenders of Sevastopol, defeat the 11th German Army and clear the Crimea of the enemy. This opened the way to the south of Ukraine and made it possible to strike Timoshenko towards the advancing towards the Dnieper armies, surrounding the entire Army Group "South". After that, the troops of the Bryansk Front in the Lgovsko-Kursk direction were to go on the offensive, and then it would be the turn of the Western and Kalinin Fronts to liquidate the Rzhevsko-Vyazma grouping. In the end - the deblockade of Leningrad and the exit of the Karelian Fropg to the line of the State Border of the USSR,

Thus, the real plan of the Soviet Headquarters for the spring-summer campaign of 1942 was "to carry out successively a number of strategic operations in different directions in order to force the enemy to disperse his enemy lines, not to let him assemble a strong grouping to repel the offensive in any from the navels "(Sokolov B. Unknown Zhukov. Mn., 2000. P. 358). Therefore, having

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shissya at the disposal of the Headquarters of 9 reserve armies were evenly distributed throughout the froit.

Stalin and his generals thought that the Red Army was now strong enough to defeat the Germans, who were no longer considered capable of major operations. This was also confirmed by the fantastic figures of enemy losses presented by the Intelligence Directorate of the 1st Headquarters, which did not lag behind Shcherbakov's Sovinformburo in compiling poor reports,

So, to | March, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front since the beginning of the war were estimated at 6.5 million people - this is more than the Germans lost during the entire period of the struggle with the Soviet Union. In general, during the 6 years of the Second World War, the losses of the German armed forces on all fronts amounted to about 6924 thousand people. And on | March 1942, the loss of ground forces on the Eastern Front reached only 1005.6 thousand, t.s. six times less than Stalin and his [Eishtab. They overestimated their own losses by 2-3 times. The balance of power members of the Headquarters exaggerated in their favor and greatly overestimated the "organizational abilities-

ty commanding staff" of the Red Army, "experience and prologue" of all generals.

By the way, in order to actively prepare for the realization of these grandiose plans, President Roosevelt raised the very question of opening a second front in Europe. In April, he invited Foreign Minister Molotov to the United States to sign the corresponding treaty. But Stalin was in no hurry and the negotiations were successful. made it dependent on the agreement with Australia, which, bound by obligations to the former, "refuses to recognize certain points" regarding the western border of the USSR. Washington, in turn, considered the inclusion of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union contrary to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. According to I.M. Maisky, in April Molotov persistently evacuated and dragged him to London to complete

2

negotiations, but "the people's commissar, however, replied that at the present time he could not leave Moscow) ... Eden took Molotov's refusal quite painfully."

The Soviet leadership had more serious things to do. | May 1942, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief addressed the armed forces with Order No. 130, which stated:

"There is no doubt, first of all, that during this period the fascist army and its army have become weaker than 10 months ago ... The war is not clear, but manpower is running out, oil is running out, raw materials are running out. In the German parodies, the consciousness of the inevitability of the defeat of Germany is increasingly paramount,

".. As for the German army, despite the pass stubbornness in defense, it nevertheless became much weaker ... If the old experienced generals like Reichenau, Brauchi Cha, Todt and others were either killed by the Red Army or dispersed by the German-fascist elite, The existing officer corps was partly exterminated by the Red Army, and partly decomposed as a result of robberies and violence against the civilian population. The rank and file, seriously weakened in the course of operations, receives fewer and fewer reinforcements ...

There is no doubt, secondly, that over the past period the Red Army has become more organized and stronger than at the beginning of the war ... The Red Army achieved a turning point in the beginning of the war and switched from active defense to a successful offensive against enemy troops ... All this says that that the Red Army has become more organized and stronger, its officer cadres have been tempered in battles, and now the generals have become more experienced and perspicacious.

I order ... the entire Red Army to ensure that 1942 becomes the year of the final defeat of the Yermen ho-fascist troops and the liberation of the Soviet land from the Nazi scoundrels (our italics. - Auth.).

There were 10 days left before the start of the Kharkov operation. From the middle of May, the countdown of "powerful blows" against "brutal enemies" and an unstoppable movement were to begin.

24

Soviet troops marched to the western borders of the USSR But, ironically, it was May that marked the beginning of a whole series of catastrophic defeats for the Red Army.

The Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation of the Kalinin and Western fronts turned out to be a major failure, the agony of the 2nd shock army began in Myasny Bor, the troops of the Crimean Front were almost completely destroyed by Manstein's swift counteroffensive. The troops of the Southwestern Front, advancing on Kharkov, themselves climbed into the bag just when the Germans were trying to liquidate them. All this created favorable conditions for the strategic summer offensive of the Wehrmacht in the southern direction.

Comrade Molotov had to urgently collect his suitcase, get into a strategic bomber and fly to bow to the capitalist uncles ...

GERMAN PLANNING

The defeat near Moscow really shocked Hitler. Still, the blitzkrieg strategy failed, the parade on Red Square was postponed for a certain time. But the leader, a priori, cannot be wrong. Therefore, the perpetrators were identified - the "elemental forces of nature" and the generals, "constantly getting stuck" in the Fuhrer's brilliant plans.

Field Marshal Tenperal Brauchitsch had to be dismissed. Hitler took direct command of the ground forces. "The consequences of this decision," according to Tippelskirch, "turned out to be disastrous for the further conduct of the war and for the land army itself. However, at that moment, Hitler's decision was the only possible one and promised success. He brought the army to Moscow, he alone possessed the power of suggestion necessary to inspire

25

army. Op enjoyed the full confidence of the troops. Therefore, the musgo decision aroused enthusiasm. Even the representatives of the high command, who were critical of his leadership of past operations, understood the moral significance of this decision by Hitler.

First of all, the Fuhrer gave the order to prohibit any unauthorized withdrawal. He also remembered the history of the great army of Napoleon and most of all feared that the Wehrmacht troops, neither materially nor psychologically prepared for combat operations in harsh winter conditions and disappointed in the promised quick end to the war, would break down physically and morally - then there will be no stopping them, the retreat will turn into a bangsgvo, the front will finally collapse. Later, the Fuhrer admitted to Marshal Antonssku that the armed forces were on the verge of a "Napoleonic disaster." In the calmed down conditions, Hitler's "stop order", from a tactical point of view, primitive and inflexible (like Stalin's "Not one step back!"), by all accounts, played a positive role: the Eastern Frontus was standing. Thanks to tough measures, the Fuhrer managed to "prevent the transformation of an operational failure into a moral defeat", and the German soldier "after all the heroic efforts made by him, after the trials, withstood in a situation contrary to all tactical principles, and after successfully repelling the onslaught of the enemy ... imbued with faith in himself and in the superiority of his command ...".

In a word, Hitler coped with the crisis near Moscow. His personal reputation as "the greatest army of all time" (all dictators are necessarily great commanders) remained untarnished. True, from all these troubles, the "accumulator of the German people" earned idiosyncrasy. "He has a physical aversion to snow and frost," Dr. Goebbels noted in his day.

The failures in Russia did not penetrate deep into the minds of the Germans, also because in December 1941 they began

26

major Japanese successes in the Pacific theater of operations, highlighted by the Ministry of Propaganda. To celebrate, Hitler and Mussoli also declared war on America, although the "Pact of Steel" did not oblige them to do so. Perhaps the Fuhrerle cherished the hope that the Japanese would oppose the USSR as a reciprocal gesture, but they preferred to get off with expressions of gratitude. Nevertheless, Japan's entry into the war provided Germany with painful psychological support and was of great military importance. It was believed that the United States would now be distracted by its own problems for a long time and would not be able to provide significant assistance.

Great Britain and the Soviet Union, which, in turn, put off the solution of the issue of opening a second front in Europe.

In a word, it seemed to the Germans that they still had time for a final solution of the Russian question. On the other hand, the solution of this issue in 1942 became urgently needed, because now the Axis countries and their allies were opposed by 75% of the population, industry and raw materials of the whole world. Hitler understood that this was the last opportunity for Germany to win the war, then the defeat of the Third Reich was calculated purely arithmetically.

Therefore, even at a time when the German troops were repelling the Russian offensive with the last of their strength, the Fuhrer began to develop plans for the summer campaign. This time it was clear that there would not be enough forces to achieve victory over the Soviet Union by simultaneously attacking the three main strategic directions. for the winter battles. Of the 162 divisions operating on the Eastern Front, only 8 were suitable for offensive operations, another 50 divisions could go

*-Axis Berlin - Rny "- the political union of Germany and Italy, formalized by the Berlin Agreement on October 25, 1936.

27

into battle after a short-term resupply, the bulk could be used only for defensive purposes. Only 140 serviceable tanks remained in 16 tank divisions.

The failure of the "blitzkrieg" confronted Germany with the prospect of a protracted war requiring colossal resources, material and human resources. Neither the armed forces nor the economy were prepared for such a war. The gap between the ever-growing needs of the front and the resources of the country, as well as the state of military production, widened more and more. The previously set output level. military production did not correspond to the scale of the unfolding hostilities and did not cover the expenses of the Wehrmacht.

On January 10, 1942, Hitler ordered the restructuring of industry for the needs of the war. For two and a half years, he did not dare to take this step - to produce cannons for oil, trying to mimic the hardships of war in the eyes of the nation. Moreover, quite a long time ago he came up with the decision to reduce the land army, the production of armaments and ammunition. After the Battle of Moscow and the US entry into the war

the situation has changed dramatically, the time has come to share the "hardships" with the people: "The modern course of total war, in which the German people are fighting a long life, imperiously requires the use of all available forces for the Wehrmacht and military production", What Stalin has already completed, the Fuhrer only started. If in the summer of 1942 the German industry achieved the production of 500 tanks per month, the Soviet industry was already producing 2,000 vehicles.

With regard to manpower, General Müller Hillebrand writes: "The losses in personnel remained so high that they could no longer be inflated. The lack of fighters became the hardest organizational problem, which was never resolved until the end of the war.

28

But Hitler tried to convince himself that this time too he would overcome fate.

Field Marshal Küchler, who replaced Leeb as commander of Army Group North, proposed initially to carry out an offensive in the northern part with the aim of capturing Leningrad. Halder continued to consider the Central direction to be decisive and recommended that the main attack be made on Moscow. The Fuhrer considered all these proposals and decided to start the campaign with a large offensive in the south, and then, as forces were released, to strike in other directions.

On March 28, 1942, a conference was held at Hitler's headquarters, at which the plan for the summer offensive was finally adopted. Mrs. Neral Warlimont, who was present at the same time, later wrote: "... Hitler, despite the failures that befell the Germans, returned back to the main idea, which he adhered to in December 1940 and in the summer of 1941. He again wanted to concentrate the main forces on the extreme flanks of the wide-spread front ... Moscow as the goal of the offensive so far completely disappeared (our italics. - Auth.).

In the north, Leningrad should have been taken in order to finally establish contact with the Finns by land. On the southern flank of the Eastern Front, it was planned to inflict crushing blows on the enemy, capture the industrial Donets Basin, the oil-bearing regions in the Caucasus, the wheat fields of the Kuban, seize Stalingrad and deprive the Soviet Union of the "important military and economic centers" vital for waging war. It was believed that, if successful, no amount of American assistance would be able to compensate Stalin for what he had lost. Germany will accordingly acquire sources of strategic raw materials for the continuation of the war. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the OKW "Ponter Blumentritt, therefore, about the auxiliary

minal: "Industrial and economic circles in [yorma

OKW - the supreme command of the armed forces of Germany during the Second World War (Oekonipalyo Tse Maitilem, OKU).

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iii put strong pressure on the military, proving the importance of continuing the offensive lead; They told Hitler that they could not continue the war without Caucasian oil and Ukrainian wheat." As you can see, there were few alternatives to the Fuhrer.

Simultaneously with the solution of the problem of the economic weakening of the USSR, it was necessary to inflict on it the maximum military defeat, "in order to finally destroy the forces remaining at the disposal of the Soviets." Particular attention was paid to the last moment: "It is necessary to avoid that, as a result of the too late approach of the troops intended for encirclement, the enemy has the opportunity to avoid this encirclement." .

In the future, Hitler intended to create an "eastern rampart" in the east - a giant defensive line, in order to then turn south through the Middle East to strike at Aiglia, Goebbels wrote that with Russia things could come to the Hundred Years War, which would not deliver Germany a pika hassle. Mentally, the Fuhrer was already rushing to India and the countries of the Persian Gulf, prejudicedly ordered to increase the production of weapons and equipment for operations in the tropics at the rate of 7 divisions.

In accordance with the decision taken, on April 5, 1942, the directive of the "Fuhrer and Supreme Commander-in-Chief" No. 41 was issued. According to this document, the main complex of campaign operations was composed of a series of successive complementary ones. deep blows. The purpose of the first of them was to break through to Voronezh, from where the tank and motorized formations were to turn to the south, in cooperation with the troops advancing from Kharkov, to destroy the Red Army forces between the Donets and the Don. This was followed by an offensive by two groupings on Stalingrad, with the capture of the enemy in pincers from the northwest (downstream of the Don) and from the southwest (upstream of the Don). And finally, turn to Kav

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kaz - kvozhdelisinoy oil and looming on the horizon: those "ipdiyam". Thus, the main objective of the campaign was to conquer the Caucasus with its oil

crafts. But first, before the army groups were to destroy the main forces of the Red Army in the area west of Stalingrad by deep envelopment.

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In the spring of 1942, the number of German divisions in the Eastern Front increased to 183, and in the south to 68. To compensate for the losses, units received about a million recruits who had combat experience. On March 31, Field Marshal Keitel ordered that volunteers over the age of 17 could be drafted into the Wehrmacht or the Waffen-SS without parental consent. After that, almost all the infantry divisions of Army Group South were fully staffed. About 50% of the slipper and motorized units available in the pali were also concentrated here. Since the armored and motorized divisions were preparing to carry out the offensive in decisive directions, their combat effectiveness was brought to the maximum level.

In the tank divisions, the tank regiments went over to the Z-battalion organization. Each battalion had two companies of light tanks and one company of medium ones. These tank regiments were fully equipped. The combat power of the main tanks ALI and T-TU was significantly increased by equipping them with long-barreled guns. The motorized brigade was reinforced with a company of 20-mm self-propelled guns, and the divisional artillery was reinforced with an anti-aircraft battalion. The reconnaissance battalions were disbanded, a company of reconnaissance tanks was attached to the motorcycle battalion.

For the first time, motorized divisions received one tank battalion, consisting of two companies of light tanks and a company of medium tanks. The razvelbat was also disbanded, and the motorcycle battle

31

got sick with a company of reconnaissance tanks. The anti-aircraft artillery was strengthened, and in the anti-tank divisions, two companies were equipped with Russian "trophies" - 76.2-mm puiks on self-propelled carriages.

Among the armored divisions there were about 130 takops, and among the motorized divisions there were 50 swiis. Thus, the armored divisions were approximately equal to the divisions of the 194] model, and the motorized ones increased their bare power.

The infantry received new 75-mm anti-tank guns, but due to irreparable losses

vavtotraisports, has become less mobile. Approximately 30% of the artillery consisted of obsolete models.

The army groups "Center" and "North", stopped on the defensive, populated in the "second turn". And the possibility of resupplying them with personnel and equipment made it possible to reduce here the regular organization of infantry divisions by one third. Tank divisions had only one tank battalion each - 60-70 vehicles. To ensure at least 85% of the initial mobility of Army Group South, all formations of the other two groups had to be demotized.

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The number of aircraft decreased compared to 1941, and the number of combat-ready vehicles was 50-60% of the actual numbers among cm. . The German Air Force was increasingly constrained by the defense of the imperial territory and participation in battles in other theaters of military operations in the North and the Mediterranean ... As a result, the ground forces had to take into account that their support from the Air Force and anti-aircraft units 6y detumspenena

32

In Islam, according to the general opinion (this is the mission of the Germans themselves), on the eve of the sometimes summer campaign, the German army looked weaker than a year ago; The total number of personnel on the Soviet-German froite was 650 thousand people in mas 1942, the lack of ro and utter was acutely felt. office

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pa 359 thousand people.

To replenish human resources, the OKW turned to the allies of Germany for help. Keitel hastily made his way to Budapest and Bucharest to recruit Hungarian and Romanian soldiers. Goering, and then Hitler himself turned to Mussolini. Persian thieves were crowned with success. The Fuhrer received promises to send an additional amount of cannon fodder to the Russian Froit. For the summer offensive, the Germans expected to have 58 allied divisions: 27 Romanian, 13 Hungarian, 9 Italian, 2 Slovak and

1 Spanish. This constituted a fourth of the united forces of the Axis powers in the East. Polopina of these formations was supposed to strengthen the southern flank of the front

'a, where the main blow was to be delivered. The task of the allies was to cover and hods shepherd its ss flank, the depth of which was to increase more as it moved to the east.

The officers and soldiers of the Wehrmacht reacted to the alliance with contempt and counted on serious help from them. The weight of the opi was shared by the feld" of Marshal Fop Rupitedt, who declared: "The Romanian officers and the lower chips cannot stand any criticism; the Italians are simply terrible, and all the games only dream of how to get home." the German command valued

2 Year 1942 33

any help. True, it was planned that the entire contingent would arrive in Russia in full only by the beginning of autumn.

By May 1942, according to the official "History of the Second World War", Germany and all allies had 217 divisions and 20 brigades in the Soviet-German froit - 6198 thousand people (the figure is clearly overestimated by one and a half million; in addition, about 300 thousand . military personnel were involved in maintaining order in the occupied territories), 56941 guns and mortars (we do not count our own 50-mm mortars, of course, we take into account the enemy, although we write in reference books that "pashas were superior"), 3229 tank assault guns (the tank of the Red Army has always been large, so the Soviet marshals prudently report that "a significant part of our armored fleet was inferior to the German ones in its combat qualities"; we can just say that a significant part of our armored fleet was superior in combat qualities absolutely everything that the Ismians had, but the quality of our "Geperal park" - yes, left much to be desired ...), 3395 bare self-propelled planes (of which 2815 were Luftwaffe vehicles and 580 Italian, Finnish and other allies),

Operation "Blau" was supposed to plow in July. Prior to this, in order to create favorable conditions, it was supposed to carry out offensive operations with a limited purpose - in the Krymuitsa and Izyum direction. The Soviet leadership, by its self-confident strategy, to some extent itself made it easier to resist the accomplishment of this task.

and**

Hitler's "rusty and loose" war machine, now (again according to Stalin's definition) "defective strategy" and "template tactics", once again managed to use both "surprise momsit" and other "possible

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cops" and put the Soviet Union literally on the brink of death. The German soldiers went to the Volga and climbed to the peaks of the Caucasus, the German admiral was already preparing to take command of the Caspian flotilla, and the "F" corps was to make a throw to Baghdad ...

The storm of the twelfth year has
come - who helped us here? Frenzy of
the people, Barclay, winter or
Russian god? But God helped...

ON THE MOSCOW DIRECTION

The Stavka's decision to continue the
opposition without a pause had all the hallmarks
of that indiscriminate offensive that Stalin himself
criticized in 1929. He said then: "...

There has never been and cannot be a
successful offensive without a regrouping of
forces in the course of the very offensive,
white consolidation of the captured positions
and settlement until the end of the
offensive. In the case of an indiscriminate
advance, if these conditions are not
observed, the offensive must inevitably
choke and fail. Indiscriminate advancement
forward is death for the offensive. Having
become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief,
Stalin himself forgot what he taught.
Tener Colonel P.A. Belov

35

In accordance with the decision of the Headquarters of January 5, 1942,
without any operational pause (so as not to "give the Germans persdy"), the
winter offensive began

Red Army. The main Soviet military operation was the strategic offensive on the Moscow on the right side with the aim of completely defeating the German Army Group Center on the Rzhev-Vyazemsky bridgehead.

The idea of the operation was to use enveloping strikes by the troops of the Kalinii Front from the region of the North-West of Rzhev to Sychevka, Vyazma and the troops of the left wing of the Western Front from the Kaluga region in the direction of Yukhnov, Vyazma with a simultaneous offensive of the rest of the forces of the Western Front to Sychevka and Gzhatsk to surround, dismember and destroy the main forces of Field Marshal Gunther von Klugs.

In order to assist Konsvui Zhukov in accomplishing such a grandiose task, P.A. Kurochkina was to organize an offensive by two armies of the left wing from the Ostashkov ramon in the direction of Toropsts, Vslizh, Rudnya. Bryansk Front, Colonel General Ya.T. Chersvichenko in full force - 61, Zee of the 13th Army - nano-strengths at the Bolkhovsky and Oryol directorates, in order to pin down the enemy troops stationed here and ensure the offensive of the troops of the Western Front from the south.

Thus, the success of the operation was to be ensured by the coordinated actions of four fronts - seventeen armies, in which there were one and a half million fighters and commanders. More than a million people, grouped together in 77 rifle, 17 cavalry and 1 tank divisions, 26 rifle, 18 tank and 2 airborne assault brigades, were part of the advancing on the main direction of the Kalinin and Zaladny fronts. The troops were replenished with people and equipment.

In its reserve, taking into account the Moscow defense zone, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command had more than 14 divisions and 7 rifle divisions.

36

brigades, and in the internal districts the formation of new formations continued. In addition, the Soviet top leadership believed that the German troops, demoralized by the defeat near Moscow and ill-prepared for combat operations in winter conditions, would be able to put up enough serious resistance at least until the serious losses they had suffered were recovered.

Army Group Center continued to be the strongest of the German army groups. Ise included 9, 4 and 2 field, 3 and 4 tank armies - all 49 infantry, 14 tank, 8 motorized, 3 security divisions and 8 brigades.

However, this same group suffered the most losses in an unsuccessful attempt to take Moscow. [Yermakov's troops were exhausted, lost a significant amount of heavy weapons, tanks and other equipment. At the beginning of January 1942, many infantry battalions numbered 90-100 men, batteries 1-2 guns, and tank divisions 10-14 tanks.

The Germans hurriedly strengthened the defense lines on the Lama, Ruza, Narai rear lines, transferred troops and equipment to the Moscow direction from the German army and several active sectors. There was a solid front line. The German defense was a system of separate strongholds, centers of resistance and small garrisons in populated areas that blocked the paths of possible movement of Soviet troops and road junctions. Approaches to the villages and villages were covered by minefields. The strength of such a defensive system was facilitated by deep snow, which excluded the advancement of large formations of its peaks across the virgin lands.

The Wehrmacht troops had only one task: to fight to the death, to hold the triangle of Rzhev, Bryansk, Smolensk at any cost. The directives of the Stavka command stated: "No value is allowed.

37

retreat, as it will lead to the complete loss of heavy weapons and materiel. Army commanders, commanders of formations and all officers ... must force the troops to defend their positions with fanatical tenacity, not paying attention to the enemy who has broken through on the flanks and behind the lines of our troops. Only such a method of conducting combat operations will allow us to gain the time necessary to transfer reinforcements from the homeland and from the west.

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In early January, the Supreme Commander I.V. Stalin wrote instructions for conducting offensive operations, in which he tried to explain in an accessible form to his generalist the provisions of the theory of deep operation and some principles of the basic art. This essay was drawn up as a directive letter from the Stavka dated January 10, 1942, and handed over by telephone to all fronts and armies. In the letter, the commanders "opened their eyes" (they themselves say so in their memoirs) to quite trivial things: breaking through the enemy defenses must be carried out by powerful strike groups of narrow sections

kah, for their support, all forces and means should be thrown, artillery should continuously accompany and assist the advancing troops on the battlefield.

"The offensive can give the proper effect only if we create a large preponderance of forces over the forces of the enemy on one of the sectors of the front," the "leading figure of all sciences" instructed his negligent students. - And for this it is necessary that in each army that sets itself the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses, a strike group should be created in the form of three or four divisions, concentrated to strike at a certain sector of the front. This is the first task of the command of the army, for only in this way can

but to ensure a decisive preponderance of force or the success of breaking through the enemy defenses in a certain sector of the front.

What will be required in order to ensure a breakthrough of the enemy's defensive line to its full depth? This requires at least two conditions: firstly, in the practice of our armies and fronts, it is necessary to replace the actions of individual divisions located in a chain with the actions of shock groups concentrated in one direction, and secondly, it is necessary to replace the so-called artillery preparation by artillery offensive.. What does that mean?

This means, firstly, that artillery cannot be limited to one-time actions within an hour. or two hours before the offensive, and must advance together with the infantry, must fire at small breaks for the entire time of the offensive, until the enemy's defensive line is broken to its full depth. I

This means, secondly, that the infantry must fall on us not after the ogia ceases, as is the case with the so-called "artillery preparations", but together with the artillery attack, to the thunder of the artillery ogia, to the sounds of artillery music,

This means, thirdly, that artillery must act scattered, but concentrated, and it must be concentrated not in any place of the front, but in the area of action of the shock group of the army, the front, and only in this area, because without this condition, artillery attack."

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that before historical writing, "the principles of which were the basis for organizing and conducting offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War! ", the leading staff of the Red Army had a very vague idea about these intricacies of the military profession and did everything exactly the opposite. However,

after, too.

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TOROPETSKO-KHOLMSKAYA OPERATION

As a result of the counteroffensive near Moscow, the troops of the Kalinin and the left wing of the Northwestern Fronts engulfed the main forces of Army Group Center from the north, which created favorable conditions for delivering a strike from this direction into the enemy's deep rear. According to the instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, absolutely everyone was to attack. Therefore, General Kurochkin, with one wing of his front, was preparing to encircle and defeat the enemy's Demian grouping, and with his left flank he was to carry out an offensive operation to assist the armies of General Konev.

The idea of the operation was to use the forces of the 3rd and 4th shock armies, which had 8 divisions, 3 brigades, 13 ski and 4 tank battalions, to strike from the Ostashkov area on Andreanopol, Toropets, Velizh, Rudnya, to defeat the enemy in the future, developing success in the South-Zapad direction and cutting rear communications, bypass the Rzhev-Vyazma grouping from the west and destroy the SS in cooperation with the troops of the Kalinin and Western Fronts. To ensure the main attack from the north, part of the forces of 34th army was to attack Votolino.

Shock armies in the Red Army began to form in November 1941. These operational formations were intended to defeat enemy groupings in the most important directions and, in comparison with conventional combined arms armies, as a rule, had more tanks and artillery. The personnel of the shock armies were equal in status to the guards, received increased cash salaries, had the right to return to their unit after being wounded, and other benefits.

The fresh 3rd shock army, commanded by Lieutenant General M.A. Purkasv, was formed in the Stavka reserve at the end of December by transforming

40

60th reserve. The army included the 23rd, 33rd and 257th rifle divisions, the 20th, 27th, 31st, 42nd, 45th and 54th rifle brigades, reinforced by two RGK artillery regiments, three divisions of guards mortars, two tank, six ski, four sapper, one engineer battalion. In total, the army has

elk: 51,500 men, 35 tanks, 142 guns, 347 mortars. Purkaev's troops were to advance almost strictly to the west, on the Hill, with a subsequent turn to Velikiye Luki.

The 4th shock, also reorganized in December on the basis of the 27th army, included the 249th, 332nd, 334th, 358th and 360th rifle divisions, the 21st, 39th, 48th and 51st rifle brigades, 2 tank battalions, 2 divisions of the RS, 2 artillery regiments of the RGK. The army was to advance to the south-west, along the Peno-Andrea pol-Toropsts-Velikie Luki railway with a turn to the south, cutting the rear communications of Army Group Center. The former commander of the Bryai Front, a specialist in carrying out strikes by the "inverted front", was appointed commissary commander, who promised all September 194 to defeat the "scoundrel Guderian" and himself a month later smashed to smithereens by him, Colonel-General A.I. Eremenko. Well, yes, for one beaten they give two unbeaten.

Chief Artillery Army General N.M. Khlebnikov left the most laudatory comments about Eremenko: "I heard about him as an ardent person, proactive, loving to strike the enemy first, even if he had a significant superiority in strength and means. It is therefore surprising that the Supreme Commander V.I. Stalin called him a "pugnacious general" and often sent him to the hottest places. However, there are other versions about this nickname. Andrei Ivanovich was known as a well-known massacre, a lover, so to speak, of the fist education of his subordinates. Here, for example, is a complaint from a member of the Military Council of the 13th Army, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Ganenko, addressed to Stalin:

41

"Being on the front line last night, General Efremov and I returned to the operational group of the headquarters to develop an offensive order. Eremenko, the commander of the front, arrived here with Mazepov, a member of the Vosin Council, with them the following syspa played out: Eremenko, asking about nothing, began to reproach the Military Council for cowardice and betrayal of the Motherland, in response to my remarks that throwing such heavy accusations is not investigated, Eremenko I rushed at him with my fists and hit him in the face several times, threatened to shoot him. Then Eremenko took out a Mauser, but the intervention of Efremov prevented him from firing a shot. After that, he began to threaten Efremov with execution. Throughout this ugly scene, Yeremenko hysterically shouted curses, cooled down a little, Yeremenko began to boast that, allegedly with the approval of Stalip, he had beaten several commanders of the corps, and had broken the head of one, Sevza

© goluzhiyat, Eremenko forced Efremov to drink vodka with him, and when the latter refused, he began to shout with a curse that Efremov should be in opposition to him. he can't be a deputy anymore, all the more so since he can beat the commanders of the constables in the face.

Dauzh, General Eremenko was a "hot" and "initiative" person. Dsputat and the secretary of the Central Committee are also good in this episode! Miss, General Guderian, for a harsh word addressed to him, challenged Field Marshal La Kluge to a duel - Hitler himself had to separate. All these aristocratic outliers have long been eradicated in the Red Army, all according to the regulations: they punched you in the face - you can complain at authority.

The total strength of the strike force of the North-Western Front was 12,210 people, more than 1,000 guns and mortars, and 97 tanks. To the memory of General G. Semenov: "The divisions ... were put together, well-managed and fully staffed with personal

42

composition and armament. Because of the time, the forces were considerable. Air support was provided by two mixed air divisions of the Air Force of the front and army aviation,

The Germans had a demarcation line between the Sever and Center groups in the area of the forthcoming actions. In the Demyansk area, 5 divisions of the 2nd Army Corps from the 16th Army of General Bush were stationed - a separate operation was being prepared against them; 3 more divisions were in the Selizharovo area. The gap between these two groups was covered only by the 123rd Infantry Division and the SS Cavalry Brigade. Reserves with a force of up to two regiments were located in the area of Andreapol, Velichko. In the section from Zalesye to Selishch, where the blow of two Soviet armies was hit, the Germans had the lowest density of forces, and in total on the front of about 100 km they could oppose the troops of Purkasva and Eremenko with a little more than three divisions and 150 guns.

The enemy did not expect extensive offensive operations by the Red Army in this secondary sector. In principle, he considered it impossible for large masses to act in this area. The conditions for the offensive were indeed very difficult. Forests, bogs with many large and small lakes occupied nine-tenths of the area. The road network was very poorly developed; even in summer, maneuvering troops here was extremely problematic. And in January 1942, the average daily air temperature reached minus 35-40 degrees, frosts alternated with heavy snowfalls, the depth of the snow cover was 70-100 cm, almost completely excluding

movement of troops, especially equipment, off-road,

The most chain special forces in such conditions were the ski battalions, which the Germans did not have. However, due to the specific "rasseis kogul" approach to their formation, front-line commanders sometimes found out by judgment that having arrived

43

The battalion of skiers at their disposal consists entirely of purebred Asians who have never seen skis in their lives. So in the 4th shock: "... the ski bata lop arrived without skis, losing them along the roads." On the neighboring front, General F.I. Golikov also received five ski battalions, but "they didn't know how to walk and fight on skis."

Another problem was the inertia of the thinking of the Soviet higher guard, who strove to attack everywhere and at once, which led to a uniform dispersal of forces and means along the entire front. Thus, the commander of the 4th shock army proposed to cover the secondary sectors with small barriers, and to throw the maximum of forces and means, having deeply echeloned them, to throw on Peno-Andreapol-Toropets. On the one hand, the only big road lay here, moreover, cleared by the enemy, on the other hand, such a formation of the army made it possible to constantly increase the strike due to the second echelons and reserves advanced from the depths: Ersmeiko already had a bitter experience of commanding the front, when the German strike groups easily cut through his messy defense.

However, General Kurochkin and the representative of the Headquarters N.A. Bulgapin criticized the commander's plan to the nines and offered him an auxiliary strike in the administration of Lake Vselug in order to obssekt the junction with the neighbor on the right and "prohibit the enemy the possibility of maisvra." Udyr was to be attacked by the 360th Rifle Division, with the 5th Rifle Brigade of the 1st in the second etelons, with a tank bag, heavy artillery and a RS battalion, almost a quarter of the available forces of the 4th Shock Army.

All these formations and units were sent through impassability and deep snow into the forest jungle (in the literal sense of the word, since the route ran through a protected area where there were no clearings), completely isolating from the main forces. For communication between the right flank and the center, the 48th rifle brig was allocated

4

with two ski battalions. To the main direction

249th and 332nd rifle divisions and the 39th brigade, 1 tank and 3 ski battalions were fired from the Leninsk-Pepel-Andreapol. The 334th Rifle Division was operating ahead of it, behind it the 21st Rifle Brigade was to move in a wedge to the left, providing a junction with the neighboring 22nd Army of the Kalinin Front. Artillery was distributed equally evenly, as a result of which its density did not exceed 30 barrels per kilometer of front. V

Yeremenko directly called such an approach the operational "poverty" of the front command, and General Khlebnikov considered it necessary to give the following explanation: "Theoretically. in principle, everyone agreed that a decisive superiority over the enemy, created in a decisive sector, ensures the success of the offensive (in fact, this theorem was proved in practice by the Theban commander Epaminondus in 371 BC; "And the future Minister of Defense Bulganin such a name"? - Ant). However, in practice, under the influence of a certain kind of circumstances, the datspai axiom of the bovine art was observed far and wide (it seems that they know that this is an axiom, but the truth is, it would be better to put "experiment" over their own troops. - Auth.) . Therefore, it happened that a well-conceived deep blow turned into a series of frontal attacks, which only "pushed" the enemy without leading to encirclement and destruction.

Due to the difficulties of concentrating troops, which was carried out in difficult weather conditions at night, the start of the operation was postponed several times. The only railroad could not cope with transportation, and 40 km before Ostashkov was destroyed by the Germans. Further, the rifle subunits were delivered to their starting lines by motor transport, the ski battalions went on their own. Some units arrived just after the start of the offensive. More

45

things were worse with material support, especially with fuel and food. On January 8, an entry appeared in the "Journal of Combat Operations of the Troops of the 4th Shock Army": "There is no food in the 560th Infantry Division as of January 1942." The same pomegaga was made in the request of the 322nd division. In the neighborhood of the 3rd shock, the situation was even worse, since it was escaping from the depots of Yeremenko's army.

In all seriousness, the commander of the army tells how he "treated" the troops for battles in harsh conditions: in the period of concentration, half-starved DIVISIONS temperatures (!)" - sort of

survival school, Political workers in the 50-degree frost inspired the fighters with an aggressive spirit and taught them to build huts, "warming them with spruce branches."

In general, according to Marshal Yeryomenko's post-war confession, in terms of material and psychological reasons, his army was prepared for the operation: "In the troops and in the warehouses there were only 2.5 sets of ammunition, 1-1.5 daily dachas of food and fodder. There was no gasoline at all in the army warehouses, and in the tanks of the cars there were about 0.15 refuelings. Nevertheless, the main conditions for success were: a certain degree of material support (see above. - Ashi.), High morale of the troops (three days spent in snowdrifts and huts for training. - Aat.), On the whole to the direct performers of the play actions.

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On the morning of January 9, the armies of the left wing of the North-Western Front, without breakfast, but "with great enthusiasm", went over to the general offensive. In the zone of the 3rd shock army, the main blow to the citr was carried out by the 33rd and 257th rifle divisions. They were opposed

46

divisions of the 415th infantry regiment of the 123rd division, reinforced by an okhrai battalion. Due to the low density of artillery and poor reconnaissance, it was not possible to completely suppress the enemy's fire system. The Soviet formations, having met organized resistance forces in a number of sectors, got involved in frontal protracted battles with small garrisons. Instead of taking advantage of the gaps to bypass the enemy's strongholds, the divisions attacked them with continuous frontal attacks. As a result, the troops advanced only 4-5 km during the day. [The commander of St. Purka, satisfied with the pace of the offensive, prepared his divisional commanders with the usual Bolshevik methods: "... listen to the task ... @ hieral Purkaso called the line to which parts of our division should go tomorrow in the evening. Tell comrades Makariev (commissar-33. - Auth.) and Lytkip (commissar. - Aat), - added the commander, - that they will go to trial by a military tribunal for not fulfilling the task. Lipi, on January 12, the 3rd Shock Army broke through the enemy's tactical defenses, penetrating 20-25 km into the city. The Germans in the entire strip began to withdraw in the southwestern papravlepiy. The lack of roads and deep cisp slowed down the advance of the Soviet troops, special artillery and tanks, complicated the work of the rear. Meanwhile, the pace of the offensive increased.

On January 14, the shock 33rd and 257th divisions reached the Moltovitsy-Kholm road, which the Yemtsy maintained in good condition, and two days later, almost without meeting organized resistance, reached the line of Krasny Klin, Lake Volkota, 20-25 km east Specifically Holm. True, by this time, due to lack of fuel, the 146th tank battalion, the 106th RS battalion, and reinforcement artillery regiments had lagged behind. The situation with the supply of food and ammunition worsened. On the right flank, it was possible to pass up to 40 km, then the Soviet formations were drawn into the fortified points of Vatulino and Molvotitsa here in protracted battles.

47

By the end of January 16, the troops of Gsialal Purkasva had spread along the front for 100 km and continued to advance in a wide fan, storming every village. vict. On this day, the compilation of the Northwest Fro cemented this vicious system with its new introductions. The right wing of the 3rd shock army was to be. take over Vatulipo and Molvotici, since the 34th Army, on the right, did not achieve success. To solve THIS "strategically important" task, almost half of the rifle formations were allocated - the 93rd rifle division, the 20th, 27th and 42nd brigades. In the center - mobile detachments of the 33rd Infantry Division of Colonel A.K. Makariev should have been occupied [January 9, the city of Kholm. The left flanks of the 257th Rifle Division and the 31st Brigade were to advance in the wake of Velikiye Luki. As a result, the froit of the army expanded even more, the ss forces were split into three parts, each of which was de! la on independent directions, we have pikakoy connected with each other. Similarly, in general, the 3rd shock army carried out its operations without regard to its neighboring army, Yeremsiko, with which it had neither an elbow nor any other kind of connection.

Teisral Purkaev with his own divisions was united with the help of the snow on the sleigh of messengers. For this reason, the 83rd grelkopa division, marching 30 km from Kholm, only received an order on January 18, from which the divisional commander learned that they should already fight for the city and completely master it on the 19th. According to reconnaissance, the Psmtsy had about 1,500 soldiers and officers on the outskirts of the city and in the Kholm Garizon.

Fulfilling the task, Makariev's regiments made a night march and in the morning entered into battle on the outskirts of the city, which was an important road junction. the pshota captured the western part of the Hill, but, the rest

appearing with a strong ogy from the eastern bersg, she was unable to cross the Lovat River. By this time, no Yemsians had pulled up to the city part of the 218th Infantry Division, deployed on planes from Dapia.

Thus, by the end of January 21, the troops of the 3rd shock army were drawn into the battle. On Demyansk, the 23rd Rifle Division and three brigades trampled unsuccessfully at Vatolipo and Molvotits. In the center, the 88th division fought for the Hill. The 257th Infantry Division and the 31st Brigade did not reach the area of Spopovo, Sheshurino on the left wing.

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Rala Yeremsiko, things were going a little more cheerfully. on the lrape flank of the 4th shock army, the enemy had 2 regiments of the 123rd infantry division, in the center - an SS cavalry brigade and separate razpedotryals, on the left flank - the 453rd regiment of the 253rd infantry division. Eremenko's army acted more decisively, two hours of artillery preparation was carried out effectively. After that, the rifle units broke through the enemy defenses and by the end of the day, having covered almost 20 km, they reached Pepo. On the outskirts of the city, not having the support of their artillery lagging behind, the opi were stopped by a strong ogism. During the night, part of the 247th Infantry Division of Gsieral G.F. Tarasov bypassed the city, howitzers, "chkatyushes", the 141st sneaker battalion pulled up - three tanks alone (four KVs, T-34 cms, twenty T-60s). The operations of 5 ski battalions, which were belated to the end, also appeared. True, "... the skiers were fed up with a difficult 2-day march without food." At dawn, Peno took the 1st blow, and his harpizos almost completely destroyed.

Avoiding frontal strikes, bypassing the strongholds, the strike force of the Eremenko army advanced along the railway to Aidreapol, Toropet, the M.V. Frunze under the command of Colonel S.A. Kiyazkova soon turned

to the south, to the Zapadpayaya Dvina station, located on another, almost parallel to the first, railway. The 249th division was advancing in the same papravlepiy. Partisans provided active assistance to the troops. The opiies were destroying the roadways behind the Isms. covered the flanks of individual units, and also played the role of forward detachments,

From January 13 to January 15, battles were fought in the Velichko, Luchi, Okhvat stations. The German commando, obsessed by the rapid advance of the 4th shock army, tried to stop it by bringing fresh forces into battle. The breakthrough was supposed to be closed by the 81st Infantry Division arriving from France. However, this time the Germans themselves worked hastily and illiterately: the division was introduced into battle on the move, in parts, on a wide front, which predetermined the defeat. In addition, both the command of the 81st Infantry Division and all its soldiers and officers, finding themselves in conditions so sharply different from the Western theater of military operations, "lost all the qualities that together determine the combat effectiveness of the troops." In the very first skirmishes, the 189th regiment and 2 separate bigals were defeated by units of the 249th and 332nd rifle divisions. .

On the night of 15 January, Tarasov's division reached the Apd-reapol, surrounding the Sgo from three sides. In the morning, artillery and taikis pulled up to the city. After a half-hot artillery barrage, the Soviet units launched an attack [er Maisky garrison consisted of an infantry regiment, a sapper "pogo battalion and a communications battalion of the 81st Infantry Division, as well as separate units of the 253rd Division. The Germans put up stubborn resistance for two days, but by the end of January 16, they were defeated. In Adrsapols, they managed to capture a large supply base for Army Group North, warehouses with food and fodder.

Thus, the offensive of the main forces of the 4th shock army developed successfully. 249th Rifle

50

the division in good darkness advanced towards Toropets 332nd - by the way, the Western Dvina. This, however, could not be said about the flank groupings.

The right-flank 360th Rifle Division of General I.M. Kuznetsova, directed to "break through" the emergency situation and the swamps, did this, completely showing the interaction with the main forces. In the second echelon, it was followed by the 51st Rifle Brigade of Colonel N.A. Fedorov. The 171 tank battalions accompanying them, two-thirds manned by the English "MATILDA" and "Valentines" and not having a single wide-track "thirty-four" howitzer and guards mortar divisions were not able to overcome the snowfields, quickly used up fuel and got up. Pozlis, they were heavily used in the direction of the main attack, and the infantry to the waist continued to pour out the instructions of Comrade Bulganin: they moved forward, paving the way in a continuous forest, felling trees by hand, trampling down the snow and dragging barefoot equipment on the ssb.

To pave the pugs for two marching kolopn, it was necessary to cut up to 1000 dersviers pas | km. Naturally, it was not possible to organize a normal supply of food along such KIM "paths". They did not organize it, and "our units ... enduring hardships, went forward and saved themselves with seven supplies, which we managed to recapture from the enemy." But there were very few enemies in this wilderness, and supplies too. This unparalleled march had a deep operational-tactical justification, it "... in the event of a failure in the Central direction, it ensured the general success of a breakthrough (!?), Leading large forces (?) To the deep rear of the Nazi defensive zone."

On the left wing, the 334th division of General N.M. Mi puppies of the 21st Infantry Brigade got involved in protracted battles and fell far behind. In addition, the Germans continuously attacked them in the flank from the Selizharovo area. Ersmsn Co. also acknowledges that "objective difficulties in

51

The actions in this area were aggravated by the fact that the command of the division could not abandon the desire to take strong points head-on without thorough reconnaissance and proper organization of the battle. Even more to the left, the 22nd Army of the Donkey fought with the enemy's Selizharov grouping. The 4th shock moved 70 km and pulled ahead, allocating more and more to the provision of its flanks - the 358th rifle division was brought into battle from the commander's reserve.

The next target was Toropets, the City, where the second large supply base of Army Group North was located, was defended by units of the 253rd Infantry Division, by the left gendarmerie and police, by the Anti-Taik Defense Regiment (PTO) - in total about 2500 people. Yeisral Tarasov received a special order: to lead his regiments through the forests and approach the city secretly, in order to break into the region of the freight station, seize the food warehouses and hold them at any cost. As Yeremsiko writes: "For us at that time, food was the first sisinos anachenis. Spab zhenis on the North-West Froit was organized but bad. Under these conditions, the opportunity to get food ... was just a treasure for the army. And we have not let this treasure out of our hands." Eremenko led his hungry army to Toropets, just like General Bonaparte his ragged men to blooming Italy.

On the morning of January 20, units of the 249th infantry division, unexpectedly for the enemy, broke into the city, and its 917th regiment by 14 o'clock captured the goods station, depot and warehouses.

the regiment gave up! However, it was not possible to take the city on the move. The troops of the 4th shock regrouped forces. The 48th and 39th rifle brigades approached from the rear. The 360th rifle division finally appeared: having covered 135 km in 12 days, it left the forests and the swamp with heavy losses at a technical peak, almost without artillery

52

and ammunition and took up positions northwest of Toropets. At the same time, a special detachment of skiers was sent to capture the Staraya Toropa stem station in order to cut the Velikis Luki-Toropets railway and intercept the enemy's retreat to the southwest and south

January 21, after 2-deep battles, Toropets was liberated. As trophies, the Soviet troops got 720 vehicles (the army headquarters was equipped with German motorcycles and all-terrain vehicles), 450 thousand shells, large warehouses of fuel and lubricants, up to 40 food warehouses. Eremenko repeatedly points out that the latter circumstance was "the most important" for the Soviet troops: "We turned these food warehouses into our army warehouses. The army fed on their supplies for a month ... The only thing that saved us was the fact that we seized large food and other warehouses of the enemy and spent them in a businesslike way ... It can be said directly that the material support of the army, especially food, and partly but fuel, and even ammunition, was produced at the expense of the enemy.

The 334th division of Colonel Mishchenko fought in this stubborn battle on the outskirts of the village and the railway station of Nelidovo, the incentive for its fighters was the intelligence report about the discovery of food trucks at the station.

Near Toropets, for the first time, camp aviation was quite active: on January 20, during a reconnaissance before the assault, Gesmeral Eremenko received a bullet here from a German pilot, which broke the shin of his right leg. The commander had to be sent to the command post. He refused to go to the hospital and continued to manage the troops from a stretcher, about which he modestly tells: "For 23 days, i.e. Until the task set by the Headquarters was completed, I had to command the troops from a stretcher, with my leg broken and put in plaster. These 23 days cost, on

53

sure, a few years of life. In addition to physical suffering, I also experienced a lot morally, first of all -

because, because of his immobility, he could not have been in the troops ("couldn't punch the commanders of the formations in the face"? - Auth) ... However, I must say that these hardships and experiences broke my will, I strove firmly and confidently lead the troops."

By January 21, the 4th shock army advanced 140-150 km in the direction of the main attack and occupied the Staraya Toropa-Zapadnaya Dvina line, cutting the Velikie Luki-Rzhev railway, which was an important communication line of the Rzhev and Olenin groupings about

tivnik.

Thus, during the 2-year battles, the troops of the left wing of the North-Western Front, having penetrated deeply into the Ismets defense at the junction of Army Groups "Sver" and "Center", paralyzed the operational interaction between them and bypassed the Rzhev-Vyazma from the west grouping.

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Due to the fact that the front of Guard Kurochka was attacking in two divergent directions, and the southern strike force was solving tasks common with the Kalpi Front, on January 22, the Headquarters transferred both shock armies to the command of Guard Konev. The new leader demanded a more energetic offensive in order to go deep into the rear and cut the communications of Army Group Center, prevent Kluge's troops from retreating to the rear defensive lines and create conditions for the destruction of the entire German grouping. The task of the 3rd shock army actually remained the same - to take Kholm, take control of Velikie Luki and advance to Vitebsk. The right flank units of the Armed Forces also fought for Votolino and Molvotitsy.

During the third decade, the formations of General Purkasva advanced in the South-West direction by another

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120 km and by January 30 they approached Velikiye Luki, defeating the 323rd Infantry Regiment of the 218th Division along the way. However, in the future, the 257th Infantry Division of Colonel A.A. Dyakonova and the 31st Rifle Brigade ran into fierce resistance against Nick. The Germans had a fresh 83rd infantry division, units of the 403rd security division and several separate units under the general command of the headquarters of the 59th army corps in the Velikiye Luki area. In early February, the 330th and 205th infantry divisions were additionally transferred here , And

Having suffered significant losses, the troops of the left flank

hectares of the 3rd shock army stopped and in the first days of February went over to the defensive.

The 33rd Infantry Division fought for Kholm for ten days. On January 23, the 146th tank battalion arrived to help her, which had in its composition the internal combustion engine of the "trid-four" and 1] T-50 tanks, as well as 3 RS installations. The division, despite the lack of ammunition and significant losses in men, continued to storm the eastern part of the Hill and at the same time repulsed the attacks of the 3860 regiment of the ka2] 8th German infantry division, which was eager to help the garrison. On January 27, the Germans bypassed the city from the north and recaptured the western part. Their further movement was stopped only on January 31, 10-15 km south-west of Kholm, with the help of the 45th Rifle Brigade, which approached from the second echelon. By this time, Makariev's division, due to significant losses, was not in a position to carry out active military actions: 200-300 people remained in the regiments. Therefore, on February 1, the Sopet troops went on the defensive in the Kholmsk direction. b

By this time, Purkaev's army had stretched out along the front for more than 200 km and had exhausted its advances.

telny opportunities.

The 4th shock was to advance in the general direction towards Velizh and Rudia,

The offensive continued without any pause. Di

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Visions were able to make up for the losses incurred, rear communications were greatly stretched. This, together with the lack of transport, by road and continuing with snowfalls, had a very negative effect on the escape of the troops. From Konev, the army received nothing but instructions.

"We had to overcome the enemy's defenses, which consisted of strong points," recalls General Khlebiikov. They covered the few roads that were still passable. With a deep snow cover, it was very difficult to get around such a stronghold with any significant forces, since the artillery immediately got stuck in snowdrifts, and the units that made the round were deprived of regular supplies and practically turned into light raids of a high group. Of course, such forces, deprived of artillery support, with a limited supply of food, fodder and ammunition, rarely succeeded in carrying out a serious military task. That is why, having thwarted the offensive, we were forced to get involved in battles for strong points, wasting time and effort to knock out these traffic jams that prevented us from moving along the roads. -

The commanders of the Soviet units fought stubbornly for individual villages, not because all the opi were completely ignoramuses in the military affairs. In the cold of winter, the settlements, in the words of Eremenko, had an "attractive power." After spending two weeks sleeping (not counting the "training sessions") in a shed or "insulated" huts, the troops wanted to get at least a short respite, at least some kind of human rest. At the same time, the opi hoped that they would succeed in hitting it right off the bat. When this did not work out, they got involved in protracted battles. As a result, the assault on the village of Ilyino took two days, Crosses - three. This allowed the German command to gain time, redeploy reserves, and strongly fortify Velizh. Fierce and prolonged battles ensued under this city.

56

On the left flank of the army, the 334th division of Colonel Mishchenko on the morning of January 25, with the assistance of partisans, captured Nelidovo. The 332nd Rifle Division, having blockaded the city of Demilov, advanced into the Rudia region, but it failed to take this settlement and cut off the Smolensk-Vitebsk railway.

The main role in the attack on Velizh and Rudnya was played by the 360th and 358th Rifle Divisions, General Tarasov's division, having bypassed Velizh on January 29, and then Surazh, broke far ahead and on February 3 reached the approaches to Vitebsk. To avoid bombardments by enemy aircraft, the division advanced at night. Ten 45-mm cannons and eight 82-mm mortars were carried on specially adapted sledges. These means limited the fire support of rifle regiments. All regimental and divisional artillery, as well as the 141st tank battalion, remained far behind, stuck on snow-covered roads.

The lack of artillery and tanks prevented the successful completion of the daring attack. On the outskirts of Vitebsk, Teterki sat down, two enemy infantry divisions with all their artillery launched a series of fierce counterattacks. General Tarasov had no connection with the headquarters of the 4th shock army, so he decided to retreat. The 249th Rifle Division, which had 1,400 infantry left, withdrew to Velizh, where it joined in the battles waged by the main forces of the army for this city.

In the early days of December, having reached the line of Usvyaty, Velizh, Demidov, the 4th shock army could not advance further, although the total number of German troops here was estimated at no more than 7000 people. despite the inconsistent

military attempts. The army traveled more than 250 km along the roads and the offensive, the units needed rest and replenishment. Due to snow drifts and lack of fuel

57

Tanks, heavy artillery and tons of warehouses remained far behind the lines. Neighbors on the right and left were 100 km behind. Heavy losses were in equipment, mainly due to breakdowns on the road. There were also no reserves. Therefore, all the efforts of the troops did not give any tangible results.

Against the 3rd and 4th shock armies, the Nazis advanced four additional fresh infantry divisions, which arrived from Western Europe, and at the beginning of February stopped the advance of the Russians. Stretching along a front of about 300 km, the Soviet troops were able to overcome the increased resistance of the enemy and went over to the defensive at the lines reached. The battles for Kholm and Vsliz were systematically resumed until the end of May, each time without success.

In the course of the Toropetsk-Kholm operation, the interaction between the army groups "North" and "Center" was disrupted, the troops of the shock armies stuck to a depth of up to 250 km, liberated from the occupiers an area of more than 12 thousand km * with a large number of exiled points, at the same time, interrupting a number of communications, creating a threat to railway lines and roads important for the enemy to the areas of Vitebsk, Orsha, Smolensk and the rear of his Gzhatsk-Vyazma grouping.

It can be said that, on the whole, the troops of Purkaev and Ereimeiko completed the assigned tasks. In addition, in the light of further events, this operation can be recognized as one of the most successful offensives of the Red Army in the first half of 1942. The losses of the general shock armies turned out to be relatively small and on February 6 amounted to about 80 thousand people. However, the breakthrough, accomplished at a great distance from the Vyazma region, where the main events took place, could not decisively influence the operational-strategic situation in the center of the Soviet-German front.

UNDER RZHEV AND VYAZMA

In the zones of the Kalinin and Western fronts between Selizharovo and Zhizdra, on the German side, 10 army corps (23rd, 6th, 27.5th, 9.7th, 20th, 12th, 13th and 43rd) and 5 motorized corps (41, 56.46, 57 and 40th) with a total of 38 infantry, 2 security, 9 sneaker and 5 motorized divisions, included

who were part of the 9th and 4th field, 3rd and 4th tank armies. Of the reserves in this direction, upon Kluge, there were corps units of the 9th Army Corps in the Mozhaisk region; The 339th and 208th Infantry Divisions, being transferred to the Vyazma region, and units of the 216th Infantry Division northeast of Spas-Demeisk. Total: 57 calculated divisions and approximately 440 tanks. On average, one division accounted for 10 km of the front.

German aviation in the Western direction was represented by the Vostok task force, which numbered 615 combat aircraft, including 236 bombers, 284 destroyers and 95 reconnaissance aircraft.
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The Kalinin Front included the 22nd, 39th, 29th, 31st and 30th armies, as well as the 11th cavalry corps - 32 riflemen and 5 cavalry divisions, 4 tank brigades, 12 arg regiments of the RGK - 346,100 people.

Froie was commanded by General Colonel I.S. Konev, a former non-commissioned officer of the tsarist army and commissar of the civil war, who grew up in Soviet times into a major commander. A man of great personal courage, according to the testimony of his colleagues, "he, frankly, did not know how to engage in diplomacy." In relation to subordinates, this was expressed in the imposition in the literal sense of the word with cane discipline. That is, Konev had a special stick with which he beat the guilty, "When I told him about this," recalled Marshal A.E. Yulovanov, - he replied: "Yes, I'm better

59

"I'll beat him in the face, then give him to the tribunal, and then they'll shoot him!"

Another review: "Konev himself was, of course, an ode to the Russian military, you can take this away from him, although those people who served as his beginning claimed that he was sorry for the people, when he took out the money, he went to any sacrifice. Krut has been a bit..."

The structure of the Western Front, occupying a strip of 60 more than 500 km, included the 1st shock, 20th, 16th, 5th, 38th, 43rd, 49th, 50th and 10th armies, the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps - a total of 45 rifle, 12 cavalry, 1 'gank division, 26 rifle, 2 airborne and 14 tank brigades - 713100 fighters and commanders.

At the head of the front was the "greatest" Soviet commander-nugget with a 2-class education, General of the Army of the Civil Code. Zhukov, fast by himself and

Numerous writers and directors, Unlike the humanist Konev, orgies Kongsaitinovi with a blinking eye, could punch in the face, and send to the tribunal, or even order to organize executions on the spot. Even the "pugnacious general" Eremenko considered Zhukov "a usurper and a rude man" (!): "He is a stern and non-Dalian man, a careerist of the highest brand ..." The famous pilot of the GF. Baidukov eye characterized Zhukov in one word - "beast". From examples of Zhukovsky's tyranny, the desire to crush and downgrade the inferior, one can compose a book that is smaller in volume than the canonized Memoirs and Reflections. Perhaps, for someone, all this is a confirmation of his leadership talents, although I have intellectual abilities (morality is not worth mentioning, morality was canceled in 1917 - this is one of the "October overthrows") of a person who has absolute power over lives hundreds of thousands of people and at the same time descending to primitive assault, raise doubts. And in 1945, the marshal's "talent" as a hoarder also erupted.

60

To match the commander of the Western Front was the Deputy General G.F. Zakharov - "... a warrior devoted to the Soviet state and the Communist Party, but very restrained in hand." ISM was mentioned in his memoirs by General P.A. Belov: "Heisral Zakharov arrived with an order to encourage the pass to complete the task as soon as possible. His presence created a nervous atmosphere. He generously lavished threats, resorted to the most drastic measures... One of the first to catch Zakharov's eye was Major Cononcico (Chief of Intelligence. - Auth.)). For no reason at all, the general accused the government that the corps did not have good roads for motor vehicles. Kononenko, as they say, elvaupss yogi and went into the gap together with General Oslikovsky. In general, the commanders tried to avoid meetings with Zakharov.

As you can see, their labourers were worse than the Germans. It was not for nothing that Steely once expressed himself in the sense that a pass needs more courage to retreat than to go on the offensive.

WZ+

Soviet military leaders complain that the manpower of units and formations was insufficient to carry out a new offensive operation. The average strength of the rifle divisions of the Kalinin and Western fronts during the Puett Goth period fluctuated between 3,000 and 5,000 men. However, the number of divisions themselves has increased, and the personnel in them are 50%

consisted of new cities. So, by the beginning of the offensive near Moscow, Konev and Zhukov had 94 | thousands of commanders and Red Army soldiers (The classification was removed, M .. 1993. P. 174), the losses for the month of the bosv amounted to 371 thousand killed and wounded. However, as of January 8, 1,060,000 people were in service, and according to the History of the Second World War, even more - 1,245,000.

It was more difficult to make up for losses in equipment: there were only 8,700 guns and mortars and 571 sneakers. Nasto

61

The next problem was the almost complete disorganization of the work of the rear. During the month of the counter-offensive, communications were badly messed up, there was a shortage of vehicles, the Pemtsy, during the retreat, blew up bridges and disabled railway wheels, suitable for the movement of the road could be counted on the fingers. As a result, the troops experienced a sharp shortage of ammunition, food and fuel.

Air Force two front! It pa | January had 331 serviceable aircraft, including 218 bombers, 18 gunships and 95 destroyers. In addition, the aviation of the Moscow Military District and the 6th air defense fighter aviation corps, the aviation of the five groups of the generals I.F., Petrovai E.M. operated in the Western direction. Nikolaenko, formations of long-range bomber aviation of the High Command, as well as aviation of the reserve of the Headquarters of the VEK - a total of 1375 combat-ready aircraft. If we take into account the aviation of the North-Western Front - 1422 aircraft,

Ego, it turns out, is much less than 615 German cars! A curious bookkeeping, in order to prove the German superiority of the prims, was carried out by a team of historians-historians under the leadership of Marshal V.D. the number of fighter aircraft (in particular, planes of the 6th Air Defense Fighter Corps of Moscow) to cover the Loysk quickly dwindled. Therefore, in the future, the fronts could generally rely only on their own air forces. These forces, especially in terms of fighters, were very small and inferior quantitatively and qualitatively to the enemy ... If we subtract 320 Moscow air defense fighters and 548 non-combat vehicles from the total number of 1422 aircraft, then only 554 combat slips remained to support the fronts. Thus, the enemy, even in number

62

aircraft surpassed the aviation of the North-Western, Kalipisky and Western fronts (!!!) ”.

So, “formally” there were more of our aircraft, and “informally” - 284 Ismet fighters “outnumbered” 548 Soviet ones.

Straino only that all the combat aviation of the Vostok group is compared with serviceable Soviet aircraft; Dalss, Soviet U-2 bombers (who were awarded the Iron Cross for shooting down, which we were very proud of) and R-5 reconnaissance aircraft are considered "non-powered vehicles", and 95 German air reconnaissance aircraft are considered to be "combatants". In addition, in all calculations, army aviation is completely taken into account, according to the principle: the Germans had the EU, which means they had nothing to compare it with. And in the meantime, each Soviet commissar had its own air regiments, which they set tasks for.

According to the regulations, the commander of the front had the right to use the aviation of the combined arms armies in the inters froit. Army appellation in terms of the number of vehicles often exceeded front-line soldiers. For example, on January 1, 1942, the Air Force of the North-Western Front counted 77 serviceable planes, and in the 4th strike alone of the army of the same front there were 60 vehicles (including 38 fighters), of which 53 were serviceable.

In general, our scientists successfully proved that “taking into account the same qualitative superiority of the material part of the German aircraft and the fact that Soviet bombers of obsolete types could only perform combat missions in some ways (by the way, imsinio adopting Soviet experience, the Germans belatedly created in this time their night aviation. - Auth.), the general superiority of the enemy became even more impressive, in fact, the enemy outnumbered our aviation by about two times (our italics. - Aet.) ”. Indeed, in order to master such "higher mathematics", pado

53

be sure to be a general and a candidate of science, pickak not less.

But the overwhelming quantitative superiority over the armies of Kluge really was, which reduced the chances of success for the “red marshals” who did not master the “axioms” of military art (Marshal Rokossovsky also repeatedly mentions the axioms that were “not respected”).

and**

The offensive of the troops of the Kalinin front began on January 8, 1942. The plan of the operation he was carrying out was to break through the defenses against the nickname with a blow from the 39th army of Lieutenant General I.I. Maslennikov west of Rzhev, and then, building on the success of the main grouping of the front in the direction of Sychevka, Vyazma, to defeat the enemy of the main communications, and then defeat him together with the troops of the Western Front. The 22nd Army under the command of Major General V.I. Vostrukhov, advancing on Bely, Yartsevo, was supposed to provide the main grouping of front from the west.

On the very first day, the 39th Army (361st, 373rd, 455th, 381st, 183rd and 357th rifle divisions, 46th and 54th cavalry divisions, 148th and 165th separate tank battalions, 3 battalions of RS, three artillery regiment of the RGC) broke through the enemy defenses west of Rzhev on a 15 km section and, encountering more resistance, rushed south, to Kosuge and Sychevka. Odiako Neighbors of Heperal Masleini

kova while stomping on the spot.

On the right, the 22nd Army (179th, 186th, and 178th Rifle Divisions) practically did not advance a single step in a week. Only on January 15, in connection with the withdrawal of the 253rd and 102nd Infantry Divisions, caused by the successful offensive of Eremenko, did the troops of gsisral Vostrukhov capture Selizharovo and part of the forces crossed the Volga. 29th Army General Major V.I. Shvetsov, which included 220, 369, 252, 243, 246 and 174th

61

rifle divisions, the 143rd and 159th tank battalions, 2 battalions of guards mortars and 4 artillery regiments of the RGK advancing from the north on Rzhev, failed to knock down part of the 6th army corps from the positions.

Things were no better on the left wing of the Kalinin Front. 31st Army Gsial Major V.A. Yushkevicha, consisting of the 247th, 359th, 262nd, 119th, 5th and 250th rifle divisions, fought the enemy's 161st and 162nd infantry divisions at their starting positions. 30th Army Major General D.D. Lelyushenko (363rd, 348th, 379th, 371st and 365th rifle divisions) could not overcome the stubborn resistance of the 36th motorized and 251st infantry divisions.

In order to eliminate the threat of a strike on the flank of the front grouping, with a strike on Sychevka, the Headquarters demanded that at all costs, no later than January 12, take Rzhev, attracting the troops of the 29th and part of the forces of the 33rd armies, Kopsv decided, using the success of the general Maslennikovo-

va, regroup Shvetsov's army in the breakthrough zone and capture the city with blows from the west and ss from the vero-west. But all the attacks of nine Soviet divisions were repelled by the enemy's defenses.

At the same time, on January 11-12, the 11th Cavalry Corps was introduced into the breakthrough under the command of Colonel Sokolov. The sgo included the 18th, 24th, 82nd cavalry and 2nd guards motorized rifle divisions. The task of the corps was to, having reached the area to the west of Sychevka, cut off the enemy's escape route. In the future, the horsemen had to cut the Moscow-Minsk highway west of Vyazma.

Thus, in the first period of the offensive of Konev's army. achieved success only in the direction of the main attack. But even this success was limited. Although by January 15 the troops of the 39th Army had reached the approaches to Sychevka in five divisions, they were unable to capture the city. The Rzhev-Sychevka-Vyazma railway remained in the hands of the enemy. The Germans transferred here an additional 1st Panzer Division from the Lato area

3rd Goy 1942 - sound 65

shino and parts of the 208th infantry division from the reserve. Maslennikov's troops were pinned down by battles and suffered heavy losses. The rear of the army, based on a single dirt road, lagged behind; the Red Army went over to "self-sufficiency" on the territory already thoroughly plundered by the occupiers. The exit to paradise, southwest of Sychevka, did not change anything for Sokolov's cavalry corps. Therefore, the front command was forced to detain the cavalry on the right flank of the 39th Army for almost a week until the final clarification of the situation.

On January 16, Hitler, under the pretext of illness, removed General Strauss from command of the 9th Regimental Army and appointed to his place the staunch National Socialist, 50th Panzer Guard Walter Maudsl.

On January 19, Neral Konev, having received the directive from Sgavka, specified the tasks for his armies: the 22nd - to secure the right flank of the front and reach Bely; 29th - paid for by Rzhev; 39th Army - to continue destroying the enemy in the Osuga, Sychevka area, and allowing him to break through to the west and the svro-west; 1st cavornus - to cut the communications west of Vyazma; 31st Army - advance on the left flank on Zubtsov. Psredavav shissya in submission to the Kalinin Front, the 3rd and 4th shock armies were to develop an offensive on Vslizh and Vslizie Luki.

By 22 January, the 39th Army advanced 80-90 km, reaching the rear of the 9th Ismet Army, and the troops of the Swedish

You deeply engulfed the Allspip grouping from the northwest. The troops of the right wing of the front had deeply engulfed Army Group Center from the northwest and penetrated all the way to the deep rear, on the approaches to Vitebsk, Smolsk and Yartsevo.

However, the resistance of the enemy RSEKO intensified. The army of Gsialal Vostrukhov waged fierce battles for the city of Bely. The 33rd Army was stopped. Sokolov's cavalry corps broke through to Vyazma from the north and on 26 January

66

cut the Iosean road Vyazma-Smolsk, but could not take possession of the gol. Strong pressure was experienced by the 29th Army, which cut off the Olsna grouping from the main forces of Molisl. Failed to overcome the German defenses and the armies of the left wing of the Kalinian Front, advancing on Rzhev from the north and northeast, Konsov, alarmed by the strengthening of the flanks at the base of the breakthrough as early as January 21, decided to regroup the 30th Army from the left wing of the front into the action zone the bloodless army of Shastsov, these measures were belated.

On January 22 at 10 a.m., 2 regiments of the enemy's 6th Army Corps, supported by aviation, went on the offensive from Rzhev along the Volga and occupied Nozhki cho. Odiovremeino, the 256th Infantry Division and the SS Cavalry Brigade, with a counterattack from Trushkovo, pushed back units of the 178th Infantry Division of the 22nd Army onto the northern bank of the river. The next day, the Germans closed the front along the southern Bersgurski, reestablishing communication between the 23rd and 6th Army Corps, and began to expand the corridor between the Volga and the Rzhev-Vslikie Luki railway. The troops of the Kalinian Front were divided into two groups: the 22nd, 30th, 31st and part of the forces of the 29th Army remained on the northern bersg of the Volga and the northern approaches to Krzhev; The 39th Army, the main forces of 29% and the 11th Cavalry Corps are southwest and south of Rzhev, between Chertolino and Sychevka.

Eperal Lelyushenko, who arrived in this area by the end of January 23 with the command of the 30th Army and two rifle divisions, was ordered to take command of the two remaining divisions of the 29th Army and restore the situation west of Rzhev. The main forces of Shvetsov were to attack towards him in the northern direction. But the enemy managed to gain a foothold in the captured positions and fiercely defended them.

The 39th Army, stretched along a 60 km front to the east along the railway, just as unsuccessfully

67

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However, the resistance of the enemy increased rapidly. The army of gsisral Vostrukhov waged fierce battles for the city of Bely. The 33rd Army was stopped. Sokolov's cavalry corps broke through to Vyazms from the north and on 26 January

66

cut the Vyazma-Smolensk highway, but could not capture the city, The 29th Army experienced strong pressure, cutting off the Olsniy group from the main forces of the Model, The armies of the left wing of the Kalipipsky Front, advancing on Rzhev from the sper and the northeast, failed to overcome the German defenses . Kopsv, worried about the strengthening of the flags at the base of the breakthrough, as early as January 2] made a decision to regroup the 30th Army from the left wing of the front into the zone of operations of Shstsov's bled army, but these

measures are late.

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The 39th Army, stretching for 60 km with a front to the east along the railway, just as unsuccessfully attacked

57

rushed to take Osugui Sychevka - the Germans managed to transfer here the 1st and 2nd tank divisions, the SS division

"Reich" and other parts. As a result, the troops of Hepsralus Mas

Lepnikova were themselves sent out to cross the coborope.

Sokolov's corps also went over to the defense of the svero-za

below Vyazma.

By the end of January, it became clear that the troops of the Kalinin Front were destined to fully assure the encirclement of the Sevsr of the Gzhatsk-Vyazma grouping of the enemy. Their actions began to take on a positional character; The most important points of passage - Rzhev, Osuga, Sychevka, Zubtsovo, Pogoreloye Gorodishche - and the main communications of the Zeitr large army remained in the hands of the Ismians. Soslinenii, 4 who were in the rear of the opposite peak, used to communicate with the main forces a narrow gap between the cities of Bely and Nelidono.

Ms. "

The Western front had the task of attacking the middle of Yaiva, carrying the main blow in the direction of Vyazma, to destroy the Yukhnov-Mozhaisk German grouping in order to achieve the common goal of defeating the main forces of the Tsigr army group in cooperation with the Koisva troops. Actually, Zhukov's armies without any interruption, they continued the offensive, which started on December 5, 1941.

Simultaneously with deep enveloping strikes on the flanks, the Soviet command made an attempt to cut through the encircled enemy grouping by striking the right wing of the Western front from the line of the Lama and Ruza rivers. The decisive role here was assigned to the 20th Army under the command of the hero of the Moscow battle, you Gepsral A.A. Vlasov (in any case, an official hero, although the general Sapdalov claims that there was no commander during this period, healing peto

cold, peto gonorrhea).

68

The 20th Army included the 331st and 352nd High Rifle Divisions, the 28th, 35th and 64th Rifle Brigades, the 134th and 135th Separate Tank Battalions, as well as the opsrativnye groups of Generals M.E. Katukova and F.1: Remi Zova - 1st Guards. 17th and 145th tank, 40th rifle brigades. 44th Cavalry Division, 89th Tank Battalion. By the beginning of the offensive, the army was reinforced with four rifle brigades and a cavalry division taken from the neighboring 1st shock and 16th armies, five artillery regiments of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and two divisions of the RS. In addition, to build on the success of the army, the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps, gsisral-major I.A., was attached. Plisva with the 22nd Tank Brigade and five ski battalions,

Before the new operation, Vlasov issued an order summarizing the results of the first month of fighting. It follows from it that the army in a good way would have been thrown into the hole, and sent in full force to the nearest training camp:

"Observation and verification of the organization of the battle by the commanders of the divisions and units show that the commanders of the NSSH stspensy poorly organize the battle, sometimes limiting themselves only to issuing a strong order. This can explain that for several days the troops of the army fought on the previously lost lines, we have little success on the right flank,

Before an offensive, reconnaissance commanders do not coordinate interactions on the ground with other branches of the military, as a result of which units and formations act blindly. The infantry knows the tasks of the artillery, the artillery does not know where the infantry is operating. As a rule, infantry commanders (company and battalion commanders) do not give requests for artillery. Military sappers for reconnaissance of the front line are not used ...

In the course of a battle, commanders of units and formations do not study the situation sufficiently, therefore, as a rule, they do not know what is happening on the battlefield. As a result, the commanders of companies and batteries are presented to themselves.

69

Vayu orders:

1. When organizing an offensive, the commanders of the 0-sdiisny and units conduct personal commander reconnaissance, determining the tasks of the offensive on the ground, establish interaction with artillery and tanks on the ground in time and ruble ...

3. Do not disperse your forces and means on a broad front, but strive to beat the enemy on a narrow front with the entire mass of artillery fire, mortars and manpower. To strive to bypass the fortified settlements of the enemy - in no case should they hit in the forehead. and hit where he does not expect.

6. Commanders of all stances to continuously monitor the situation in battle and, if necessary, respond to the stance immediately ... "

With these fears, the 20th Army was to advance on Shakhovskaya on a narrow 20-kilometer front. The immediate area of the breakthrough did not exceed 8 km. Here the shock fist was concentrated as part of the groups of Remizov, Katukov and the 352nd Infantry Division of Colonel Yu.M. Prokofiev. In the second echelon were the 56th and 64th rifle brigades. In total, 70% of infantry, 87% of artillery and 100% of tanks were assembled here. In the decisive sector, 296 guns and 312 mortars were involved in the "artillery offensive", a density of 76 guns and [2.5 tanks per] km of front was achieved and a 2-3-fold superiority over the enemy was created. The Pli-sva cavalry corps was planned to be put into action on the second day with the task of moving to Rzhatsk.

An auxiliary attack by five rifle brigades was carried out by the 1st shock army of lieutenant general tenant V.I. Kuznetsova.

The Germans held the Lamsky defensive ru-

escaped by the forces of the 5th and 6th Panzer, 86th and 106th Infantry Divisions.

By January 9, the Soviet troops did not have time to complete their concentration, and the offensive had to be postponed. Ut

70

On January 10, the weather deteriorated, snow began to fall, and aviation was able to operate. The half-hour artillery preparation turned out to be ineffective. At 10.30, the strike groups of the 20th Army went on the attack across the virgin snow. The Germans were already waiting for them, the intensive preparation of the Russian side in the previous days did not pass by their attention. In their bloody battles, the units advanced only 8-3 km in a day. Proi: why is this even more because the shock groups of the army immediately set to work! 'to rush heavily fortified points in the forehead, instead of bypassing them and thundering on to advance. dalyns, leaving many! pemetskis garrisons for the second echelon: ac. Remizov's group "won" the village of Zakharino, and Prokofiev's division - the village of Timonipo,

During the second day of the operation and during the first half of January 12, the shock groups of the 20th Army covered another 3 km in this way. At the same pace, the left-wing units of the 1st shock moved forward. General Vlasov wanted to bring the cavalry corps into battle, but Zhukov forbade this until the enemy's defenses had been breached to the entire depth. Corps Pliev Sutra 13 yaya cooking still had to be thrown into battle, but this did not change much. The troops continued to only slowly play through the defenses, moving forward at a speed of 3-4 km at a time. Moreover, the cavalry and tanks moved to the level of the infantry. To the left of the shock group, the 331st Rifle Division of Major General F.P. went on the offensive. The king, and then all the troops of the army.

To the south, on January 14, the 16th Army of General Lieutenant K.K. began to advance. Rokossovsky, and then the 5th Army of Lieutenant General L.A. Govorova. The next day, the front commander ordered General Vlasov not to delay the cavalry corps near Shakhovskaya, but to turn it to the south to re-target the pas. Serslu Tzhatsk "to intercept the retreat of the Mozhaisk grouping."

Indeed, fearing that having formed in both

Since the gaps will lead to a deep breakthrough of the Soviet armies in the Vyazemsky direction and the complete collapse of the front of the Army Group Center, Field Marshal Kluge asked for permission to withdraw his troops to the rear line. Hitler was forced to give this

In a directive dated January 15, he stated: "I authorize the commander of Army Group Center, on the basis of his request, to withdraw the troops of the 4th Army, the 4th and 3rd Panzer Armies to the line east of Yukhpov, Gzhatsk, Zubtsov, Rzhev Severis. The decisive factor for the passage of the front line is the requirement that the Yukhnov-Pzhkatsk-Zubtsov-Rzhev highway serve as a road communication and be protected from enemy influence. On the upper line, the enemy's advance must be stopped ... In this war, for the first time, I had to give an order to withdraw troops on a relatively large sector of the front. I hope that this withdrawal will take place in a decent non-German army form. The feeling of superiority over the enemy and the fanatical will to cause him maximum damage must prevail in the German troops during the withdrawal.

The withdrawal of troops to a higher position made it possible to reduce the distance by 100 km and free up forces to eliminate Russian breakthroughs. To facilitate Kluge's administration, the 2nd Field Army was placed under the command of Army Group South.

In accordance with the directive of the Fuhrer, under the threat of a flank attack from Volokolamska, as well as under the influence of the offensive of the 5th army of Gyuovorov along the Moscow-Minsk highway, parts of the 4th, and then the 3rd tank armies, began a general withdrawal to the Gzhatsky defensive frontier. On January 16, Soviet troops liberated Lotoshino, on January 17 - Shakhovskaya, on January 20 - Mozhaik.

At the same time, the 2nd Guards Cap Corps, after a two-distance assault, took Sereda. On this and finished

72

the path of the "mobile" group, which was turned into an assault group: the warriors never made it to Gzhatsk. General Pliev recalls:

"The corps broke away from the infantry and successfully developed the offensive. Patrols sent ahead reported that Sereda was occupied by large enemy forces. On its outskirts and on the western bank of the Ruza, there is a well-prepared defense system. In front of the settlement, north to south, there is a wide strip of open country with a large thickness of snow. All this space was a zone of continuous barrage fire. The decision to bypass this stronghold and continue the rapid movement to [Zhatsk] naturally suggested itself. The army command ordered not to waste time (?) on a detour and to take Sereda with an attack from the front (our cursive. - Aat.). Frontal attack

a strong point through an open, rushed space during the day, which is white in advance preparation, reduced our advantages to a bullet and could lead to a protracted battle with heavy losses. But an order is an order."

As a result, 3 cavalry divisions, "having spent the best" of the namansvry, fought for another day for two days and took it, BUT "... our losses due to the frontal attack of the enemy were very large." What is it now

Gkatsk!

In addition, on January 20, on the orders of Stalin, who believed that the Germans were plowed at their "last breath", the 1st Shock Army was withdrawn to the reserve and the offensive zone of the 20th Army was doubled. The withdrawal of the whole army from the battle at such a crucial moment was an undoubted mistake of the Supreme High Command, which assessed the situation at the front too optimistically.

, On January 21, to repel the counterattack of the 2nd Panzer Army on the Suhpicheskoy direction, the command and separate formations of the 16th Army were transferred,

KE]

The offensive of the right wing of the Western Front, which had robbed the strike force, gradually died out. On January 17, the Soviet troops reached the new prepared German positions on the Lipiy Pogorelos forest site - Durykino - Shansky Zavod and stopped. In two pushes they advanced 40-50 km. enemy's tesia with bloody frontal attacks, and ran out of steam. An attempt to break through the defenses prepared by only two armies was successful. Although there were only about 50 km to Sychevka in a straight line. it was not possible to overcome these kilometers and connect with Konev's troops.

LJ

At first, the offensive of the troops of the left wing of the Western Front developed successfully - the 48th, 49th, 50th, 10th armies and the Gsiral group P.A. Belov, who fired a blow from the southeast. Their tasks) included defeating the Yukhnov-Medyn grouping of the enemy, capturing the Vyazma-Bryansk railway in the Kirov, Lyudinovo district, and then advancing in the general direction towards Vyazma. Here, at the beginning of January, as a result of a successful counterattack by the Soviet troops between the flags of the 4th field and 2nd tank armies of the German armies at Yukhnov, Belev, an operational breakthrough was created and gradually expanded, where there was no longer a solid front.

The main efforts of the 43rd Army, Major General K.D. Yulubsva - the 17th, 58th, 415th rifle divisions, the 26th tank and 5th airborne brigades - after capturing Maloyaroslavets were sent to capture Medyn, an important stronghold on the Warsaw highway. Overcame the defense of the 98th Infantry Division on the Luzha river, on January 14, Soviet troops liberated the city. The capture of Medyn was a major success and created the opportunity to develop a strike on the flank of the Yukhnov enemy grouping. The Germans defended very stubbornly along the Warsaw highway. Only 29 Jan

74

while cooking, Golubev's divisions managed to capture Myatleno and reach the Izver' line. Naztom advance of the 43rd army, bogged down in protracted battles, in fact, ended: the coverage < of the north of the Yukhnov group, numbering about ten divisions, turned out to be unbearable for the carriers, the 4th army of the general-I: Itenaita I.G. Zakharkina in the 5th Guards, 60th, 133rd, 1773rd, 194th, 238th Infantry Divisions,] 9th, 26th, 30th, 34th Rifle, 18th and 23rd Tank Brigades led the offensive in tapering con) - all in the general direction for Kondropo, Yukhnov. Here it all came down to a frontal gnawing) prepared defense. As a result, from January 8 to January 31, Zakharkin's army advanced to the Varshavskoye highway, north-west of Yukhnov by 55-60 km and was forced to stop,

50th army of geieral-leitsnaite I.V. Boldin (154, 217, 258, 290, 340, 413th rifle, 31st cavalry divisions, 112th and 32nd tank brigades) attacked Yukhnov from the southeast. The offensive developed slowly, only the right flag of the Assumption army moved forward along the southern bank of the Ugra and, simultaneously with the troops of the 49th Army, slowly approached Yukhpov's syak.

The group of General Belov, which included the 1st and 2nd Guards, 57th and 75th Cavalry Divisions of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, the 239th and 325th Rifle Divisions, as well as 5 ski battalions, in early January all advanced to Yukhnov and started fighting on the southern approaches to it even before the approach of Boldin's army. About this critical moment for the German troops, the former head of the 4th field army staff, General Blumentritt, will deprive: "The intentions of the Russians are clear. They plaid a double encirclement of the 4th Army by striking north and south. Their ultimate goal was to encircle and destroy this army in its positions west of Moscow. The Russians slowly expanded the breit, between the 2nd tankop and the 4th field

75

armies. Field Marshal von Klugs did not have the reserves to eliminate the danger that had been written over the southern flank. In addition, the 4th Army was connected to the rear only by one road. It passed through Yukh pov, Medyp, Maloyaroslavets and Podolsk ... If the Russians, advancing from the south, had managed to seize our unity, a vital artery, it would have been smoked from the 4th field army ... Something like a miracle happened in the southern flank of the 4th army. It was not clear to us why the Russians, having examined their advantage in this section of the front, cut the Yukhnov-Maloyaroslavets road and did not deprive the 4th Army of the EU of the only supply route. At night, Belov's cavalry corps ... advanced in our deep rear towards Yukhnov. This corps reached a communication vital for us, but, fortunately, did not cut the ss. Op continued to move in a frantic direction and disappeared somewhere in the huge Bogoroditsky swamps.

Even according to the recognition of the German generals, the situation near Yukhnov was developing exceptionally well for the attackers. Belov's group, which had already reached the Warsaw highway, smashed all the shays, turning Medyn, to surround and destroy the main forces of the 4th field army of General Ludwig Kübler in cooperation with the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies. At that moment, Zhukov, for whom the encirclement of one enemy army was not enough, created a "miracle" for the Germans: he ordered Belov to march towards Mosalsk, and from there to Vyalmu. The 50th army of Geper la Boldia was entrusted with capturing Yukhnov.

"The Cape was forced to stop the battle, which was drawing to a close end, and turn towards Mosalsk," writes: Belov. - In the opinion of the command of the Western Front, the capture of Mosalsk should have freed our hands for the upcoming raid on Vyazma. But this additional operation delayed us for seven days. During this time, the Germans managed to close the gaps in their battle formations ... while the units

76

The 50th army approached the city, the Pemtsy managed to strengthen the defense at the expense of the troops retreating from Kaluga and Maloyaroslavets. The task, which in the first days of January our group could solve relatively easily and quickly, the 50th Army failed to complete, as time was lost but ... The opportunity to encircle and defeat the 4th field army of the Nazis was lost. The 9th field army of the Germans also escaped encirclement. Of two birds with one stone, it is possible to kill not a single one.

January 9 325th Rifle Division on its own

took possession of Mosalsk, knocking out the enemy's numerous garrison, and Belov's troops, having made a senseless detour 60 km away, again led the attack on Warsaw highway, in the area of Ludkovo, Solovsvka, while receiving an "encouraging" radiogram from the Eastern Soviet of the Front: "Lack of fuel, mated, food comes from your carelessness. You are not engaged in organizing the rear, falsely thinking (?) that this duty lies with the rear of the front. They curiously imagined in the high headquarters the organization of the supply of just the operational group of the front, directly subordinate to Zhukov, assembled or various formations and having their own rear structures. And how can General Belov, with such a formulation of the question, feed 28 thousand subordinates and 10 thousand horses?

The German command understood the importance of keeping in their hands the itosse, which was the "sleek life artery" of the 4th field army, and took all measures to strengthen numerous strongholds and nodes of resistance on the outskirts of Islamism. The defenses here were held by units of the 19th Panzer, 10th Motorized and 216th Infantry Divisions. The highway behind them made it possible to quickly maneuver reserves, German aviation, as usual, dominated the air.

From mid-January, for ten days, the troops of the Belov group fought tense and unsuccessful battles.

77

near Solovyovka and Truikovo, pasturing weakly with MSS then for a breakthrough to the north. Finally, on January 25, one of the battalions was out of the way. walking through the forest belt, managed to seize the area of lusse with a hanging blow. Belov immediately pulled up his main forces here. By the corner of January 27, the 2nd Guards and 75th Cavalry Division crossed the Varshavskoe Highway. Sugki after the transition made the remaining \$ kavdipizii. Following the koniki, a rifle division, a taik brigade, and also the rear of the high subdivision of the group were to enter the breakthrough. However, this did not succeed.

Remember P.A. Belov: "Eisral Zakharov (Zhukov's military deputy, who arrived to urge Belo Avt.) surrounded the misconception that the breakthrough would be expanded and secured, I had no reason to put my promises under commission, However, the Germans, as soon as the highway crossed the road, closed behind us swap flancy. For a whole week I sent radio messages to the commanders of the 325th Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Brigadier. Neither the infantry nor the tanks managed to break through los. Almost the same thing happened that happened with the troops of the Kaliini group ... My group

pa was cut off from the main forces. X

1 (the hierarch Zakharov turned out to be unable to restrain his general public. Yes, to say it all. It's one thing to wave a fist in front of the nose of subordinates, another thing to compete with Kluge on equal terms. divisional and anti-aircraft artillery, tanks and convoys.

In order to assist the troops of the Western Front in the hole: the German defense was adopted "about the decision to land an airborne assault force southwest of Vyazma as part of two battles of the 201st Airborne Brigade and the 250th Infantry Regiment, Rayopom dsaitirovatsiya chose the Zhelans tree in 35-40 km behind the front line. The landing was planned to take place in several:

78

pov; dropping paratroopers to capture and hold the landing site; landing of the starting team and receiving landing troops. The operation was supported by 21 PS-84 transport aircraft and several TB-3 bombers, detached from the 23rd Air Division to transport 45-mm cannons.

On 18 January, 452 paratroopers were thrown into the area of the village of Zhelanye. On the evening of the same day, 65 people of the starting team landed, and on 19 January, more than 200 paratroopers landed. During the whole of January 20, the landing site was being prepared, and in the next 3 nights, Major Soldatov's 250th Rifle Regiment was delivered to it by transport planes. In total, 1643 people were landed in the Zhelanye region, more than 100 machine guns, 90 mortars and forty-fives were deployed. After the landing, both parachute battalions under the command of Captain Surzhik on 24-27 January captured the villages of Klyuchi, Petrishchepo, Tyrnovka, in which, in general, there were Yemtsy, after which they joined with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps.

Veterans of the Airborne Forces believe that, on the whole, the detachment fulfilled its task: "captured and held the area indicated to him." However, the actions of the paratroopers caused special enthusiasm among General Belov, since his group received any real help during the breakthrough through the Varshavskoe highway:

"Mis knew that ten days ago an airborne detachment landed in the rear of Prague - two battalions of paratroopers, with a total number of more than seven hundred people. The detachment was commanded by captain I.A. Surzhik. The paratroopers were ordered to attack the palog, the Lyulkovo tree, and help our corps break through the enemy defenses. However, the detachment conducted active operations and did not provide practical assistance to us ... One of the companies

parapies have reached. Tyrpovka, where she stopped. Passing through this dersviyu, we finally met with slezaptnikami, I rented to make a halt in Tyriovks. For Surzhik were sent and skiing as many as a couple

73

chutists, and the captain quickly appeared to me. To questions about why he kept his forces far from the front, why he did not advance either on Lyudkovo or on Strelenki, Surzhik could not give an intelligible answer. I got the impression that the leader of the Parappotists is a very cautious man. not able to act persistently and show initiative.

On 30 January, Soldatov's regiment joined the cavalry. The further success of the group, according to Zhukov, depended on the speed of its actions. Therefore, he ordered Belov to move forward with available forces, not getting involved in protracted battles near the Warsaw lose. The cavalry began a forced march to Vyazma, to which it remained about 40 km.

The 10th Army (322. 323, 324. 326, 328 and I30th Rifle High Division) under the command of the former chief of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army, in good faith, in accordance with the instructions of Comrade Stalin. failed the ismetskos attack in 1941, lieutenant general F.I. Golikova was on the approaching flank of the Western Front. Ordering continuous battles during the month in winter conditions. it was off-road, the army was advancing like a fan in separate directions. Its divisions moved westward along the roads, without any elbow connection with each other, at intervals of 20-30 km or more. Guilt Yulikov here in general, and no. since the commander of the front, over the head of the commander, personally set tasks for each formation, juggling them at his own discretion

niyu.

The level of training of the troops of the 10th Army was in no way different from that of other armies, that is, it was very high. The head of the political department reported to the political department of the front:

"... The largest number of crimes was noted in parts of the 385th division due to the fault of the division commander, who criminally led the troops entrusted to him,

80

able to organize combat operations and only formations as a whole, and in separate parts, thanks to which not a single divine order was executed.

blue council of the army.

The division commander, Colonel Savits, and the vosin commissar Nesterukie organized a systematic reconnaissance of the enemy, the location of his firepower, a thorough study of the terrain and ways of approaching the enemy's location, and sometimes, in a timely manner, we receive data on the forces of the enemy, appointed blind attacks, from which the units carried large losses.

Due to the lack of commander's will and Bolshevik perseverance, high political consciousness, iron military discipline, aggressive spirit, vigor and confidence in victory over the enemy did not penetrate into the consciousness of the mass of soldiers and commanders,

Because of this, during the conduct of military operations, individuals of the commanding staff and fighters criminally did not follow orders, showed disorganization, cowardice and panic, threw down their weapons and fled from the battlefield.

And where could the fighters get the necessary skills from, even if everyone in Dalsko had mastered shooting from a rifle. Here is a summary of how combat training was carried out in the 325th Infantry Division: "... There would have been shortcomings in the process of training. Sometimes commanders teach what is not on schedule, namely: regulation of the stride step, turns to the spot, but not to the other; what you have to deal with in the war. Parts of the compound did not complete the accelerated program, the quality of training is low. Improvement is required... The lack of training and combat weapons, ammunition does not allow studying the materiel, will not give the opportunity to prepare personnel for combat... Nothing is taken from the equipment of communications and artillery .. The personnel conducts classes using home-made wooden weapons (!)".

81

Having gone through the "accelerated program" and not even mastering it, but with a "adjusted" massive step, the divisions changed wooden weapons for combat and went to the front - "to be revised". According to General M.I. Kazakov, many Soviet military commanders considered the staffing of their personnel to be a settled and advanced criterion that determines the military capability of the formations: the more people, the more powerful the division, the more significant tasks can be set. Such is determinism.

The order of the commander of the Western Front, entitled "On the use and saving of tanks" will give an idea of the order of the tank troops:

"The Froite troops will suffer heavy and justifiable losses. The reasons for the huge losses of Taiks are that tanks rush into battle without thorough and careful preparation, linking interaction on the ground with artillery, infantry and aviation due to the negligence and frivolity of Taikists and general military commanders. Tasks are set in writing - in the hut and only on the map. Time for the preparation of brigades is not allotted. Regroupings are carried out by dism, air strikes and artillery fire from the enemy

The commanders of the slipper units will engage the brigades into battle without the appropriate technical training, without the time of the terrain, without the preparation of evacuation equipment, try to solve combat missions with one slipper, without infantry. The provision of sappers, infantry and artillery support is poorly organized.

The tankers themselves, having received a task, solve it without proper art, straightforwardly and, most often, with a frontal attack. Tankers do not study hidden approaches to the enemy and dead spaces, as a result of this lack of resistance, there are many losses. In some cases, a wrecker is noted in the attitude of the taikists towards material prosperity (they break the machines! psred by the front line, they are making repairs)".

82

The artillerymen of the TNU mountains of the Western Front also distinguished themselves, having guessed to use weapons of special power to fight the opponent's slippers! The Headquarters had to send the main artillery to the Vogue: the countries of Geisral 11.- N. Voropov, in order to figure out where to go, a breakthrough of expensive rows of rows: "Huge guns were used to fight counterpike taiks, expensive shells were fired in vain) ... I visited the batteries and made sure that the general army was responsible for correcting the use of powerful artillery and artillery commanders.

Such armies, out of necessity, could be thrown into the balance at a critical moment, when the question of saving Moscow was raised, but they were not capable of crushing the "Hitler scoundrels" once and for all in 1942. May be. were cardinal measures taken to improve the quality of training of new formations? And why, if pro tse - to increase their number? Untrained, often even armed, recruits were thrown into battle without hesitation throughout the war.

The Germans could not afford such a luxury. The first place in the Wehrmacht was given to the professional training of the police and newly formed divisions, after which - Hitler's demand - they can

were to be recruited to participate in operations, but in such a way that they would "get into the fight against the enemy." Sgalii preferred an extravagant way of waging war: throwing the corpses of Red Army soldiers at Prague.

same

The total offensive zone of the 10th Army, which was 25 km wide in the middle of December, in January reached 150 km in the space between Yukhnov and the Bryai Front. There were no tanks and heavy artillery for Yulikov. It is true that the limits on the line from Kirov to Mosalka could scrape together no more than three calculated divisions, including rear, reserve and police battalions.

83

By January 11, Golikov's troops, having surrounded the enemy garrison in Sukhinichi, liberated the cities of Mosalk, Lyudy Novo, Kirov and reached the approaches to Zhizdr, Ziksevo. Parts of the 326th Rifle Division of Colonel Nsmudrova captured the Baryatinsky station, where a real treasure was discovered; huge stocks of Soviet artillery and rifle ammunition, which the Germans were unable to blow up. As Marshal Yulikov recalls: "Subsequently, from this warehouse, for several months, troops were supplied not only to our army, but also to neighboring ones." However, in the Zapoznaya area, where there was a large enemy airfield, the Soviet troops ran into fierce resistance. Attacks in this direction, the 330th and 326th divisions suffered heavy losses, especially from the impact of enemy aircraft, and exhausted their offensive capabilities. There were 250-300 bayonets left in the regiments. The division of Nemudrov for the period from January 9 to 19 lost 2562 soldiers killed and wounded,

In the meantime, the German command convened in the Bryansk area a grouping of units of the 4th and 18th Panzer, 339th, 211th and 208th Infantry Divisions. Beginning on January 12, the 208th division, which had arrived from France, with the support of tanks, began to "smoke" the left flank of the 10th Army, counterattacking from the Ziksevo area in the direction of Sukhinichi. The Luftwaffe aviation bombed and fired at the barracks of the Soviet troops, and the German garrison encircled in Sukhinichi - two battalions of the 216th infantry, one battalion of the 403rd guard, one battalion of the 56th infantry divisions, marching and construction battalions under the general command of the general Major von Gilza - began active reconnaissance in several areas, looking for weak points in the sand ring created by the 324th Infantry Division of Major General Ch.I. Kiryukhin. It was obvious that the Germans, given the deep exit of Golikov's army to the west, it was stretched along the front

false, as well as a weakly covered ledge between the flank

84

gami of the West and Bryansk fronts, are preparing a counter-gift under the foundation of the Soviet offensive wedge.

The absence of an elbow connection between these two fronts also worried the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. By order of the 61st Army of the Bryansk Front, commanded by General Lieutenant M.M. Popov, since January 13, the Persian was subordinated to Zhukov. However, the task of the army to destroy the Belevsky-Bolkhov grouping of the enemy was not changed; between it and the left wing of the Western Front, there was still a 70-kilometer gap between it and the left wing of the Western Front. .

From mid-January, intense fighting returned on the left flank of the 10th Army. Delivering a concentrated blow along the Zikeevo-Sukhipichi railroad, the enemy pushed back the units of the 322nd Rifle Division, which numbered more than 69,500 men, to the northeast and began to move forward.

On January 19, the Germans returned Lyudinovo, driving the 323rd Rifle Division out of the city. Thus, for. One week the situation on the left flank of the army became very complicated. In 8 days, using the flank position and the gaps in the disposition of the Soviet troops, the German "kulak" advanced 40-45 km forward. Golikov's divisions, which fell under a flank attack, were forced to suspend the offensive, move north of Lyudinovo, to the north-west and north-east of Zhizdra and cross the defense.

Due to incomplete and contradictory data provided by intelligence, the army headquarters could not understand the situation for some time and, trying to cope with the situation on its own, did not provide particularly alarming reports to the front headquarters. General Yulikov decided to surround and destroy the enemy.

The question of organizing defense was not even raised. Firstly, his troops did not know how to defend themselves, and secondly, the moral factor was taken into account: "How will it affect the mood of our people, including

85

political composition, a sudden transition to the defense? .." The organization of a correct defense at that time was a little-known science for our Geisrals and was considered a sign of cowardice:

to the advancing enemy their will. It was no less important from the point of view of maintaining the proper morale of the personnel, including commanders.

By January 22, Golikov completed the regrouping of his troops. The 328th Rifle Division, the 12th Guards Division, and the 146th Tank Brigade, which had four light tanks, moved out against the German spearhead. The 323rd and 322nd Rifle Divisions concentrated on the flanks of the advancing German grouping. On January 23, the troops of the 10th Army began to "impose their will": the 328th Rifle and 12th Guards Divisions went on the offensive from the front, and at the same time flank attacks were launched. However, the Pemtsy, "not afraid" to dig trenches at each occupied line, held their positions with all their tenacity, repelled Soviet attacks, maintaining "proper morale", and steadily moved forward. After fierce battles, by the end of January 27, the 8th Tapkovskaya and 216th German Infantry Divisions united in the Nikolasvo area.

On January 28, a new 16th army was created in the Sukhinichi region, led by the gsisral Rokossovsky, who arrived here from the right wing of the front. The EU consisted of 5 rifle divisions and a tank brigade transferred from Golikov, the 11th Guards Rifle Division and 2 ski battalions. The 10th Army, which was headed by Lieutenant General V.S. Popov, with two divisions remaining at Ise and the new 385th Rifle Division, continued to hold the occupied lines northwest of the right flank of the 16th Army.

Further military operations on the Zhizdrinsky direction were carried out by Rokossovsky's troops, who on January 29

86

At dawn, they occupied Sukhinichi (the Germans, having unblocked the garrisons, left the city without a fight), after which they received the command of the command of the Western Front with the task: to continue to eliminate the enemy by offensive actions (our italics. - Auth). depriving him of the opportunity to strengthen himself and accumulate strength,

Chao, this means only the brilliant Zhukov knew. General Rokossovsky, by his own admission, did not understand: "It is one thing to exhaust the enemy with defensive actions, seeking to equalize forces ... But is it possible to "exhaust and weaken" offensive actions with a clear balance of forces not in our favor, and even a harsh one? in winter? Marshal's answer to this question was removed from his memoirs and published only in 1990:

"With offensive actions, we swept away our

troops are many times larger than the enemy. This exhaustion was beneficial to the enemy, and not to us (*italics ours. - Auth.*). Our strength was already exhausted to the limit. The command of the front could not but know this, and if so, it had no right to demand from the troops what they could not fulfill. It turned out that the Stavka and the General Staff wanted to see the real state of affairs, while the front command, knowing well the state of the troops, did not want to prove the failure of offensive measures. Mechanically signing off with directives that were obviously unrealistic, it shifted responsibility to the command of the armies... A detailed report on this, backed up by accounts and conclusions, was presented to the commander of the front. As expected from G.K. Zhukov, the reply was short and harsh. His reaction ruled out the hope that there, at the top (the front, Headquarters) would understand, perhaps that the time had come to think about accumulating forces for the summer campaign, and not to bring the troops, as they say, to the handle.

Zhukov basically did not recognize any 060-ronitsInye actions. Wherever he commands, orga

87

the "defense" he had reduced was always a continuous series of counterattacks and counterattacks until the complete exhaustion of his troops, and as Artillery Marshal N.N. Voronov: "Our happiness is that the forces of the Soviet rear are innumerable."

The fighting in the zone of the 16th Army eventually boiled down to a struggle for separate strongholds in the south-west of the Sukhinichi. they overcame deep snow under heavy fire, with weak artillery support due to the small number of barrels and the lack of shells. Even having seen the enemy, long before the attack, the heroic infantry was exhausted, suffered losses ... - writes Rokossovsky, - The difficulty also lay in the fact that I did not understand the main goal of the actions of the troops of the Western Front. Generalissimo Suvorov adhered to the good rule that "every soldier must know his maneuver." And the commander of the army also wanted to know the general task of the front and the place of the army in this operation. Such a desire is an axiom in military affairs. I could not be satisfied with the formulation of the task, given to me by the command of the front, "to exhaust the enemy", realizing and seeing that we exhaust ourselves first of all.

Zhukov was engaged in this senseless beating of his own troops for almost 2 months. German analysts very quickly revealed tricky secrets

Soviet offensive art, summarizing the collected information in a special bulletin of January 14, 1942:

"... Russian attacks, as a rule, take place according to this scheme once and for all - by large masses of people and are repeated several times without any changes. The advancing infantry leaves their infantry positions in compact groups and rushes to the attack from a great distance with a shout of "Hurrah". Ofi

88

the tsers and commissars follow behind and shoot at those who are melting.

In most cases, the atax is preceded by a reconnaissance in force on a broad front, which, after breaking through the enemy or infiltrating our position, turns into a decisive attack by the steel and flags. Artillery preparation for an attack is rare.

The Russians begin their attacks at dusk or at dawn. Taking advantage of the darkness, fog, blizzard or rainy weather, the Russians take up their initial positions for the attack. Repulsed attacks are repeated again, sparing no effort and changing nothing. thus change the scheme of conduct. birds (our italics. - Auth.).

Thus, to repel the attacks of the Russians, strong nerves and the consciousness that our excellent small arms are able to withstand the mass offensive of the Russians ... "

The 61st Army, commanded by the talented drunkard Markian Popov - 342nd, 346th, 350th, 356th, 387th Riflemen, 91st and 83rd Cavalry Divisions, 66th Tank Brigade, 142nd Separate Sneaker Battalion, 2 guards mortar battalions - was in a similar position. In Warmia, by the end of the Yangp Ryan, there were 42,829 soldiers and officers, 160 field and 70 anti-tank guns, 372 mortars and 25 tanks. Popov's troops continued a tense struggle with the 2nd Panzer Army, stubbornly defending in the area of Belev, Bolkhov. At the same time, if at the beginning the 61st Army was advancing on a front of 75 km, then from January 13, it was given the task of closing the 70-kilometer gap with the Western Front, to which it was transferred. By the end of January, the right-flank units succeeded in advancing in general to a depth of 55-60 km and enveloping the flank of the Bolkhov German group. There was no strength to continue the offensive, the struggle took on a protracted character.

By the beginning of February, the offensive in the bands of the 10th, 16th and 61st armies transferred from the Bryansk Front had actually ceased. .

Since January 8, two other armies of the Bryansk Front, the 3rd under the command of General-Leitsai P.I. Batov and the 13th Army of General Major N.P. Pukhov (total 12 rifle and 6 cavalry divisions, 14 ski battalions, one tank brigade).

VYAZEMSKIY NODE

The main events unfolded in the central section of the Western Front,

Zles 5th army of the general-leitsnait L.A. Fvorova {19. 32. 50. 108, 144, 32%, 336th rifle, 82nd motorized rifle divisions, 37, 43, 60th riflemen, 20th Thai brigade), which had the task of capturing Mozhaïsk and advancing to Gzhatsk, 9 January, with its left-flag aids, it broke through the enemy defenses. and led an epergic offensive along the Moscow-Miisk highway. On January 20, Bvorov's troops occupied Mozhaïsk after a daytime assault; on January 22, the 19th Rifle Division of General Major N.S. Dronova took Uvarovka, the last major German stronghold in the Moskop region. On 30 January, move forward 80 km, the 5th Army ran into a new defensive line of the enemy 18-20 km east of Gzhatsk, which it was able to break through, although it included part of the forces of the 16th Army - the 26th and 354 1st Infantry Division and 86th Infantry Brigade. But the troops were exhausted by force, 2500 people remained in the divisions.

century.

Just at that time, Lieutenant I.M. Tretyak: "They greeted me cordially, as an experienced front-line soldier, but there was nothing special to treat, Rusks were given out for Easter, in welding

9

there was horse meat, it was cold and hungry. In such conditions, what is the correction after treatment? Instead of curling up, the body weakened. Wounds opened up."

To the south, the 33rd Army of the Gsneral-Lates Panta M.G. was advancing. Efremov. The army included the 93rd, 110th, 113th, 160th, 201st, 222nd, 338th Rifle and [-I Guards Motorized Rifle Divisions. On January 19, after 3 days of stubborn fighting, the army liberated the countryside. Version After this, Efremov received an order to turn his troops to Dubna and strike in the direction of Vyazma. January 24 Ryagolovnye divisions, repulsing the counterattacks of the enemy

ka, went to the Shansky Zavod}, and a day later the 93rd rifle division captured the Ugryumovo station. On January 26, army troops crossed the Vorya River. The advance of the advanced units of the army into this area meant that they had succeeded, immediately and unexpectedly for the enemy, in penetrating deeply into their defenses and capturing a number of important settlements that opened the road to Vyazma.

After long battles along the borders of the Vorya River, the 113th, 338th and 160th rifle divisions advanced even deeper during January 26-28 and reached the Kuzistsovka, Morozovo line 30 km southeast of Vyazma. The enemy in the Ugra range sought to delay their advance, but these attempts were not successful. Following the troops of Efremov, the 32nd Rifle Division from the 5th Army broke through into the German rear.

General Efremov, the most experienced and educated in the early peak, who, however, did not know how to "hit formation commanders in the face" and was in this sense with the "white crow" in the Red Army, was on January 31 in the Iznosok region, where he tried to organize flank support for a breakthrough, however Zhukov was interested in such trifles, he drove the troops forward without any frills.

The telegram received by the army commander from the commander of the front looked like a reprimand: "Your task is near Vyazma, and not in the area of Iznoski. Leave Kopdra tiev in Iznoski. Go ahead on your own right now."

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(Thirty years later, Marshal Zhukov would write: "Yons ral-lieutenant Mikhail Grigoryevich Efremov decided to stand at the head of the army's shock group and move swiftly with them to Vyazma.")

Leaving the army to the chief of staff, Efremov personally led a 12,000-strong group of three divisions that had broken through. On February 1, the 13th Rifle Division reached the Dashkovka area, the 160th Division, the Lyado area, and the 388th, the Vorobsvka area. (On this milestone on February 2, the army grouping launched an offensive against Vyazma.

xx

In an effort to quickly complete the encirclement of the enemy, on January 15, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to throw a large airborne assault force behind enemy lines with the task of saddling the railroad and the Moskva-Minsk highway, preventing the approach of enemy reserves from the west and the passage of his troops from the Vyazma region. Desaitniks were also supposed to assist the Soviet troops,

advancing from the north and southwest. This was a bold decision: a mass landing of airborne troops at night, in winter conditions, was a unique enterprise, see.

The 4th Airborne Corps (VDK) was assigned to carry out the operation under the command of General I.I. Leitesnait A.F. Levashova. The corps included 8 and 214 brigades, numbering about 10 thousand paratroopers. The general leadership of landing operations was assigned to the commander of the Red Army Air Force, General P.P. Zhigarev (he led from Moscow), and the direct preparation of the landing force for landing - to the commander of the airborne troops (VDV) General V.A. Glazunov (placed his command post in Kaluga). The start of the operation was scheduled for January 22.

92

An aviation group of 39 PS-84 type transport aircraft from the Civil Air Fleet (GVF) and 22 TB-3 from the Air Force was allocated to ensure the drop. Tacos, obviously insufficient, the number of aircraft could ensure the de-airing of the corps in at least 3-4 days, and even then under the most favorable conditions, if you make 2-3 sorties per night, air cover on the route and reconnaissance was provided by a special group of Ps aircraft -3 from the 9th long-range bomber regiment.

The initial area for the airborne assault was chosen from an air hub of three airfields, located 30 km from the front line in the Kaluga region. The airfields were not equipped with shelters for vehicles and personnel, did not have anti-aircraft weapons, and, in addition, were well known to the Germans. On the other hand, their small distance from the front line allowed transport aviation to make a greater number of sorties and ensure the release of the maximum possible number of people and cargo during the summer. 19 fighters of the 402nd Air Regiment were allocated to cover the area where enemy air raids were concentrated, which, in addition to this, carried out other tasks in the front's interstates.

The relocation of units of the airborne corps by rail from the Moscow region to the original area began on January 17 and lasted nine days instead of the planned two. In a fright, it "suddenly" turned out that the bridge across the Oka at Aleksin had been blown up by the Germans during the retreat and had not yet been restored. I had to reload from train to train across the river on ice. It was not possible to ensure the concealment of the concentration of troops, since the Pictor did not even think about it. Both on the way and upon arrival in the

parachute equipment was not camouflaged, the personnel walked around in airborne jumpsuits, the headquarters of the units were conveniently located in settlements that had only recently been liberated and flooded with German agents.

53

The plan of the airborne operation, developed jointly by the headquarters of the Air Force and the Airborne Forces, determined the objectives and tasks of the landing force, the composition of the forces, issues of operational and combat support, but interaction with the troops of the miphroite, in whose interests it was sent, was not even considered. It was planned to throw out the entire desait at night, the forward detachment during the day. Due to the delay in concentrating in the initial area, the operation was postponed to January 26-27.

On January 24, Zhukov ordered General Levashov to land the main forces of the 4th Airborne Forces on January 26-27, and to hold the line indicated on the map in order to cut off the enemy's retreat to the west. Part of the forces of the corps was supposed to take up defense with a front to the east in the area from Rebrovo to Berezniki, about 8 km long along the line of the former Soviet defensive lines built in October 1941. The reserve of the corps was planned to be concentrated 6-8 km west of the indicated line in readiness for action both in the direction of Vyazma and in the direction of Smolsk. One reinforced battalion was ordered to take up defense in a front to the west, east of the Dnieper. Particular attention was paid to the fact that the main efforts of the VDK should be directed to the east with the task of delaying the enemy, who was retreating from the Vyazma region. Questions of interaction with the advancing troops of the Western Front, as well as the 33rd Army, as they said, were not considered.

Setting these tasks, neither Zhukov with his Iggab, nor the Air Force command could provide Levashov with any reliable data on the presence of the enemy in the landing area, despite the fact that partisans, detachments of Major Soldatov and Captain Surzhik were actively operating around Vyazma. Subsequently, it turned out that the chosen area was saturated with a significant number of German troops and garrisons. The corps commander was optimistically oriented by the front headquarters in the sense that the enemy was already rabbing, everywhere

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but retreats and is pursued by our units. Therefore, the plan for de-airing was more like a plan for holding an air parade: the planes in it flew on a clear schedule, making 5-6 flights per night,

the pilots went out exactly on the targets, the deadlines for completing the tasks were calculated strictly according to the ratios. Difficult weather conditions, the possible failure of the already few transport aircraft and their loss, opposition from the enemy - all this was taken into account in the calculations.

The 2nd paratrooper battalion of the 8th brigade was parachuted as the detachment's lead. Its commander, captain M.Ya. Karnaukhov, received the assignment: to land in the area of the village of Ozerechnya and ensure the landing of the main forces of the corps.

The forward battalion landed in the rear of the opposition on the afternoon of January 27th. Even at the wrong time, due to a strong snowstorm, the pilots were not able to correctly identify Oze rechiyu and threw the paratroopers from a high altitude into the Tabora region, 18 km south of the target. The paratroopers were scattered within a radius of 20-25 km from Tabora, as a result, some of them ended up in Ozerechia, where the Yemtsy ended up. Four people were captured in tribes and in the morning povesspy. The collection of desaitpiks continued all the way, out of 648 people, only 476 managed to meet at the agreed place. At the same time, the battalion commander could not report to the corps command about the results of the landing, since the head of the radio station with a long-distance radio was drifted far away from the place of landing of the Kariaukhov headquarters of the forward detachment. The radio operator himself could not establish contact with the "Big Land" either, since the negotiation tables were located with the battalion's communications chief. They searched for each other for several days.

Captain Karnaukhov decided to leave a small group in the derevis of Tabora, which

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prepare the site and light signals in case the aviators repeat the mistake. Early in the morning of January 28, not waiting for the full gathering of people, the battalion commander led the desaitiiks to the district of Olerechia, where the landing of the main forces of the corps was planned. In general, the forward detachment, t the mistakes of the pilots, did not fulfill the tasks and justified their reading.

General Levashov, having no connection with the forward detachment, decided to continue airdropping the #th airborne brigade in the Ozerechny area. On the 28th of July and dawn, the 3rd battalion of the brigade was thrown out by part of the forces in the Tabora area, where the dssi ki Karilukhova you. they sent signals, and partly - in the area of \u200b\u200bthe Ozers tree \" pya. Battalion commander Major L.G. Kobets, not waiting for the battalion to be fully assembled, rushed to the north.

on the Vyazma-Smolensk road, where he began sabotage operations on these communications.

In addition to the drop of the 3rd battalion on the night of 28 July, it was planned to land the remaining units of the 8th brigade from the airfields of Grabtovo and Rzhaists. However, as soon as twilight came, an anti-aircraft bombing attack on the concentration of transport aircraft and day at the Grabiyevo airfield. As a result, the runway was destroyed, including 7 TB-3 aircraft, one fighter, a fuel depot; several planes were damaged, the personnel of the transport aircraft suffered losses: a.

At dawn, the Germans repeated the air raid. Responsible for air defense, one link (!) of fighters of the 402nd Air Regiment was not capable of resisting them. Landing from this airfield had to be stopped, but continued from the rest.

Due to the loss of one airfield and transport aircraft, difficult weather conditions and countermeasures

behind

96

enemy, the schedule beautifully drawn at the headquarters broke down on the first day of the operation. On the night of January 29, 540 dssantiiks were thrown out, on January 30 - 120, on January 31 - 215 ... In total, in 6 days until February 2, only 2323 people from the composition of the 8th airborne-dssant brigade were landed, i.e. With. menes 25% De! GTA, Further continuation of the operation was deemed inappropriate and the corps was returning from Kaluga to the Moscow region.

Dropped in the rear of the desaptic due to pi errors

The lots turned out to be scattered over a large area between Vyalma and Dorogobuzh, sometimes 50-60 km from a given point. Some groups of paraciotists fell into areas occupied by the enemy and were immediately destroyed. As a result, the commander of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel A.A. Onufriesw managed to gather only 800 fighters and commanders. Another 520 people got to the partisans and the location of Belov's corps, they joined the posdiss brigade, and 1003 desaignians (48%!) were not found at all.

For some time, the 8th Airborne Desaptation Brigade operated independently in the rear of the enemy's Vyazma grouping, and then joined Belov's cavalrymen,

living

On February 2, the advanced units of the 33rd Army came out of the southeastern approaches to Vyazma and withered battles for the city, and on February 3, the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps broke through Vyazma from the south. Sokolov's 11th cavalry corps was planted 12 km northwest of the city. Since the troops of two fronts reached Vyazma almost simultaneously, it would be logical to unite their actions under a single command, which, however, was not done.

As a result, the meeting was not coordinated either in the distribution of tasks, or in time and place. The enemy, hastily pulling here, except for the infantry, slippers, artillery

4 Year 1942 - educational "97

Riya and bomber aircraft, kept the city in his hands. 1ermaiskos commanlovanis, realizing what the loss of Vyazma threatened, urgently organized defense on the approaches to defense, mobilizing all the forces and means at hand.

"The inconsistency in the timing of the assault on Vyalma," writes General Belov, "did not allow us to use the element of visibility. Moreover, the enemy got the opportunity to repel the offensive of the Soviet troops in parts, now in one place, then in another, maisvriya on their own and means."

Fierce battles began near Vyazma, in all difficult conditions for the Soviet troops that advanced there, which did not have heavy artillery, iks, air cover, or supplies. At the cost of heavy losses, Belov's dismounted cavalry captured the strongholds of Stogovo and Zubovo by January 6, but could not advance further. The offensive of the troops of the 33rd Army did not develop. Parts of the 11th cavalry corps reached the Vyazma-Smoleisk highway, but they failed to prevent the movement of German troops along it.

The most pegatypical role was played by the lack of organization and interaction between our children. From the South-Eastern direction, Vyazma was defended by units of the 5th tap, 10th motorized and 51st infantry divisions. 3 divisions of General Efremov and 5 divisions of Belov operated in this direction. 329th rifle division from Yuvorov's army, 250th regiment of Major Soldatov, 8th airborne brig and Onufriysva. All the egi associations and units performed their personal tasks and submitted to their headquarters or directly to the front headquarters. Bolss of addition

when General Belov proposed to create a common front with Efremov's troops near Vyazma, on the basis that "in this case, we would be able to operate more freely with the forces we had. But it was not allowed to get together with the pamas either. Fropta headquarters gave me a strange

38

ukazapis: "The elbow connection with the iscota (meaning the 33rd army) is worth nuzhia to you (!)". February 10 Yemtsy counterattack

We pushed Belov's corps back 12-15 km from the city.
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At the beginning of February, the Vyazma junction of German defense and communications, linking Vyazma with Rzhev, Bryazsk, and Smolsk, was also in the focus of attention of both the Soviet and German commissaries. The liquidation of the Yukiiov grouping and the capture of Vyazmoya Dolgoi led to the completion of the encirclement of the main forces of the Army Group "Tseggr" and the creation of favorable prerequisites for their digging thunder. For the Wehrmacht, this would mean a past catastrophe. Therefore, the actions taken in February in the western direction, and especially in the Vyazma region, took on an extremely acute character. Although the Germans mostly managed to create a new front, they held out with the last of their strength.

The commander of the 4th Ismetsky army on January 31 added to the force that this "community is overstretched and mentally exhausted. Soldiers of officers have the first seizures. About 3 officers, 12 non-commissioned officers, 60 soldiers, 5 machine guns and heavy machine guns each remained in the battalions, Popolishis has enough training, marching battalions provide proper assistance to the dogs. Doctors note that the soldiers as a common phenomenon are filled with perviousness and apathy.

For the benefit of the defending Ismet troops, at that time the Russians also ran out of strength. Named on February 1 by the labor committee of the newly created West! south of the right of the pia general of the army, Zhukov, was released to knock out every machine gun at the Headquarters literally by the day. There were not enough halo of siarads and missions, all the reserves of the material were used up. Rocket artillery and communications with sutegvism ammunition were generally asleep from the frost. In this situation, the troops, of course, did not have sick striking power.

In the meantime, the German commanders hastily transferred divisions from Western Europe to help von Kluge. In mid-January, 4 divisions from France arrived in the Smolensk direction. On the most

Subdivisions and units moved forward in more dangerous areas, freed up as a result of internal regroupings, as well as from other areas of the front. Considering that K b ler could not cope with the crisis, Hitler appointed General Kheiprzi as the new commander of the 4th Army.

Having regrouped the troops and using reinforcements, the Germans stepped up their operations. On February 2-3, the forces of the 20th Panzer Division and the SS Infantry Regiment launched strong counterattacks in the Zakharovo region from the north and south, cut off the communications of the Soviet troops that had penetrated to Vyazma and closed the 8-kilometer breakthrough in their defenses. The 33rd Army found itself in two disparate groupings: the infantry divisions under the general leadership of General Efremov and a small operational group - near Vyazma, the main grouping led by General Major A.K. Kopdratsvym - at the turn of Iznoski and Severis, >

"At first, the command of the army and the Front did not attach much importance to this event, hoping that the situation would be quickly restored. A large group was thrown into the Zakharovo area, about 2000 infantrymen with sandy slippers under the command of General Major V.A. Revyakip. However, the enemy managed to gain a foothold, and it was possible to knock him out with these forces" (The defeat of the Ismetsko-fascist troops near Moscow. M., 1964. P. 348--349).

At the very eve of the German pastuplepie, the full-blooded 9th Guards Rifle Division, designed to reinforce Yefremov's strike force, entered the gap. Commander General A.P. Beloborodov immediately "became clear that the fascist troops

300

proceeded to decisive action in order to "crush" the base of the breakthrough of the shock group of the 33rd army and surround it, "However, on the same day, by order of Zhukov, the division was transferred to the army of Tolubev. and received an order to get out of the breakthrough and take the village of Zakharovo, which the guards were engaged in storming until February 13.

Remaining under the command of the tyrant-alcoholic General Kopdratyev, the divisions of the 33rd Army were generally unable to perform any tasks due to the complete disorganization of command and control. One after another, the members of the Military Soviet Army and even the head of the Political Directorate of the front scribbled the most negative characteristics of the chief of staff:

"Kondratiev continues to get drunk. Today on-

drank to the point that he was able to work ...

..Copy completely decomposed. There is no person now who could be entrusted with the leadership of the headquarters ...

... on March 6, 1942, in a linen form, he signed a clearly impracticable combat order. As a result, the units suffered unnecessary losses ... Everyone in headquarters and units knows about the drunkenness and idleness of Kondratsva, which is why the author of Kondratiev has no place.

It was to this man that Zhukov entrusted the responsibility of securing the rear of the Sfremov group.

To the radiograms of Efremov, who was surrounded, demanding to quickly restore communications and strengthen the strike force, Zhukov answered with a reinforced concrete: "Less hysteria. Behave more calmly" or "You are not given the right to enter into polemics with the Military Council of the Front and criticize ...", but could not provide any real help. All attempts by the 43rd Army to restore contact with the Efremovites were not successful. By the beginning of March, at the cost of heavy losses, Golubev's troops managed only to slightly push the enemy and leave Vorya.

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On February 5, Model's 9th Army unexpectedly delivered a strong blow to the 29th Army of the Kalinin Front from Rzhev and at the same time a counterattack from the Olenino region. As a result, by February 17, Shvetsov's army was cut off from the 39th and found itself in complete isolation.

The situation of the Soviet troops in the Western direction in February deteriorated sharply. Weakened by prolonged battles, they lost their offensive capabilities. Therefore, the Headquarters allocated to General Konev from its reserve a guards rifle corps, 7 rifle divisions and 4 air regiments, and for Zhukov - a guards rifle corps, 3 rifle divisions, 4th air regiment. a desait corps, 200 tanks and 60,000 marching reinforcements.

By a directive dated February 16, the Headquarters demanded that the High Command of the Western Direction of the mobile call on all the forces of the Kalinian and Western Froites to complete the defeat of the Zeitr Army Group. The forward troops were ordered to destroy the enemy grouping operating in the Rzhev, Vyazma, Yukhnov regions, and on March 5 to reach the line of Olepino, the Dnieper River, Yelnya and further along the Desna River to Snopotya. At the same time, the armies of the left wing of the Western Front were to liquidate the enemy grouping in the area of Bolkhov, Zhizdra, Bryansk and liberate the city.

genus Bryansk.

Guided by these instructions, Zhukov first decided with the forces of the 22nd, 30th and 39th armies of the Kalinin Front and the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies of the Western Front to defeat the Olenin and Yukhnov groupings of the enemy, and then complete the defeat of the main enemy forces with a combined strike from both fronts in the region of Rzhev and Vyazma. The 16th and 61st armies received the task of advancing in the Bryansk direction. Subsequent events showed that the troops were given overly complex tasks.

102

The new offensive of the Kalinin Front did not bring success, it was not possible to release the troops of General Shvetsov; they had to break through with heavy fighting and heavy losses to join the 39th army. To help the encircled, Konev decided to parachute the 4th parachute battalion of the 204th airborne brigade under the command of senior lieutenant P.A. Belotserkovsky - more than 400 people,

The landing was carried out on the night of February 17 by single aircraft in several passes from a height of 300 m. During the dropping of parachutists and cargo, TB-3 aircraft flew in a circle around the landing area. The Germans fired at them with rifles and machine guns, so that the radius of the combat area of the 29th Army had decreased by this time to 4 km. Despite the ego. neither the pilots nor the paratroopers had any losses in the air. In total, 312 people were transferred to the assigned area, 75 people were brought back, and 38 paratroopers were mistakenly landed near Staritsa. Only 166 people gathered at the location of Shvetsov's troops. How they could help the commander is unclear.

On February 28, 6,000 troops of the 29th Army escaped from the ring to their own. According to German data, 4,888 fighters and commanders were captured, and another 26,647 people died on the battlefield. Thus, the Germans cut off the first half of those pincers that were supposed to compress the main forces of Army Group Center in February.

Konev's attempts in March and April to continue the clearing and fulfill the assigned tasks failed. General Model received from the Fuhrer the Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross and the nickname "fireman for hopeless situations."

and:*

On February 17, the group of General Belov received an order from the Western Direction Labor Committee to bypass Vyaz

103

mu from the west and intercept the Vyazma-Smolensk railway. At the same time, the 11th Cavalry Corps of Sokolov, breaking through from the north, was supposed to leave the highway. The offensive began on the evening of the next day and developed successfully. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division and an ongoing blow knocked out the Yemtsy from the village of Izborovo, on February 21, the 8th air-desait brigade occupied the village of Bskasovo, and the 41st Cavalry Division - Yakovlevo. The Soviet units cut the railway and partially destroyed it. Sokolov's corps at that time intercepted the highway and secured in the villages of Azarovo and Chernovo, 6 km north. However, the two mobile groups did not succeed in connecting.

The enemy, pulling up slippers, aviation and 3 armored trains, first threw Sokolov's corps off the highway, and on February 25 launched a series of counterattacks on Belov's group, surrounding the 4th 1st cavalry division, Opufriev's brigade, the 250th regiment of Major Soldatov and the 329th rifle division, Belov had to abandon the attack on Vyazma in order to save his troops. The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division went to help the encircled. After the battles of Diev, the cavalrymen and paratroopers were able to break through the enemy ring and join up with the main forces. But the losses were psliki. So, in the 7th cavizion there were only 59 active bayonets. —`

The command of the 329th division decided to break through to the east, to the 33rd army of Efremov. In fact, no one managed the divisions anymore; it broke up into small groups that acted according to their own understanding. As a result, about 700 people were able to seep through the enemy's battle formations to Belovui Efremov. On March 10, Major Soldatov led the remnants of the 250th Regiment—75 skiers to the location of the cavalry corps.

In the midst of the most difficult battles in the most unfavorable conditions, Zhukov sent a new telegram to the group commander: "... Why, you, contrary to the order of the Headquarters and

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Military council of the front, left Vyazma? Who gave you the right to choose your task? The task is determined by my order. You seem to have forgotten what happens for ie-

executing orders, although you yourself arrested and bring the guilty to justice ... "What, however, is the style of management! The infallible Zhukov "seems to have forgotten" that the troops of Belov and Efremov have been fighting behind enemy lines for more than a month, receiving almost no help from the front command, except for new tasks and monotonous threats: "We did not receive ammunition from the mainland", so we used cannons and sleep ranks, which were collected behind enemy lines. Operations were left the molds tighter during the retreat of the Soviet troops in the fall of 1941. The pairs lay under the sky for a long time, nine hundred percent of them did not burst. All that was left was to load the cannons with Zhukovsky telegrams. Jaspo knew that Vyazma could no longer be taken.

LJ"

To assist the troops of the Western Front in the encirclement and defeat of the Yukhnov group, Zhukov decided to carry out one more airborne operation. On February 10, the 4th Airborne Corps was tasked with using the forces of the 9th and 214th brigades and the balance of the 8th brigade to land in the area west of Yukhnov, break through the enemy's defense front in the direction of Klyuchi, subsequently go to Varshavskoe highway and unite with units of the 50th Army. Bol's army was to advance towards the airborne assault and capture the areas of Babykino, Klyuchi, Pesochiya.

For the landing of the corps, an aviation group was formed consisting of 64 PS-84 and TB-3 aircraft. Landing this time was supposed to be carried out from the Lyubertsy and Vnukovo airfields near Moscow, well covered by the Moscow air defense forces. The site of the east of the village of Zhelane, which was controlled by the partisans, was chosen as the center of decapitation. The operation was planned to be carried out within three days,

105

each transport aircraft had to perform 2 flights per night.

The command strictly warned the crews of the aircraft of personal responsibility for the accuracy of the drop of each group of paratroopers. After such a briefing, many pilots, in those cases when you laid down on the ground signals instilled doubts, preferred to return to their airfields, having completed their tasks. This led to a violation of the departure schedule and repeated flights of a significant number of aircraft.

German aviation did not have the opportunity to perform siting at airfields near Moscow, which turned out to be

active anti-aircraft defense on the flight routes of transport aviation and over the area of desitation of the aircraft, it was evident that the air echelons with airborne aircraft before proceeding without escort of fighters. Nemekis bombers were hitting paraniotist landing sites. Soviet bombers and attack aircraft did not support landings in the landing area and at the entrance to hostilities.

The first to land on February 18 was the 4th battalion of the 8th airborne brigade. Zalach was executed only by 2 crews, which dropped 293 people and 32 bales of cargo. The rest of the planes were not able to pass the given area due to the loss of the oris! tions. A large number of bonfires and fires on the ground, among which it was difficult to recognize "our" signals, made it difficult to recognize "our" signals. In addition, in the future, the enemy also gave signals, indicating false sites or gathering places. Instead of primitive bonfires, laid out in the form of various "letters", light or radio engineering means of pasture, the bosses guessed, or maybe they just knew what it was. Moreover, the imagination was not even enough for each Soviet grouping in the rear opposite the peak to have a separate signal: in an identical way, in the same

105

for a while, bonfires were lit by Belov's air-supplied cavalry, Kirilov's partisans, and Yefremov's foot soldiers.

Subsequently, units of the 9th and 214th brigades landed. Instead of three nights, the operation took a lot of time, during this time 7,100 people and 1,500 bales were abandoned behind the enemy's rear. On the night of February 23, the headquarters of the 4th VDK flew to the landing area. All command was in one low-speed TB-3 aircraft, which, on approaching the target, was attacked by a German Me-110 night fighter. As a result, the commander of the corps, General Levashov, was killed by shrapnel and several staff officers were wounded. The command was taken over by the chief of staff, Colonel A.F. Kazankin.

On the whole, the damage inflicted by the German aviation was small, Yurazlo bolse serious losses - over 2000 people - paratroopers were found as a result of an inaccurate drop due to the fault of their own transport aviation. As before, there were numerous cases of throwing people and cargo over a large area, from a height of 1000-2000 m, instead of the prescribed 600 m, into the disposition of the 33rd Army, Belov's corps, the enemy's battle formations and even beyond the Dnieper. The loss of cargo significantly reduced the combat effectiveness of the Desait, the loss of skis deprived many units of mobility. Until February 23, at the same time as the continued landing, parts of the corps were concentrated in the assembly areas,

searched for dumped property and conducted reconnaissance.

The Germans, in turn, from the very first night of the appearance of paratroopers in their rear, began to strengthen the garrisons and defensive structures. Many buildings in populated areas were adapted to control points, ice trenches and various barriers were built. The garrisons were reinforced with slippers and artillery.

Having taken command of the corps, Colonel Kazankin contacted his brigades and the command of the 50th Army. By this time, the troops of General Boldin, approaching the Warsaw highway at the turn

107

Sapovo, Savinki, met the stubborn resistance of the enemy, which they were unable to overcome.

standing.

On the night of February 24, the 9th airborne brigade of Colonel I.I. Kuryshva, destroying small garrisons along the way, went to the populated points of Ps clean and Kurakino, where she was stopped by the Ismians. 212th brigade of Colonel N.E. Koloboviikova tried on the move to capture the strongholds in Ivapts vs. Kostinki, Zherdovka, but had no success. From 24 to 25 February, units of the corps conducted reconnaissance searches, improved their positions and prepared for repeated attacks on strongholds. The strongest means of suppression that the Desaithtes had at their disposal was small arms and mortar fire. However, even this could not be particularly intense due to the limited number of ammunition. Therefore, the corps operated mainly at night, with viszap attacks.

In total, there were about five infantry regiments belonging to the 131st, 34th and 31st divisions of Kalaikin, they were located in settlements adapted for defense, occupied fortified positions, were reinforced by artillery and supported by bomber aircraft. Thus, from the first day of hostilities, the corps, throughout the offensive, met with an organized defense, which was strengthened more and more in connection with the landing and collection of parts of the airborne assault dragged on for a long time. The enemy, having determined the intentions and government strikes of the troops of the 4th Airborne Forces, slowly began to pull additional forces into the area of operations,

In spite of this, the paratroopers advanced 20–22 km on individual paprias to meet the Froite troops and captured a number of settlements. As a result of the fighting on February 23-28, parts of the corps reached

'the line indicated by the command of the West Front,

108

where the meeting with the troops of the 50th Army was to take place. Several reconnaissance groups of the 9th Airborne Brigade even managed to get through the Warsaw highway and establish contact with General Boldin's units. But the 50th Army was not able to break through the front and connect with the paratroopers, and the corps, having suffered significant losses, with a limited number of troops, on March 1, went on the defensive.

As a result, the landing operation did not achieve its goals. The troops of the 43rd, 49th and 50th armies did not achieve decisive success. Only at the beginning of March, after many days of heavy fighting, did they manage to cut off the Yelnya ledge and free Yelnya. They could not advance further. The current situation made it necessary for units of the 4th Airborne Forces to stay behind enemy lines for a long time. In this situation, the forces of the corps were reduced to the capture of the area and sabotage activities on German communications,

The lack of regular supplies - after all, according to the plan of the operation, the landing operations were supposed to last no more than 2-3 days - artillery and tanks, as well as weak support from the air of the Front aircraft, did not allow the paratroopers to successfully carry out complex combat missions. In essence, the assault brigades and battalions turned into ordinary light rifle units and partisan detachments.

Analyzing this operation, General Lisov writes:

"... in late January and early February, in the rear of the Vyazma grouping of the enemy, several centers of struggle of the Soviet troops developed. These are the groups of General Belov and Efremov, the groups of paratroopers Major Soldatov and Lieutenant Colonel Onufriev. By the time the decision was made to use the 4th Airborne Corps in February, the position of these groups could not even be considered satisfactory. From this the question arises: was it worth it in this situation to throw paratroopers towards the troops of the 50th Army?

109

Wouldn't it be better for the 4th Airborne Forces to use the force to strengthen the Efremov group, then, by combining these troops with the group of General Belov, form a single bridgehead and, relying on it, under the command of command ..., strike north between Vyazma and Smolensk, towards the 11th Cavalry Corps

of the Calipian front or to the south towards the army of General Boldin? But the command of the Western Front did not give appropriate instructions.

The inconsistency both in terms and in the direction of the actions of the Soviet troops near Vyazma did not make it possible to achieve decisive successes, and the enemy got the opportunity to repel their attacks in parts, now in one place, then in another, maneuvering with his own forces and means.

During the Patriotic War, the Soviet commando attempted to conduct another major airborne landing operation in September 1948, when our troops reached the Diepra line. It would seem that we have the most valuable experience of the Vyazma landings, now it was possible to foresee everything. However, the fall of Pikom did not need experience, and miscalculations in the organization of the operation lost the level of cretinism.

The purpose of the landing was to assist the troops of the 40th Army of the Voronezh Front in expanding the so-called Bukrisky bridgehead on the western bank of the river. For the landing, a combined airborne corps was allocated in the composition of the 5th brigade under the command of the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, General Major I.I. Zatevahiya. The plan of the operation was personally approved by the Stavka representative, Marshal Zhukov, who, in order to maintain secrecy, forbade the interaction and exchange of information between the army and airborne headquarters - "let everyone solve their own tasks." In accordance with this idea, the brigade commanders received a combat order on September 24 at 16.40 - one and a half hours before the personnel boarded the planes; the battalion commanders left to set tasks for their subordinates

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th 30 minutes; the commanders of the companies and inputs conducted the briefing of the fighters already in the air.

Reliable intelligence about the composition and grouping of the opposite peak was absent, and those that were available were ignored. The advance into the area of the supposed landing of German reserves remained unnoticed. Significantly fewer transport aircraft arrived in the initial areas than planned, and their carrying capacity turned out to be less than that included in the calculations and landing tables. The tankers sent 30 minutes (!) before takeoff did not have time to refuel all the vehicles in such a short time. has been terminated.

In total, on the night of September 25, it was possible to land the 3rd and 2nd ba-

taglia of the 5th airborne brigade - 4575 people without 45-mm guns. As a result of the loss of orientation by the pilots and the desire to quickly leave the enemy's air defense zone, parashiotists and cargoes were randomly dropped from a height of up to 1000 m and at high speeds. This led to the dispersion of the landing on a huge area between Rzhishchev and Cherkassy. Part of the paratroopers was thrown directly into the Dnieper, 230 people - on their territory. 13 planes returned back without finding the landing area. The main mass of the landing force hit directly into the battle formations of the enemy, and here, so to speak, empirically, it was established that five Yemets were concentrated against the bridgehead. divisions, including two tank divisions.

But the paratroopers were not even able to report their "discovery" of multi-stars to their superiors due to the loss of communication (as a result of disorderly loading and improper distribution of radio equipment). For example, the commander of the 3rd airborne brigade, flying on the same plane with his chief of staff, did not take a single long-range radio with him,

111

while in other planes there were 3-6 radio stations with radio operators. And the radio stations, in turn, were de-aired separately from the power supplies. And all this was scattered over an area of over 1500 km "l Many radios were lost even in the air or immediately after landing, a part failed for technical reasons. As a result, most of the commanders of the units were left without radios.

Due to the unsuccessful drop, the Desaitiiki were doomed to independent actions in small groups in the areas of their landing. From September 25 to October 5, 43 takis groups with a total number of about 2,300 people acted behind the rear of the enemy. Of course, they could not provide any assistance to the troops of the Voroizh Front, of course.

At the end of September, Lieutenant Colonel Sidorchuk managed to assemble several such groups in the Kanpevsky forest and put together a consolidated brigade of 600 people from them, which went over to sabotage operations. It was only in October that it was joined by a group of signalers with a corrected radio station, which for the first time established contact with the 40th Army.

In the meantime, it was enough to open the Field Regulations of the Red Army of 1940, which clearly stated: "The use of airborne assaults requires the organization of thorough reconnaissance of areas for dropping (landing) and landing operations; secrecy and suddenness of application; case support of combat aviation for the transportation of airborne troops and the subsequent ground

actions; strict accounting of the time required for the mission to prepare for the operation and complete the task; organization of reliable communication with the thrown out shym de sait. That charter was not written for our marshals.

Zhukov in his memoirs did not say a single line about these events, as well as about Stalin's order, which, in particular, stated that "the release of a mass desait at night testifies to the megrimousness of the irga zizespors of this Delhi ... (italics ours. - Aat.)".

112

As a postscript to this topic, the opinion of Marshal N.N. Voronova: "It must be said with great regret that we, the pioneers of the airborne assault, did not have reasonable plans for its use." Neither the General Staff nor Zhukov indulged in airborne operations anymore - too complicated

turned out to be quiet.

"SETTINGS:
AMAZINGLY PEACE...

In the first ten days of March, there was a relative lull in the entire Soviet-German border. Both sides replenished their troops, having greatly reduced over the past months.

A vast zone continued to exist behind the Germans south and southeast of Vyazma, controlled by regular Soviet units and partisan detachments. Soviet power was established in a number of regions, draft commissions worked, and the collection of weapons, ammunition and food was carried out. [General Belov reorganized his group, disbanding the 41st, 57th and 75th cavalry divisions, and using their personnel to resupply two guard divisions.

Due to the mobilization of the male population aged up to 49 years and the "encirclement", the number of the corps was increased to 17 thousand people. Major General Baranov's 1st Guards Cavalry Division was deployed in the Dorogobuzh area, subordinating all local partisan formations to the SSBE. 2nd Cavalry Division gsisrala N.S. Oslikovsky controlled the area of Vskhody, Senyutino.

The 4th Airborne Corps occupied the area of Klyuchi, Tynovka, Yurkino, Pstrishchevo, Novaya, Verterkhovo station. The total front of defense was 35 km. In the first half of March more or mepes was nala

113

supply of the corps and evacuation of the wounded by air. However, there were often long interruptions in air traffic due to favorable weather conditions, increased opposition from enemy full-time fighters, and a shortage of transport aircraft. The 8th brigade of Opufrisva again joined the corps, from which, however, a little more than a battalion remained.

Efremov's group held a line along the Ugra River in the area of Shelomitsa, Gulyasvo. The commanding troops were required to "organize defensive actions in such a way that in no case should they allow the surrender of the occupied territory and the narrowing of the group's area of operations."

None of the Soviet groupings in the enemy's rear received an order to break out of the encirclement, since for Zhukov to accept such a decision meant completely giving up hopes of capturing Vyazma. The headquarters in the directive of March 20 noted that "the liquidation of the Rzhev-Gzhatsk-Vyazma grouping of the enemy faltered" and again ordered the capture of the cities of Gzhatsk, Vyazma, Rzhev.

The Germans left the forest areas, but tenaciously held on to the nodal settlement points and the main communications lines. Around the zones occupied by the Soviet units, barriers and fortifications were created, consisting of minefields, ditches, ice ramparts, and bunkers. These lines were guarded by artillery, tanks and searchlights. Having exhausted the armies of the Western Front, the anti-Tivian could now devote more forces and means to clear their rear. The German units began to systematically compress the ring.

So, having repelled the offensive of the 50th Army, the Germans were able to come to grips with Kazankin's paratroopers. On March 18, units of the 13th Infantry Division attacked from the east and captured Pushkino. By the end of the battle, only 30 people survived from the 4th battalion of the 214th airborne brigade, which was defending this point. 31 March 34th

314

the infantry division hit at the junction of the 9th and 214th brigades, between the villages of Dubrovia and Prechistos, and occupied Kurakino. Parts of the corps suffered significant losses. Detachments of parahypothists-saboteurs, designed and not armed for proper combat, found themselves in a difficult situation. Almost all artillery was lost, there was an acute shortage of ammunition and food, over 2000 rapeseeds were plowed in the hospitals of the corps, and three of them needed immediate evacuation, on April 3 the Ismians captured

Akulovo, April 9 - the village of Zhukovka. Verterkhovo and Ugra stations. The next day, the village of Kombein and Maryino fell. There was a real threat of the division of the 4th Airborne Forces into two parts.

Colonel Kazaikin turned to Mr. Neral Belov for support. The entire 2nd Guards Cavalry Division was sent to help the Desapghics. Finally, on April 11, the airborne landing corps, by order of the Vosniy Council of the Front, was subordinated to the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Corps. Belov sarcastically commented on this matter that all Soviet formations behind the rear of the enemy peak had their own tasks, "but as soon as they got into a difficult situation, they were immediately reassigned to the headquarters of the corps and we were given special responsibility for their salvation." By the combined efforts of the cavalry and paratroopers in extremely fierce battles, by April 12, the Ismians managed to stop. The paratroopers moved to the defense along with the Jabot partisan detachment.

In these days, the agony of the Efremov group began. On April 10, the op sent a report: "From 13.00 on 10.04.1942, the enemy threw us slippers and infantry, aiming them at each of ours! fortified area ... I strive to organize a defense along the Ugrs rex. On April 12, Efremov received a deliberately impracticable directive from the commander of the Western Front to break through to the east towards the 43rd and 49th armies, which were ordered to break through the enemy's defenses to the entire

depth

115

Assessing the actions of the troops of Golubev and Zakharkin, Colonel of the General Staff K.V. Vasilchenko wrote: "They scattered on a wide front in different directions, without closely linking the ongoing operations with each other. They did not manage to quickly achieve superiority in forces in the decisive direction by decisively slandering secondary sectors of the front. The desire to be strong everywhere, the fear of showing operational risk in the face of dissipation of forces and means in each of them. To

Initially, the armies of dazhs had sharply distinguished shock groups; The 49th Army stands out especially for the worse in this matter, in which even divisions operated in different directions, and it is impossible to understand from the operational situation where and in what direction the army commander is looking for a solution to his problem,

Starting from February, the 43rd Army had strike groups in separate directions, weak in strength and fragmented in strength. On the first

The Etasei had to fight against the enemy's Myatlyov grouping, which strained every effort to break through units of the 43rd Army to the northwest and against the protracted gap in the Zakharovo area. Subsequently, she created two shock groupings and, finally, a single strong southern grouping, but with a great delay. Maneuverability in parts was weak and sluggish.

The 43rd Army is also characterized by haste, haste, bringing units into battle in batches, in parts, without proper organization of the interaction of all branches of the armed forces, thanks to which the army did not have a major mustache.

pshov...

When the enemy split the western grouping of the 33rd army into parts and went to the eastern bersg river. Ugra, on the one hand, the futility of the battles of the 43rd and 49th armies to break through the defenses - on the other, the fate of the western group was clear. Thanks to the croup

16

to some shortcomings, primarily of an operational nature ... in the actions of the 43rd and 49th armies, the enemy escaped defeat in parts, instead of an op rative scale, a purely tactical success was achieved - the displacement of the enemy's Myatlev grouping, the capture of Yukhnov and the exit to the line of the Vorya rivers and Ugra,

Generals Golubev and Zakharkin did not fulfill the task of deblocking and on April 14 they stopped offensive operations, thus giving the Germans the opportunity to concentrate on the final destruction of the 33rd Army grouping. It was tightly blocked in the area of the village of Novaya Mikhailovka. Three times wounded General Efremov, not wanting to be in the pleiu, shot himself. About a hundred fighters under the command of Colonel F.M. Orlov made their way to the location of the Belov group. about 660 more people came out as part of the Jabot partisan regiment. Strike Group 3: The army ceased to exist.

Viiu for the failure of the operation, the death of Efremov and his three divisions, Marshal Zhukov, as already yetrudio guess, laid on Efremov himself: "... As the investigation showed, no one except the commander of the 38th army is guilty of the opponent intercepted communications. Zhukov".

In August 1966, he told historians: "There, in fact, there was no operation. About torn. Efremov was cut off, Belov was cut off. They remained in the rear... Concerning the cutting off of this group. It is very difficult for a front commander, when a battle is being fought on such a vast expanse of 600 km along the front, to keep track of questions of a tactical order.

Efremov went into a free "hole". Behind him were the main forces ...
What was Efremov supposed to do? At the expense of the main forces of the army, which were delayed at the Shan plant, he had to put a couple of divisions, kah struts, so that his rear was provided. Di didn't do that... The security issue is not in opposition to the clamor of the blowing front {? }, and I did not consider it necessary to look that

And?

right and left (???) ... (our italics. - Auth.). Well, to take on more responsibility in order to show oneself here as self-critical, I think there is no foolishness, why is this needed.

Regarding the way out of the encirclement, Zhukov thought, or rather, thought up the following in his memoirs: "At the request of the generals P.A. Belova and M.G. Efremov, the command of the front allowed us to leave the occupied area and go out to unite the front, while it was strictly instructed: to leave the Vyazma region for Kirov, making our way through partisan areas, through forest misivs, in the general direction: in the direction of Elnzya, Feku Desiu Kirov (Italics ours. - Auth.), where the 10th Army of the Budst Front prepared a breakthrough of the defense against Ka. In this place there was the weakest sector in the enemy's defense... And Mikhail Grigoryevich Efremov, believing that this path was too long, turned over the head of the froit by radio to the General Staff with a request to allow him to break through the shortest path - through the Ugra. Stalin called me and asked for my opinion. I categorically rejected this request, but the Supreme Commander said that Efremov was an experienced commissar. Iado agree with him and ordered to organize a counter strike by the forces of the front. With

Not for the first time "memory failed" Georgy Konstan tipovich. Firstly, for five months until the last opportunity, General Belov was strictly forbidden to leave Vyazma. Only in early June was he given permission to break through the front line. It was he who came up with the route to Kirov described above, which was too abstruse for Zhukov, who thinks in terms of the shortest distances. Secondly, Zhukovsky's order to Efremov to break through precisely to the east is documented, in contrast to the marshal's "memories".

Marshal Sokolovsky, former chief of staff of the Western Front and direction, in a work published by his editorial board on the Battle of Moscow authoritatively under

repeated the version of the "patron" that Efremov was at least a heroic personality, but the general was useless: "As for the three divisions: the first army, when it turned out that taking Vyazma with the available forces,

It's impossible for us, the Froit command suggested (in what form Zhukov flattered his "proposals", we have already seen - Auth) to Gepsral Efremov to withdraw his troops to the forest area between Vyazma and Yukhnov. Our large partisan leaders successfully operated there (no instructions to Efremov to "withdraw his troops" to the forest area in the archives have yet been found, - Auth.). To detain further near Vyazma these formations, which at that time became very small in number, without doubt, should not have been.

However, General Efremov, in response to this proposal, in a rather strong form, spoke out in favor of a breakthrough to the main forces of his army in the Zakharov area and immediately moved in this direction, turning off radio communications (?) with the front. The front command, having received the latest reports from General Efremov, ordered the commander of the 43rd Army to organize a strike against these divisions. But a two-sided breakthrough was successful, because the enemy resisted in the most stubborn way.

In this battle, Gepsral Efremov (according to Sokolovsky, because of his own stupidity and self-confidence. - At.) and a number of other army officers died a heroic death, and the remnants of the divisions, not pursued by the enemy, withdrew to the forests, where they joined the partisans (!)".

It turns out that General Efremov, almost on his own initiative, abandoned the army to the stream of divi; Ziyami decided to take Vyazma, and in general, he led the way easily mentally, without listening to the advice of the wise commander-in-chief, who, in his own words, "did not consider it necessary to look at what was right and left", and even more so "take responsibility".

119

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In the meantime, Zhukov was preparing a new, equally careless offensive operation. And even then to say, because in 3 months he lost only some gender

million people:

The 50th Army was to try for the third time to break through the Warsaw highway, and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, together with the landing corps, was to help it by attacking the Germans from the rear. Pleased with such encouraging news, General Belov conducted reconnaissance in the indicated direction and on April 10 sent a plan of the upcoming operation to the commander of the Western direction: "The length of the corps along the circumference exceeds 300 km. The forces of progivium are: on the Milyatino-Eliya line, six

puff divisions. Reinforcements from Roslavl and Smolensk are approaching Elis... The forces of the corps and the strength of the front forced me to go on the defensive. The initiative noticeably passes into the hands of the opponent. Reserves are. Under these conditions, I put forward the following offensive plan

Belov's plan envisaged the concentration of a strong strike group for 7-10 days in the Vshody area in the camp of the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, the 4th Airborne Infantry Corps and the Zhiabo partisan detachment and breaking through the rear of the 50th Army in general right flank on Milatino. The answer of the front headquarters was disappointing: the proposed plan was generally recognized as correct, but it was reported that the 50th Army was not ready for the offensive. In addition, it was forbidden to weaken the Dorogobuzh area, which, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, was to be held. Belov, at his own peril and risk, decided to carry out several private operations in order to move south to create a more favorable environment for joining Boldin's army,

Dale began a leapfrog caused by Zhukovsky's concepts of secrecy and interaction:

120

"On April 14, a completely unexpected message was received from the headquarters of the Western Front: the 50th Army went on the offensive and even captured Zaitseva Gora, six kilometers from Milyatino. This message seemed strange to me. Three years ago, the army was still not ready for active actions, and suddenly, on its own, without agreement with us, it begins to break through the enemy's defenses. How can this be explained? Disagreeing with the post? Or did the 50th Army dream of just a partial success?

Be that as it may, the commander of the Front demanded that we immediately speed up the offensive towards the meeting of the 50th Army. I thought that it was necessary to take a risk, to shine from the Dorogobuzh region, our strongest at that time - the 1st Guards Cavalry Division with its artillery and mpm. However, the front command had a different opinion.

The 2nd Guards Cavalry Division and the 4th Vozlushno-Desantnyy Corps launched the offensive quite successfully. By the end of April 14, Kazankin's formations had occupied the Verterkhovo and Bogoroditskoye stations, and by the end of April 15, Platonovka, Akulovo, and Baraki Plotki. Cavaliers of Oslikovskiy fought a stubborn battle three kilometers from the Baskakovka station. Over the next two days, the 8th and 9th brigades continued their offensive and on April 17 they liberated Bula. However, since the morning of April 18, after heavy artillery and air raids

the enemy went on a counterattack) and at 16 o'clock drove the de Saitniks out of Buda. Colonel Kazankip shifted the blow to the board and by April 23, the advanced units of the 9th airborne brigade reached Novy Askerovo. From here, only about two kilometers remained to the positions of the 50th Army. It seemed that one more effort and the goal would be achieved, these last kilometers turned out to be insurmountable. The enemy brought units of the 31st infantry and 19th tank divisions into battle and continuously counterattacked.

Boldin's troops were not only unable to break through

a line of the 34th pshotpoi division, but were driven out of Zaitseva No. ry. The attacks continued for several more days, but were not successful. The offensive gradually died down.

Another attempt by the 50th Army to break through the Varshavskoe Highway turned out to be unsuccessful: the Belov troupe trusted the former area and continued to defend itself.

The offensive of Govorov's 5th Army also failed, the results of which only strengthened the Germans' superiority. On April 14, the headquarters of the German 9th Army Corps reported to the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army; "Enemy attacks carried out from 4.3.42 by seven rifle divisions, seven rifle and two sneaker brigades against the northern flank of the 252nd infantry division and against the front of the 85th infantry division with the aim of capturing Grzagsk were repulsed. The enemy lost over 800 prisoners in these battles. His loss in killed, according to the testimony of the prisoners and according to our calculation, is over 20,000 people. 36 enemy tanks were destroyed. The corps lost 5800 dead and missing and about 3200 people seriously wounded and sick

In connection with the "weakening of the offensive capabilities of the troops of the Western Government" and the beginning of the spring thaw, the Stavka on April 20 decided to transfer these forces to the defenses on the basis of the rubes. Yes, and there was some weakness, sat down only in April, the armies of the Western Front alone, with stubbornness worthy of better use, unsuccessfully attacking the fortified positions of the enemy on the same lines, lost | 9 thousand people killed and wounded - twice as many as the Wehrmacht troops in the entire Eastern Front.

On April 20, General Ilder wrote down in the diviik 'anovka;: amazingly calm ... "

122

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This was the end of the Rzhev-Vyazma offensive operation - but not the epic of the airborne and cavalry corps that remained behind enemy lines, "The units that fought behind the front line," our official history says, "were ordered to join forces".

In fact, on April 26, General Belov was informed that the Western Front had gone over to the defense. But the Smu was not at all ordered to "come out to connect" with anyone, but on the contrary, to hold the occupied area, "go over to active defense" and at the same time "give rest to people and protect personnel connections". Belov's group went into the forests, turning it, in essence, into a partisan community. On the territory controlled by it was a huge mass of weapons and equipment, abandoned by the Soviet units during the October defeat 1941 of the year:

"During the time we were behind enemy lines, we lost some of the few artillery pieces that we managed to take on the raid. But the total number of guns not only did not decrease, but even increased (our italics. - Author). With the help of the population and partisans, our guardsmen searched for guns, mortars and ammunition left in the forests and swamps after the fighting that took place in these places in the autumn of 1941. Artillerymen of the 1st Guards Cavalry Division managed to find several long-range guns with a supply of shells. One of the guns turned out to be serviceable. It was installed near the village of Grishino. From time to time, it fired at the enemy, most often at the Vyazma railway station, when enemy echelons accumulated there ... German aviation searched for this cannon for a long time and to no avail, the shelling of Vyazma stopped only when the cannon exploded from too large a charge.

Assembled and repaired artillery weapons were used to replenish the mother

123

al part of our divisions. In addition, mortar divisions and ICE heavy artillery batars of 152-mm howitzers were re-formed.

Behind the rear of the enemy, on the liberated territory, we found a significant number of Soviet tanks. Some vehicles could be refurbished and

Siov to put into operation ... In the first days of May, we merged these two companies into a separate tank battalion, which was headed by the senior lieutenant Koshelev - more than 20 tanks (!), We shot down two heavy KVs and eight T-34s. In April, a landing site for self-propelled boats was also organized, and rapeps were drunk.

In April-May, the 23rd Airborne Brigade of the 10th Airborne Forces - 2319 people under the command of Lieutenant Colonel A.G: Milsky, was abandoned in the Dorogobuzh region,

This ililly continued for a whole month. The formation of the group firmly believed that it was useless to accumulate forces and build up a "bridgehead", that in the first days of June the big offensive operation of the Western Front would be destroyed. General Belov had information that the Germans were preparing an operation to clear their rear, in which 7 divisions of the 4th and 43rd Army Corps were involved, and considered this moment "extremely successful for the strike of the 50th Army. However, the Germans launched Operation Hannover » May 24, and the offensive of the Western Front on the Vyazemsky government

did take place.

In the meantime, the enemy, pushing in sneakers and aircraft, slowly and methodically divided the Soviet troops into separate groups. Finally, on July 5, Bslov and Kazankip received permission to leave the area of operations and break through to their own. At the same time, the directive of the front headquarters forbade taking partisan units with them and recommended two options for a breakthrough; neither to the north, to connect with the main forces of the Kalinin Front, and to the east, in the direction of Mogsilsk, towards the advancing enemy. That sst Zhukov again offered to break through the shortest path. However, Belov did not arrange sa

124

murderous options: "If we break through to the north, we would have to force Diepra, we'll move on. legal means. In addition, we should have been able to cross the railway and the Moscow-Minsk highway (which we did not manage to do even under more favorable conditions. - Author), where the Yemtsy could freely maneuver their troops. A breakthrough to the east, to the 50th Army, was ruled out because the main enemy reels were operating in this direction.

Therefore, Belov proposed to go to the southwest, breaking through near Yelnya: "The enemy here was relatively weak, and south of Elpi, a significant area was copied by the 5th partisan regiment named after Lazo. Passing through this area, we could cross the Vartaisk highway, break through the front line and join up with the troops of the 10th Army near Kirov.

tew and without great losses. In general, this is the one that Zhukov later attributed to himself and even allegedly defended it before Stalin,

The breakthrough to the south was marked on the night of June 9, ten kilometers west of Yelnya between the trees of Byki and Titovo. In the first echelon, the 4th Airborne Forces, the 1st and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions were to pasture, in the second - the 329th Rifle Division, covering the wagon trains with the wounded from the rear. The operation went well. Then, having made a heavy march through the swampy forests, on June 15-16, the main forces of the group concentrated near the Varshavskoe highway. On the night of June 16, Baranov's division and half of the airborne corps broke through the highway, and on the night of June 20, the rest of the forces. On the night of June 28, about 10'000. fighters and commanders went to the location of the 10th Soviet Army.

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Not a single textbook on military art says directly that the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation failed

125

lass. No, it received the label "incomplete", 30 which was of "important importance": "Soviet troops drove back the progivnik in the Western direction for 80-250 km, completed the liberation from the invaders of the Moscow and Tula regions, liberated many districts of the Kalipinsk and Smolensk regions. The German troops did not get the expected winter respite to prepare for new operations and suffered significant losses. In the course of the operation, the Soviet command gained instructive experience (emphasis ours. - Let.) of conducting a major offensive operation with airborne landings behind the enemy's rear "and even, who would have thought - only two years have passed since the war with Fiplyandis her" under gained offensive experience in harsh winter conditions and off-road conditions "(Soviet Military Encyclopedia. Vol. 7). Moreover, in the course of a passionate discussion about the strategic operations of the Great Patriotic War, having carried out "in-depth studies", our historians docked in 1987. that near Rzhev and Vyazma, the Soviet troops suffered an enemy) "heavy defeat" (!?), and "the flags of the Army Group Center" were deeply engulfed by our troops.

Behind this idle talk lies a simple fact, that none of the goals of the operation was achieved, and the "learning experience" had to be paid for by hundreds of thousands (!!) of funerals. On the 6th of the line, Konev fictitiously laid down the entire Kalinsky freight of the "first composition": by the time of the operation, 346,100 Red Army soldiers had been combined, while the losses amounted to 34,1257 people!

The rest - on the account of Zhukov. The troops of the Bryapsky Front added another 61 thousand killed and missing.

Marshal Rokossovsky called this operation "a step towards an undertaking", which "turned out to be beneficial only to Prague, who had crossed the defenses ...": "Continuous offensive battles devoured people like a flame dry grass ... The operations remained unfinished. And if so, then they did not delay the forces and resources expended on them. Vytalchivaya of the enemy, we only weakened ourselves (italics

126

our. - Ayat.). In addition, they were in an unfavorable position: they stretched the front line, writing out incredible "monograms" from the ta kis, which gave the enemy the opportunity to cut off numerous ledges (which led to the death of units of the 33rd, 29th, and subsequently the 39th armies. - Auth)".

The reason that prevented the successful completion of the offensive of the Lepis, our commanders say is the lack of forces and means. And they are to blame for everything - Stalin and the G2ishtab, they say, swung too much. This is only partly true. But, firstly, when planning the winter offensive, the picture from the generals did not object to the stated goals and all their criticism is dated backdating; secondly, we have already seen how illiterately the available forces were squandered,

The aforementioned report of Colonel Vasilchei to the main blame for the defeat (taken achieved, like the deeply covered flanks of von Klugs, for an officer of the General Staff was a sign of success. - Auth.) placed on the gist of the army Zhukov, who directly led the troops of the Western Front and the right

leniya:

"The operational plan of the operation for the sudden destruction of Vyazma, the exit and rear of the Gzhatsk-Vyazma group of the enemy, the separation of the Vyazma group from the Yukhnov group and their simultaneous defeat in parts, did not correspond to the availability of forces and means allocated for this purpose by the Western Front.

An incorrect assessment of the enemy's ability to fight after serious defeats in previous battles.

Incorrect timing and ignorance of the conditions in which our troops operated led to an incorrect decision, as a result of which the duma operation was completed.

If the Western Front had first collapsed with all its left wing (33rd, 43rd, 49th, 50th and Count Belova)

new grouping, would surround the EU and destroy it, for

127

which, according to the conditions of the situation, provided a full opportunity, and then, together with the right wing, in cooperation with the Kalinin Front, could liquidate the Sychevsk-Gzhatsk-Vyazma grouping of the enemy.

But instead, the Western Front prematurely pursued large targets, at the same time wanted to destroy the Gzhatsko-Vyazemskaya, Yukhpovskaya, Spas-dsmepskaya, Myatlevskaya groupings of the enemy, we do not have sufficient forces and means for this. The actions of the Western Front were likened to action with outstretched fingers. Each army had its own strike force, which acted on its own command line in close coordination with its neighbors. Even when the 43rd and 49th armies were correctly aimed to solve the common task of breaking through the enemy defenses in order to link up with units of the western grouping of the 33rd army, then in this case too close interaction between them was evident.

The armies, accustomed to acting independently, without linking their actions with their neighbors, continued to remain true to their old principles.

It turned out like this: when the shock group of one army advances, then the other one stood in place, then they changed roles. And the command of the Western Front continued to observe how the strike groups of the two armies were fighting side by side, and did not interfere in their affairs until the operation on this front was finally thwarted (our italics. - Aat.).

The Western Front did not create a kulak in the form of a powerful grouping or all branches of the armed forces in a decisive direction, with the help of which it would solve the problem of a large operational scope.

Forces and means were almost evenly distributed over the entire huge front. The loud calls given by the commander of the Western Front were unrealistic. Not a single order for the entire operation was carried out on time by the troops (our italics, - Auth.) They remained

128

blank paper, which did not reflect the actual position of the troops and was not an operational document. And the haste that the command of the Western Front showed was transmitted to

troops and attributed great harm to the cause.

Operations began unprepared, without the close interaction of the Arms of the Forces, units were brought into battle in batches, in parts, they thwarted any surprise, just to start the operation quickly, without analyzing the future fate. at

Aviation was also divided along the entire front into small groups, there were no concentrated strikes in succession in certain directions, and when the troops broke through the prepared enemy defenses in advance, they almost did not participate on the battlefield, which negatively affected the morale of the troops.

Tank and artillery weapons were also irrationally used and heavily dispersed.

The control of the troops operating in this direction on the part of the Western Front was weak.

This was especially pronounced in the absence of sufficient reserves for the commander of the Western Front, who could not influence the course of operations without them.

The German "colleagues" agree with these assessments:

"The stubborn and inflexible pursuit of the goals set for itself by more and more fierce attacks in the same places in all respects greatly facilitated the task of the German command to break the onslaught of the enemy."

lcd"

The total losses of the Kalinin and Western fronts in the Rzhev-Vyazemsky operation from January 8 to April 20, 1942, according to conservative estimates, amounted to

776889 people, 7296 guns and mortars, 957 tanks and 550 combat aircraft.

5 Year 1942 - training "123

Army Group Center, according to Soviet estimates, from January 1 to March 30 lost more than 330 thousand people. According to German sources, the losses of the Wehrmacht on the entire Eastern Front from January 5 to April 25 reached 318 thousand killed, wounded and missing,

These are the results of the military labor of the most "outstanding" Soviet commander,

talnys? However, there were many talented commanders in the Red Army. It's just that the selection for the highest position was made according to other criteria. The gigantic and cumbersome military mechanism created by Stalin, consisting of interchangeable "cogs" and "gears" that did not have the right to pass with: a solid idea, looked menacing only at parades and exercises, and in a real war it could work only with abundant grinding with blood. The commanders of the Zhukovsky warehouse turned out to be the best "oilers".

Who, against the background of the dinosaur K.M. Voroshilov, without gift F.I. Kuznetsov or the real Krstina GG. C4-Kolova - Zhukov and Konev really looked like true coryphs of Eastern thought.

"..AND CONQUERING CRIMEA"

An army of rams led by a lion is stronger
than an army of lions led by a ram.

Napoleon Bonaparte

As early as August 23, 1941, Hitler sent a note to the High Command of the German Land Forces
forces:

"For reasons of a political nature, it is imperative to reach the areas
where

130

Yes, Russia is getting oil, ps only to deprive it of this oil, and above all, to give Iran hope for the possibility of receiving assistance from the ISMC in the near future in case of resistance to threats from the Russians and the British.

One of the shortest roads to the Caucasus led through the Crimea. The peninsula was a very convenient springboard for air bases. Being in Soviet hands, it made it possible to bomb the rear of the German troops operating near Rostov, to keep the oil-bearing regions of Romania, which supplied three-quarters of the oil consumed by the industry of the Reich, under aviation influence. Accordingly, the capture of the Crimea gave the Germans a springboard for jumping across the Kerch Strait to the Taman Peninsula and a well-defended airfield from which aviation could operate in the direction of the Caucasus.

In addition, the main base of the Black Sea Fleet was located in Sevastopol. Its position provided control over maritime communications, the possibility of intercepting enemy transport, shelling the Romanian coast, oil fields and ports. Yurazlo's weaker fleet of Romania, consisting of four destroyers and three destroyers of a very respectable age, three gunboats, three torpedo boats and one submarine, was not able to seriously resist the Soviet forces - one battleship, five cruisers, three leaders and thirteen destroyers, eighty-four torpedo boats, forty-seven submarines Ypres. The capture of Sevastopol would force the ships of the Black Sea Fleet to move to remote, technically poorly equipped bases on the Caucasian coast.

181

SURRENDER OF CRIMEA

The leadership of the Red Army was well aware of the strategic importance of the peninsula. To protect the Crimea, after the defeat of the Southern Front, the threat of invasion from the mainland was abolished. On August 14, 194, the Stavka decided to create a Separate 51st Army with the rights of the front and the operational subordination of the Black Sea Fleet. The commander of this army was appointed the notorious General-Colonel F.I. Kuznetsov, who for the full 2 months had already managed to "steer" the North-Western and Central fronts. The army "mission included 106, 156, 27] and 276th rifle, 32, 40th, 42nd and 48th cavalry divisions. Another 4 divisions were urgently formed from local draft pikes and militias. The task of the 51st Army was not to allow incursions into the Crimea by land through Perscopsky Pereshsk and Sivash, but also to prevent the landing of sea and air assault forces - the commander had enough troops for this. All that was left was to manage them properly.

However, instead of determining the direction of the most probable enemy offensive - and even on the globe it is clear that this is primarily a Persian Persian - and accordingly distributing his forces, General Kuznetsov began to build a circular defense of the Crimea. The cavalry divisions were scattered all over the peninsula to deal with possible air raids, the 27th rifle division was concentrated in Simfsropouls as the commander's reserve. Four Crimean divisions - 172, 184, 320 and 321 - were supposed to defend the Black Sea coast near Evpatoria, Sudak, Alushta - in the event of a naval landing, and all this with the absolute dominance of the Soviet FORCES "on the ground, in isbes and pamors."

Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union I.S. Isakov wrote about this: "The Germans had no opportunities for landing (toppage, cover, support from the sea),

132

even if they could send 2-3 divisions into the landing ... But, apparently, everyone was infected with the psychosis of de saita, moreover, of the sea. This "psychosis" led, for example, to the fact that during the entire period of the fighting for the Pseresheyki, the 321st Rifle Division stood idle near Evpatoria, and the 184th - in the same position of the nabersgu in the region of Balaklava-Sudak. For the same reason, in anticipation of powerful enemy squadrons, naval comrades in the first war filled up coastal waters with minefields, which subsequently, due to navigational and navigational errors, managed to blow up 4 of their own destroyers.

As a result, 3 rifle divisions under the general command of General P.I. Batov. Moreover, the 276th had to defend

to take the Chopgar Peninsula and the Arabat Spit - the direction for the advancing side is unpromising, the 106th stretched for 70 km along the southern coast of the Sivash, there were lines on Perskop, 5 battalions of the 156th division of P.V. Chernyaev.

Thus, the commander of the 51st Army acted in the best traditions of the cordon strategy of the KhUsk, dispersing his forces throughout the territory and not thinking about concentrating forces on the most probable direction of an enemy attack - Perekop. Of the nearly 100,000 bayonets available to the Crimean army, 30,000 were defended from the mainland, of which 7,000 were located in Persko. Fears firmly settled in the head of Gsisral Kuznetsov that the enemy would arrange for him a new Crete or Norway.

At the beginning of September, the Germans crossed the Dnieper in its lower reaches without hindrance, by September 12 they completely blockaded the peninsula, and the threat of an invasion of the Crimea from land became an absolute reality.

To solve this problem, the German General Staff sent the 11th Army, the command of which on September 17 was taken over by Colonel-General Erich von Manstein. To him

133

the 3rd Romanian Army of General-Regiment Dumitrescu was subordinated. Most of these forces continued their offensive to the east in the Melitopol-Rostov government. Only the 54th army corps of General Gaizeia, consisting of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions, was turned to the Crimea.

The Perskop positions were considered almost impregnable by the Soviet commanders, and Manstein understood the complexity of the task assigned to his troops. The only crossroad suitable for an offensive in the northern part is only 8 km wide and 30 km long. Attacks along it could only be carried out frontally, besides, the area is completely open - in good weather, visibility reaches 15-20 km, which makes it possible to secretly accumulate troops.

Peretssk was prepared for defense by field-type structures, which began to be erected at the end of July, after the Southern Front abandoned the Distrov line. More than 40 thousand people worked on the construction. In addition to the existing old Tatar rampart and a ditch in front of it 10-20 m deep, 2 more anti-tank ditches, trenches, false positions were dug, anti-tank hollows and long-term ogie points were installed. Since there were no anti-tank, no anti-infantry missions in service with the "most offensive of all armies", at the suggestion of naval specialists, naval mines and artillery bombs were installed in the forefield, exploding by wires (many of them did not work, and these "surprises" have to be neutralized to this day). Somewhat to the south, the village of Armyansk was located, turned into a reference point.

But even after breaking through Perekop, the attacker found himself still on the same isthmus - Itunsky. It will reach a width of 15 km, but due to the presence of five fairly large salt lakes. real polo

134

sa offensive narrowed in this area to 3-4 km. South of the Ishun positions, the Chatyryk River ran from east to west, the swampy bed of which was another natural barrier.

Artillery support for the Soviet PSHOTs was to be provided by 8 naval coastal batteries - the ZG gun, which were located on the northwestern coast of Crimea and the southern coast of the Sivash, and the Ordzhonikidze armored trains.

It is noteworthy that the memories of the battle for the Crimea were left by both of its direct leaders - ns

German Field Marshal Manstein and Soviet General Colonel P.I. Batov. The latter, literally from the second page of his work, honors the enemy with an "extremely objective and incendiary memoirist", citing "apokryphic information" coupled with "obscene lies".

Then pay! the commander enumerates all the formations of the 11th German army - 10 divisions, including its divisions, which, such as the SS Viking division, were never included in it, and reports that in addition to all this, Manstein had 40 artillery regiments, absolute superiority into the air and the darkness of tanks,

That is, it is clear that the enemy was incredibly strong, "How could our army commander organize a successful fight against this huge force, if he did not have artillery groups in the 9th corps, and on the army scale?" - General Batov asks an inquisitive reader. And he himself answers: "The only possibility is to take artillery from the divisions scattered throughout the entire territory of the peninsula and therefore endowed with no inactivity (our cursive. - Auth) divisions ... but the commander did not dare to take such a risk. that "a thunderstorm came to Perekop and it was impossible to bring all the forces here," and is Manstein to blame that the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet - 626 planes, including 346 fighters and 136 bombers - was mainly occupied by the lawsuit of "enemy naval forces"?

135

On September 24, having pulled up all the army's heavy artillery and engineering units, the Germans began the assault on Perekop with the forces of the 46th and 73rd infantry divisions. The Soviet troops put up stubborn resistance, defending each trench and strong point, but on September 26, operating along the Perekop Bay, Anzen's corps broke through the rampart and captured Armyansk. On the same day, Batov launched a counterattack with the forces of the exhausted 156th and the approaching 172nd, 271st rifle and 47th cavalry divisions. The single combat was still smoky, the Perskop positions went out of hand four times.

As usual, the pockets of the very first German soldiers taken prisoner were filled with "vile photographs: one rapes a girl, others with drunken faces are waiting for a goose." Again, a paradox: on the one hand, every second Soviet general tries to present the Wehrmacht as a bail of maniac tourists with cameras (stories about "foul photographs" roam from memoirs to memoirs with statutory sdnpo-imagination), on the other hand, it's a mistake, how did they manage to be so professional beat the red commanders. armed with the most advanced military spider? Sopst soldiers were forbidden to have cameras until the end of the 20th century (see the Charter of the internal service of the USSR Armed Forces), petoi

describe if they were filming something at a time when, breaking into the "lair of the fascist beast", they took "trophies" and, at the call of I. Ehrenburg, "broke the pride of the arrogant German people"

In the most difficult battles, the German corps defeated the Soviet units at Perekop and forced them to retreat to Ishun. Manshteyn reports on the capture of 10 thousand prisoners, 135 guns and 1 12 slippers. However, the victory came at a high price, Glien's corps lost about 8'000 in killed and wounded. Human. There was no force to break through the Ishup positions.

The news of the surrender of Perkop, according to the recollections of all participants in the events, made a stunning impression. Only General Batov will not be surprised: all

136

our 156th division had to enter into "one-on-one combat with the enemy, who had a triple superiority in manpower and artillery and absolute superiority in tanks and aircraft" (italics pash. - Auth.). This is exactly what a "deliberate lie" is. While the Soviet troops on the third day of fighting brought their forces to four divisions on the front, the same two infantry divisions from the 54th Corps were still active on the enemy side. The remaining formations of the 1st Army fought off the Soviet pastuplepis between Dpepr and the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov, which was thickening on September 26, and Manstein did not have the opportunity to transfer a single additional regiment to Hansen. But the most important trick is that the Germans, at the same time, practically did not have air support and they did not have one slipper.

Here, Colonel-General Batov describes in colorful detail the difficulties of anti-tank combat, operating with dozens of enemy vehicles!

"At 7.30, German slippers appeared, followed by thick chains of infantry, above them whole flocks of fighters covering ... In the first echelon of the Germans there were T-4s (there were only a little more than 200 pieces on the entire Soviet-German front of the T-4 slippers and, Of course, most of them were thrown against General Batov, just think, Operation Typhoon is unfolding somewhere near Moscow! (At first there were 12-15 of them per kilometer front, then this number increased to 20-22 (yes, this is already a whole tank division, by no means mezshtss! - Auth.)

..tanks ironed NP batteries ...

Seven chains went to the positions of the 417th regiment at a distance of 200-300 m from one another. Fifteen T-4 tanks were ahead... German tanks tried to break through passages in wire obstacles and gouges... The Germans threw up to four tanks into battle in a relatively narrow area.

regiments with 50 tanks ... Everyone asks where are our tanks when the Nazis have an abyss ... "

There are more and more Atanks: "Against each unit, from 20 to 30 enemy tanks acted,

187

supporting the breakthrough of their infantry ... The enemy's middle slippers are participating in the counterattacks ... The Germans are concentrating up to 70 tanks ... "

If we count after Batov, then the enemy had 150 tanks. At the same time, none of the Soviet sources informs us of the pom-tank division. which operated as part of Mapshteip's army. And they cannot do this for a simple reason: in the entire Army Group "South" there were only 5 tank divisions, all of them at that time were part of the Kleist tank group and rushed to Rostov. Manstein had to send his only motorized formation there, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, which, however, also had tanks.

There were just enough defenders of Perekopatanka, not many, by Soviet standards, but still more than hundreds. For example, in the 172nd Rifle Division of Colonel I.G. Toroptsev, the 5th Tank Regiment operated - 56 amphibious tanks and 10 "thirty-fours", and in the 156th - a paid talk reconnaissance battalion,

Nuikou us here "sandy memoirist"?

It was only at the beginning of October that the 11th Army was again able to take up its main task - the occupation of the Crimea. This time, the 30th and 54th Army Corps - 6 infantry divisions - were included in the composition of the pas. The army of Dumitrsk was withdrawn from its subordination, but Maishtein managed to beg the Romanian mountain and cavalry brigades to protect their rear.

The number of Soviet troops in the Crimea also increased by this time. In the period from October 7 to 16, the Primorsky Army of Major General I.E. was evacuated from Odessa to Sevastopol. Petrov - 5 divisions, 86 thousand soldiers and commanders, 462 guns, 24 tanks and 20 thousand tons of ammunition. Thus, under the command of Kuznetsov there were already 12 rifle and 4 cavalry divisions - 235,600 people. Let's add here the absolute quantitative superiority of the Soviet fleet in the sea and Soviet aviation in the air.

138

Meanwhile, Manstein was preparing to storm the Yishun-

positions: "The command did not have ... any opportunities to ease the difficult task of the offensive by any tactical measures for the troops. © a sudden attack on the enemy was out of the question. The enemy was expecting an offensive in well-equipped defensive positions. As at Perekop, any possibility of envelopment or even flanking fire was ruled out, since the front rested on one side against Siwa, and on the other against the sea. The offensive was to be carried out frontally, as if along three narrow channels, which were divided by lakes located here.

The cirina of these bands allowed only three divisions of the 54th corps, 7.46 and 22nd, to be brought into battle in the first echelon. That is, General Salmuth's 80th Corps—the 50th, 72nd, and 1st 70th Infantry Divisions—could only go into battle after occupying the territory of the south of the Persians. Vengeance was a completely flat solonchak steppe without the slightest shelter. So General Batov admits: "Our positions on the isthmuses were convenient in that the attacker was deprived of the opportunity to maneuver with a flank ogy...

nom". ›

The offensive of the 11th Army began at 5.10 am (October 8) and took place in extremely difficult conditions. Soviet planes dominated the air and continuously attacked any enemy target.

"Ns only the infantry on the front lines and the batars had to dig in, it was necessary to tear off trenches for each wagon and horse in the rear zone in order to shelter them from enemy aircraft .. Only when Mölders was subordinated to the army by this fighter squadron, he succeeded clear the sky, at least during the daytime. At night, even he could not prevent enemy air raids. However, mense

139

German infantry stubbornly gnawed through the defense, pushing the enemy from the isthmus and trying to break out into the operational space.

From the Soviet side, the Nshun positions were defended at first by five rifle divisions, two cavalry divisions and the 7th Marine Brigade, and then their number was increased to eight rifle and three cavalry: from October 22, the formations of the Primorsky Army - the 25th Chapaevskaya and the 95th rifle, 2nd cavalry divisions, which received orders to restore the situation. The style of work of the headquarters of the Separate 51st Army in these decisive days for the fate of the Crimea is interesting: for example, December 19 is Sunday

day, and arrived in Simferopol with applications for fuel and ammunition, the Chief of Staff of the Primorsky Army, General N.I. Krylov can't find anything but the officers on duty—a day off, sir.

"And at this time Bonaparte was crossing the border..."

On October 20, the Ismians occupied Ishun, crossed the mouth of the Chatyrlyk River, and along the coast of the Karkinit Bay began to enter deep into the peninsula, into the steppe. Even now, the commander of the 51st Army does not orient himself in the situation: he will give Batov a categorical order "to hold the Ishun positions" and at the same time point out to General Savipov the need to "stubbornly defend Chopgar and Sivash", where the enemy will not show any activity.

Two days later, the Headquarters recalled General Kuznetsov to Moscow, and appointed Vice-Admiral GI as commander of all forces in the Crimea. Levchenko.

LJ"

On October 24-26, the troops of the Primorsky Army of Petrov and the operational group of Batov, who advanced to the north, tried to launch counterattacks, but the units were brought into battle on the move, separately, without artillery support, so they did not achieve their goals. Manstein threw on the scales handed to him from

140

Army Group "South" 132nd Infantry Division, and the Germans finally seized the initiative.

As General Batov beautifully described the essence of the problem, the Soviet formations "took part in the battles, but at different times. If you are not afraid of metaphors, then we can say that one or another of our divisions appeared on the arena of the Ishun battle and performed its heroic monologue ... The valor of the soldiers and the skill of commanders and political workers on the scale of regiments and divisions had to compensate for the lack of concentration and a single purposeful plan as a whole. In other words, and without metaphors, the valor of the soldiers and high-ranking officers, their lives once again paid for the mediocrity of the operational leadership.

Copechno, let's not forget that in terms of numerical strength the staff of the German division outnumbered the staff of the "Soviet" by about three, but the old tactical rule is also true that one soldier in defense is equal to three attackers, But even this ratio was not there, the Soviet side on Yishun positions had a clear numerical superiority over the opponents

com. But during the whole battle, our units had connections between themselves and the command, so the headquarters "daddies rushed around the steppe day and night", As Bultre did not invent radio Popovesche in 1895, and, it seems, it was in Russia (however, why is it funny to lie here , if only twenty years earlier the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command learned about the defeat of three of its fronts in the Moscow government from messages from the Berley radio). And our aviation, after the 8th Luftwaffe air corps was brought into battle, lost air supremacy.

Vitoge "the counterattack of the Primorsky Army was met by a massive enemy artillery fire and a large group of German bombers under the cover of fighters", and on October 28, after 10 days of fighting, the Soviet defense collapsed.

The writer V. Karpov described this very literary:

141

"The Nazis broke through the Yishun positions. With their tank and mechanized columns, they broke out into the Crimean steppe expanse ... If the Primorye could beat off infantry with small arms, then there was simply nothing to fight with tanks. Oh, those "tank and mechanized columns" on their viscous teeth! Manstein did not have a single tank, so the Primorye had not "nothing" to fight with them, but there was no need. A mechanized column, ksgati, is just infantry riding in cars.

General Batov also continues to fight in his virtual reality: "...according to intelligence data, 6 battalions and 30 tanks were concentrated in the Filatovka-Karpova Balka area ... the number of enemy 'ganks of Armyansk increased by 100...

The fighters climbed onto the tanks and threw bottles of fuel...
An Ismet tank fired a projectile at the battalion commander right at the command post...

The Germans with part of their forces went behind the 29th battery and again threw about 30 tanks and an infantry battalion against it. Unequal fight...

The 170th German infantry division, with which more than 60 infantry support tanks operated, broke out to the mouth of the Chatyryk.

Batov's aboev comrade-in-arms, General I.A. Laskin authoritatively reports that the Germans concentrated 375 tanks in the Perekop direction, which is about half of the armored forces of Army Group South,

When, while reading the memoirs of Soviet commanders, you keep in mind that all this did not really happen, then, by God, you can earn schizophrenia. All of Manstein's "tank hordes" at that time consisted of 24 \$1 and S Sh self-propelled guns from the 190th assault gun battalion.

At the end of October, the defeated 51st Army rolled back to the Kerch Peninsula, the troops under the command of General Petrov - 6 exhausted divisions - sarrier

142

guard battles through the mountains retreated to Sevastopol to protect the main base of the fleet. The Germans took about 26 thousand prisoners, but they themselves suffered heavy (by their standards) losses. Only the 54th Corps near Ishup and Perekop lost 1920 men killed and 7273 wounded. For comparison, the Soviet 172nd Rifle Division alone irretrievably lost 100 men, 64 tanks, and all of its artillery.

...

For the pursuit and final defeat of the enemy, Manstein sent three infantry divisions in the direction of Feodosia-Kerch, two - to Simferopol-Alushta, and two divisions received the task of advancing to Bakhchisaray--Sevastopol. To get ahead of Petrov's troops and break into Sevastopol on the move. From the Romanian motorized regiment, German artillery battalions and reconnaissance battalions, having collected cars and motorcycles from a "pine collection", Ziegler's consolidated motorcycle brigade was created. (In this impromptu formation, General Batov managed to count as many as 210 tanks - more than in any Wehrmacht tank division; one involuntarily gets the impression that Manstein's tanks bred like some kind of rabbits. Another pang source so directly indicates: "The enemy sent all new and new tanks". On October 30, on the outskirts of the city, the brigade was stopped by the Soviet coastal batteries and naval infantry units. This day is considered to be the beginning of the Svastopol defense. Following the motorized brigade, the 132nd Infantry Division approached the city, and November 4 - parts of the 50th Infantry Division. However, they succeeded in capturing Sevstopol, immediately. :

The Sevastopol garrison numbered about 52 thousand people, had 162 field and coastal guns, 194 anti-aircraft guns, as well as the Zheleznyakov armored train. True, most coastal defense batteries, armed with 41 guns, could fire only at

143

side of the sea. Ogisvuk support for the ground units was also provided by detachments of warships consisting of the cruisers Krasny Krym and Chervopa Ukraine, three destroyers, patrol boats and minesweepers. It was a strong group of long-range artillery of large and medium caliber. 82 planes of the naval aviation remained in Sevastopol. The 8th brigade, 2 regiments and 7 separate battalions, marines took part in the defense of the city from land.

On November 4, all these forces were united into the Sevastopol Defensive Region (SOR). The general leadership of the defense was entrusted to the commander of the fleet, Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, General Petrov was appointed his deputy for the land unit. For the convenience of command and control of troops, the SOR was divided into 4 sectors, headed by commandants.

On the night of November 7, separate units of the 172nd Infantry Division and the 7th Naval Infantry Brigade arrived in Sevastopol from Yalta by sea. and a day later, units of the Primorsky Army began to approach - a total of almost 30 thousand fighters and commanders, 360 guns and mipoms, 10 Taikov T.26. With continuous counterattacks, with effective support from naval artillery, the defenders of the city forced the enemy to stop and proceed to a grouping of forces.

During the period of the so-called "first pgurm", and exactly on November 7, "on the 24th anniversary of the October Revolution," a group of sailors under the command of political instructor N.D. performed their fantastic feat. Filchenkova from the 18th separate battalion of the marines (coastal defense).

In the presentation of Commissioner L.N. Efimsiko it was like this:

"Not knowing what and where the enemy is in charge, we, in order to strengthen the combat security, formed as many as five groups, which we called reconnaissance. One such group was led by political instructor Nikolai Filcheikov. Opa advanced to a height near the road that goes to the Severiss Duvankoy highway ... Then

144

Filchenkov let them know at the command post that tanks had appeared and that he and his Red Navy men would try to hold them back.

Seven tanks were advancing, Filchenkov's group roared on their way with grenades and bottles. The scouts knocked out three tanks. The rest turned back - the Germans, they must have stolen the pug, did not understand that there were only five of us ... And then fifteen gunks appeared there. We have already prepared to meet them at the forefront. But Filchenkov decided not to allow them to the battalion

frontier. And he didn't allow it. Five sailors destroyed more than a few tanks. They had a fair amount of grenades, but, of course, they had enough for such a battle. The grenades are running out, the attackers are climbing ... In order to somehow delay them, our guys began to throw themselves under the tracks with the last granites. Filchenkov was the first, followed by two beauties of the fleet, it seems, they were already raisins ... All five were killed. The last one, Vasily Tsibulko, died in the arms of our military assistant Petrenko. From him, the main thing is known ... Three other Kraspoflotmen were called Ivan Krasposelsky, Yuri Parshin and Daniil Odintsov.

There are many absurdities in this story. For example, why is it that an intelligence group, sent to collect information about the enemy, decided to engage in battle with twenty-two tanks and "allow them" to reach the battalion line. In the official, later version, Filchenkov's group is already called a fighter group, armed with an easel machine gun, which, of course, the scouts could not have, and in an unequal battle destroys 10 tanks and up to 200 enemy soldiers. It's also hard to imagine in practice how 4 sailors, led by the head of the club, who didn't bother to dig even the most primitive trench, but simply "lay down" in the path of an armored column, laid down such a number of adversaries. On the Elney this was also corrected: they didn't lie down, but "strengthened themselves in a dilapidated dugout in front of the height of the road."

145

But why go under the caterpillars? Isn't it easier to put a grenade there?

This rebus is easily solved if you remember that the Germans did not have tanks, so no one had to throw themselves under the tracks. The mythical enemy tanks were needed by the Soviet commanders in order to justify their defeat in the Crimea. In our reality, Filchenkov's group has gone missing, and no one has ever seen a military battle or at least the bodies of the dead "heroes", including the "dying Qi Bulko". However, the myth, born of the faitasis of political officers and the talent of the writer Andrei Platonov, entered into

canon.

The first description of this battle, which arose in the bowels of the Political Directorate of the Black Sea Fleet, shows that its authors never saw the alpine battle feast or real tanks themselves. I wonder how the veterans felt. when the propagandists recited to them such pearls:

"Pemtsy appeared in the morning. Tanks were moving along the highway and fields, covering the German infantry with their armor. Huepers and Messerschmitts roared in the air...

At any cost, it is necessary to stop the tanks, cut off the infantry from them, "Who will undertake this daring and courageous deed?" asked the battalion commissar. Everyone volunteered, but this honor fell to the political officer Filcheikov, the Red Navy Tsibulko, Parshin, Krasnoselsky, Odintsov (and what did the whole battalion do? - Auth.) ...

... Then Krasnoselsky ran forward with four bottles in his hands (2). With a well-aimed blow, he lit one tank, then another

... The tank is moving closer and closer, the sroy rushes under the tracks. A heavy explosion is heard, so it falls heavily on its side (did the wheels go flat? - Auth.

In the future, not a single narration about the events of November 1941 in Soviet historiography and msmu aristics could do without mentioning the feat of the Black Sea sailors, just as the defense of Moscow was without

146

28 Paifilov's men", and the defense of Stalingrad without "33 armor-piercers", The parallel between these myths is obvious, the Panfilov's also died under the caterpillars of slippers, while "scratching the steel plates with their fingers". The title of Hero of the Soviet Union Filchenkov), Odintsov, Krasnoselsky, Tsibulko and Parshin was awarded almost a year later - on October 23, 1942.

On November 10, the Isms completed the encirclement of Sevastopol.

..

In the eastern part of the Crimea, the remnants of the 51st Army retreated in disorder towards Kerch. I apologize, the organizations retreated, holding back the pressing enemy:

"To maintain the combat readiness of the small divisions (106th, 157th, 276th and 320th divisions), the people in which were on the verge of exhaustion of physical and moral strength, the commanders were helped by commissars, officers of the political department, and political workers of the units. Being constantly in companies and batars, they, with a personal example of courage and courage, with a truthful Bolshevik word, instilled in the soldiers confidence in the final victory over the enemy "(Gvardeyskaya Chernigovskaya. M., 1976. P. 43).

But even with the help of the "truthful Bolshevik word" it was not possible to stop the enemy's 42nd corps in the Ak-Mo Nai positions, they were abandoned on November 6th. The above source reports that there were a lot of enemies - "strong moving parts" and at least 50 slippers. Manstein will soon have a tank army! In the meantime, Admiral Levchenko was gossiping in the name of Stalin that the situation was extremely difficult: the Soviet units were completely demoralized.

vans, incompetent and unable to keep Kergchensky. peninsula. Raised great concern. the possibility of losing the entire materiel of artillery and equipment. The commander of the united Crimean troops asked the Supreme permission to proceed with the evacuation of troops on the Taman Peninsula

island.

147

On November 12, Marshal GI arrived in Kerch. Kulik, on the personal instructions of the leader: to assist the command of the 51st Army, to prevent the enemy from forcing the Kerch Strait and entering the North Caucasus from the Crimea. The study of the situation plunged the marshal into shock. There was not a single military unit on the Tamap Peninsula, except for the border guards, there was a complete lack of defensive structures, with the exception of single rifle cells, dug by the fighters of the mountain regiment, which was already transferred to Kerch and drawn into battle. The enemy could land with complete impunity landing.

On the other side of the strait, the German units came close to Kerch, and the artillery, having occupied the dominant heights, shelled the city and the piers. The commander of the Crimean troops and the headquarters of the 51st Army were found by Kulik in caves, not far from the pier. After listening to the reports, the marshal realized that neither Levchenko nor the chief of staff were in control of the situation. The admiral, according to Kulik, "...represented himself as a limp political officer, talking a lot, but no one listened to him." Landing on the front line left a favorable chattel. The division commanders reported to the marshal that they were holding on mainly thanks to artillery, that there were few infantry and that they were assembled in the main from the rear, the units were mixed, poorly controlled and retreated at the slightest pressure from the enemy. Fifty German submachine gunners occupied the old fortress, dispersing the consolidated battalion of marines that "defended" the SS. The front was actually held back by two regiments of the newly arrived 302nd Rifle Division.

At the same time, on the piers, a crowd of people stormed everything that could hold on to the water. Everyone tried to get to the Taman Peninsula as quickly as possible, abandoning their equipment and personal weapons.

Returning to the cave to Levchenko and once again assessing the correlation of forces and actions of the Permians, Kulik

148

came to the conclusion that the army would not be able to defend the city for more than two days. There was only one way out, in his opinion: to transfer troops in an organized manner to the Taman Peninsula, to save weapons, primarily artillery, equipment - about 2000 guns and the same number of vehicles, otherwise the Germans would defeat the remnants of the army, which were already left | 1,500 fighters, and on the shoulders of the retreating troops will break into the unprotected Taman, and from there - into the North Caucasus.

Having made this decision, Kulik ordered the commander of the Crimean troops to immediately draw up a plan for the army to move to the Taman Peninsula and personally lead the crossing. General Batov and a member of the Military Council Nikolaev were entrusted with organizing the defense of Kerch. The chief of staff was given the task of moving to Taman and ensuring the reception of troops, and, more importantly, strengthening the defense of the Taman Peninsula. The marshal gave two days to prepare for the withdrawal, and on November 13, having sent a cipher message to Headquarters, he left Kerch.

On the night of November 15 and 16, Soviet troops evacuated to Taman. The entire Crimea, with the exception of the Sevastopol defensive region (since November 19, it came under the direct subordination of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command), ended up in the hands of the Germans. Thus, 7 infantry divisions of Manstein destroyed the main forces of the two Soviet armies. Curiously, what conclusions did General Batov draw for himself as a military professional? After all, defeat is a lesson for the mind person.

And here, please, he himself wrote about this: "I must, by the way, note that the fascist soldier as a single fighter is weak. The Nazis were strong in mass, in the ranks, and acting at their own peril and risk, they became indecisive and timid. This feature is characteristic of an invading army. What a profound observation! That's what it turns out to be! The main thing for the German soldiers was not to separate from the "mass", then they are strong and not shy, and also able to beat

149

"Batov" and "Petrov", not looking at their 3-fold superiority. Kopschko, here Kuznetsov lit up, and the enemy's tanks are simply "an abyss".

In total, during the period of the first capture of the Crimea, Mapshteip's army, according to German data, took up to 100 thousand prisoners. captured 750 guns and 630 mortars, destroyed 166 tanks and 2 armored trains. Modern Russian sources estimate the Soviet losses of the Crimean defensive operation at 63,860 people.

Vice Admiral Levchenko was arrested at the end of November

Vai and during interrogations by the Lubyanka investigators admitted that he was liar in the fact that "Under the influence of fascist propaganda about the invincibility of the German army and the power of the EU, he was in a state of shock, succumbed to panic and, having organized a rebuff to the enemy, contrary to the order of the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Red Armin, — sent the enemy a large part of the territory of Crimea with the city of Kerch. At the same time, he testified about the sabotage actions of Kulik and Kuznetsov. On January 25, 1942, the Vosina Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR sentenced Levcheiko to 10 years of imprisonment. However, six days later, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Council, his criminal record was removed and replaced with the expulsion of pafroits popizhepism with the rank of captain of the 1st district,

Less than a month later, Marshal Kulik went on trial. He was accused of defeatist explanation, failure to comply with the order of the Headquarters, unauthorized abandonment of Kerch and Rostov, and at the same time drunkenness, depraved lifestyle, abuse of the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union and embezzlement of state property. On February 16, 1942, the Supreme Court sentenced Kulik to be stripped of the titles of Marshal and Yoroï of the Soviet Union; as well as all combat awards. Three days later, by a decision of the Politburo, he was expelled from the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and removed from the post of deputy people's commissar of defense.

Tener Colonel F.I. Kuznetsov was Zhukov's deputy for the Western Front for a short time, but

150

and in this post he managed to demonstrate to Spock complete denseness in military affairs. Marshal Rokossovsky recalls how Kuznetsov arrived at the end of January 1942 to test the preparation of the 16th Army for the assaults of the Sukhinichi: "Having settled down in one of the houses with his typist (there was no one else with the cim), he called me to himself. After listening to my report, he said in a raised tone that our measures were no good. Say, instead of strengthening evenly the entire strip occupied by us (did you evenly pause in Crimea a little? ; - Auth), we, by concentrating forces to Sukhi Ilich, weaken other areas, giving the enemy the opportunity to take advantage of this. S: I could not do it in any way I agreed and considered it my duty to report from there to the front commander by telegraph. He approved my decision, and ordered Kuznetsov to leave for the 61st Army

And he didn't like it there either. The events that M.M. Popov carried out in the troops, he rejected and reported this by telephone to the Civil Code. I live cow. Orgy Konstantinovich reacted immediately: he ordered the general to take command of the 61st Army and show what he was ready for. No matter how

he tried to avoid appointment, referring that after his instructions the commander would cope with his tasks, straighten things out, he himself had to take the army and responsibility for it. Less than a week later, the Germans advanced 30 kilometers in the zone of his army. M.M. Popov again took command of the army, and F.I. Kuznetsov left the Western Front altogether.

In the end, the former commander of the three beaten fronts was appointed to the post of head of the Ishtab Military Academy - to share the experience of "uniform reinforcement". He was not judged, was not demoted in rank and was not deprived of awards. I wonder why Comrade Stalin loved Fsdor Isidorovich so much?

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It was not possible to capture the Sevastopol naval base on the move, and the German troops began to prepare more thoroughly for the assault, which was scheduled for December 17th. Six of the seven infantry divisions available in the 11th Army and separate Romanian units, supported by heavy artillery and aircraft, were to take part in it. In total, the Germans concentrated near Sevastopol 645 field and 25 anti-tank guns, 378 mortars, 300 aircraft. The reserve consisted of 2 battalions of assault self-propelled guns and 2 battalions of super-heavy artillery. Manshtsein first of all had to stop the sea traffic, through which the fortress was constantly replenished with people, equipment and ammunition. Therefore, the main blow was to be carried from the north and northeast in the direction of Severnaya Bay. In addition, only in this direction the Germans could fully use the capabilities of their artillery.

The 54th Army Corps, consisting of the 22nd, 132nd, 50th and 24th Infantry Divisions and the 6th Romanian Motorized Regiment, was supposed to attack the svers. The 72nd and 150th Infantry Divisions and the Romanian Mountain Brigade were to deliver a pinching blow along the Cherpaya River to Inkerman.

The garrison of the fortress, reinforced by sea, by this time consisted of six rifle divisions, two brigades of marines, separate regiments and battalions. Literally on the eve of the assault on Sevastopol, the 388th Rifle Division (11,000 soldiers and officers), marching reinforcements (7,500 soldiers), 22] guns and mortars, 30 new fighters and attack aircraft were delivered from the Caucasus. The number of defenders of the city grew to 81 thousand people, they had 26 T-26 tanks and 90 aircraft at their disposal. Additional strength to the defense of the Soviet troops was given by the fire of the guns of coastal batteries and battleships.

152

On December 17, at 6:10 a.m., German batteries conducted fire training, after which the infantry of the 54th Corps went on the attack. For the money, the divisions managed to advance 1-4 km, but the losses were also high - 1698 people. Supporting the attack of the 22nd division, the 197th assault division lost 7 of the 15 available self-propelled guns. The next day, the fighting became even more fierce.

Throughout the second half of December, the troops of Petrov and Manstein fought for Sevastopol, while suffering significant losses. On December 20, there was a threat that German troops would reach the Northern Bay. The Headquarters took urgent measures to reinforce the SOR troops. On December 21, a detachment of ships delivered the 79th separate rifle brigade from Novorossiysk under the command of Colonel A.S. Potapov and a battalion of marines, who stopped the enemy with counterattacks the next day.

On December 22-24, the 345th Rifle Division (10,000 soldiers) and the 81st Tank Battalion (26 tanks) arrived from Poti and Tuapse on transports and warships, and on December 28, the 386th. rifle division.

By the way, although the state of the Romanian fleet improved somewhat, the psychol diagnosed by Admiral Isakov did not pass. So, the chief of staff of the 345th division, I. Homepko, describes the difficulties of breaking through the convoy to Sevastopol: "I had to take into account that the Turks, having examined their neutrality, nevertheless let German fascists into the Chernos Sea (?). The sea was literally swarming (!) with enemy submarines and surface ships and mines, "here either eyes are wide with fear, or someone from the navy played a land colonel.

A day later, Soviet troops, supported by an army of arrived warships, including the Paris Commune battleship (the gunners of the battleship recorded 19 destroyed tanks at their own expense) and the Molotov cruiser, dealt a horseback with aircraft and tanks.

153

trular and threw back the Germans in the main direction, eliminating the threat of a breakthrough. On December 30, the division commanders reported to Manstein that further attempts to continue the offensive did not promise success. The commander of the 11th Army, who was also forced to respond to the emerging threat from the east, reluctantly gave the order to withdraw troops to the heights.

you are north of the Belbska valley, positions abandoned on December 17th.

Another assault failed. In two weeks of fighting, the 54th Corps lost 7069 soldiers and officers, of which 1318 were killed and 255 were missing, as well as 15 assault guns from the NW. significantly less. Soviet losses are indirectly estimated at 10-15 thousand people and not less than 15 slippers.

KERCH-FEODOSIA OPERATION

While the Isms were trampling around the walls of the seaside fortress, the Soviet Headquarters developed a plan for the Kerchei-Fsodosian operation, which was an integral part of the general offensive of the Red Army in the winter campaign. The goal of the SS was to once again seize the Kerch peninsula and create conditions for the liberation of the entire Crimea from the enemy. The idea was that the forces of the Transcaucasian (from December 30 Caucasian) Front, commanded by General Lieutenant D.T. Kozlov, with the participation of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov military flotilla, to land troops in the Kerch region and in the port of Feodosia, cut off from the main forces and destroy the "Kerch grouping of the enemy". The Supreme High Command attached great importance to the operation: the rapid release

154

Crimea and the lifting of the blockade of Sevastopol should have significantly improved the general situation on the southern wing of the Soviet-German front, eliminated the danger of the Germans landing on the Caucasian coast.

The main blow, in the area of Feodosia, was to be delivered by the 44th Army, removed from the Iranian border, Major General A.N. Pervushin, and the auxiliary, in the Kerch district, is the 51st Army, familiar to us, but already under the command of Lieutenant General V.N. Lvov. The landing of the troops was planned to be carried out on a broad front (up to 250 km) at several points simultaneously in order to deprive the enemy of the opportunity to maneuver with zervs and tie him down in all the most important directions. The landing forces included 8 rifle divisions, 2 infantry brigades, 2 mountain rifle regiments - a total of 82,500 men, 43 tanks, 198 guns and 256 mortars. For their support, 78 warships and 170 transport ships were involved, as well as about 500 aircraft of the Front Air Force and 161 aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet.

One week was allotted for preparing a strategic operation to land an assault on the coast occupied by the enemy - here it is, the pinnacle of naval art! Moreover, the command of the Navy was the last to know about the decision taken by the Headquarters. But there are no fortresses that the Bolsheviks would not take!

It was supposed to start on December 21, but at that time the situation near Sevastopol deteriorated sharply. At the direction of the Headquarters, the ships of the fleet urgently transferred the 79th Naval Brigade and the 345th Rifle Division, which, according to the plan, constituted the forward detachment and part of the main forces of the 44th Army landing force, to the besieged fortress. The decapitation operation had to be postponed. Instead of the departed formations, the 9th and 68th mountain rifle divisions were assigned to the Feodosia landing. It was a bold step to change the marines for mountain shooters in such a responsible and complex business, but time was running out, and there were no other parts at hand.

155

This decision added a headache to the naval crew: together with the new "passengers" they now had to ensure the delivery of a large amount of high-quality equipment and 1.5 thousand horses. (In general, there is nothing to be surprised about here, we have always preferred fire measures to thoughtful planning, and we have no irreplaceable ones. So it turned out that near Moscow and Stalingrad sailors and paratroopers fought with German tanks, bright arrows, Caucasian oboro passes! yali guardsmen, and ski battalions were formed from the Uzbeks.)

At the same time, the commander of the Froit decided to carry out the operation in two stages: on December 26, the Azov flotilla was to land troops in five points on the north side, which were to launch an offensive in the southern direction in order to unite with the troops landed by the Kerch naval base kugu from Kerch; Three days later, the ships of the Noporossian base provided the landing to the port of Feodosiya. Plans were also being made to drop an airborne assault into the paradise of Vladislavovka in order to seize the airfield, to which fighter aircraft could be relocated. After seizing the bridgeheads, the troops were given the task, with the support of the fleet and aviation, to advance on Ak-Monai.

The entire "Kercheian group" of the Yemiyevs consisted of the Igtab of the 42nd Army Corps with a subordinate cm) of the 46th Infantry Division, two regiments of half-own artillery and five anti-aircraft artillery divisions. Soviet intelligence "revealed" the presence here also of two teipkovy battalions with 118 slippers, which for some reason were not enough

were sent to the storming Sevastopol, Maistein, but this will remain on the conscience of Soviet intelligence. In addition, it was established that the port of Feodosiya was prepared for the enemy's proto-legal defense, since the new gates were open.

156

The landing of units of the 51st Army in the north-east along Berszhs began on the morning of December 26, 1941. The conditions were difficult: the iggorm was raging in the sea, the strength of the building reached 7 points, an ice edge formed, preventing the approach of ships; the air temperature dropped to 19-15 degrees below zero. In addition, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla did not have special means for unloading heavy equipment and landing troops on equipped ships. For the transfer of troops, small warships, fishing seiters, shalanly and zempairs were used. In tow, they dragged fishing lifeboats and a samokhod pys watercraft. During the night transition, the formation of the detachments broke up, thunderstorms were torn, and many boats, in which about 20 people were stuffed, were lost. The landing was delayed and not at all marked points. At the same time, it was not possible to achieve surprise,

So, the 1st detachment of the Azov flotilla was able to get to the appointed point of the sea - Kazantip Bay - and, by order of the commander of the flotilla, turned to Cape Zyuk, where the troops of the 3rd detachment landed. From the composition of the 3rd detachment to the point of landing at Cape Tarkhan at the appointed time, only one minesweeper and a Voroshilov dredger, which had a total of two boats, left. Having managed to bring 18 people to the coast, the zemsiary with 450 fighters who were on the ISM was sunk by Ismet aircraft. Having picked up more than 200 people from the water, the detachment commander decided to return to Temryuk.

Detachment "B", which was supposed to land a desapt on the southern coast of the Kerch peninsula, in the region of Mount Opuk, suffered a setback. Here summed up ne 'goal: to the weather, to and organizational tabs. The departure of the detachment under the command of Rear Admiral N.O. Abramov from Anapa was delayed for a day, twice turned back due to a storm and "mismatches" - the ships lost each other during the transition. in the end the squad

157

appointed a new landing site - in the Kerch Strait in the Kamysh-Burun.

The soldiers delivered to the landing area jumped into

ice water and wandered to the berg, where they dug in in anticipation of the next wave of landing. Many, especially wounded, froze to death, since on December 27 the storm intensified, the movement of ships along the strait was prohibited and resumed only a day later. Despite opposition from the enemy, the Soviet troops managed to capture a number of bridgeheads on both sides of Kerch and the northern coast of the peninsula. Until December 28, units of the 224th and 302nd rifle divisions and the 83rd naval infantry brigade, numbering about 14 thousand soldiers, entrenched themselves on the coast. the main forces of the 51st Army crossed over to Kerch literally on foot.

Manstein, having received a report on the Soviet Desaites, at first considered them a diversionary maneuver, with the aim of alleviating the position of the defenders of the Svasto field. He ordered the commander of the 42nd Corps, General Sponeck, to concentrate all the forces of the 46th Infantry Division and throw the Russians into the sea, and to cover Feodosia, send the 4th mountain, 8th cavalry Romanian brigades and one German infantry regiment - their last reserves. The remaining forces of the 11th Army were involved in fierce battles for Sevastopol: it seemed that it was necessary to undertake a post-dyseusilis - and the fortress would fall. Therefore, on December 28, the Germans continued the assault.

Zhik

On the night of December 29, a group of ships - 2 light cruisers and 3 destroyers - under the command of Captain 1st Rank N.E. Basistoy approached Feodosia and opened fire on the port with all her guns, firing over 2,000 artillery shells along the coast. Artillery fire was conducted over the area and turned out to be ineffective. Noon allowed unnoticed to get close to

158

the entrance to the harbor for boats with the first wave of landing. At about 2:30 a.m., an assault group of 600 marines under the command of Senior Lieutenant A.F. broke into the port on patrol boats and small minesweepers. Aidinova. They took possession of the coastal strip and the lighthouse. All this was a complete surprise for the German garrison, which was celebrating Christmas, which consisted of a sapper battalion, one coastal battery, which had 4 guns of 105 mm caliber, and an anti-tank division,

At 04:30, destroyers and cruisers entered the harbor. Troops began to land directly on the berths from warships and transport ships. The Germans resisted desperately. Although, according to Admiral A. Zubkov,

Enemy gunners "after the Christmas flask" opened fire late, they managed to sink 4 boats and cause serious damage to all the ships of the detachment, the destroyer "Shaumyan" lost the mainmast, the wardroom was smashed on the "Zheleznyakovo", and the "Nezamozhnik", trying to quickly get out of the shelling, he stuck his nose into the wall, turned his bow and was forced to return to Novorossiysk.

The cruiser "Red Crimea", which was on the roadstead, was hit by 8 shells and 3 mines. Twice the shells hit the "Shield" tanker. The cruiser "Red Caucasus" moored for more than two hours at the outer side of the pier: a strong squeezing wind interfered, and the presence of at least one tugboat in the forward detachment was not provided. During this time, the ship received 17 hits from shells and mines and, having finished unloading artillery and vehicles, was forced to retreat to the roadstead. His commander later reported that "the cruiser suppressed the right; hard batteries, hit with direct fire on an armored train (?), Tanks (?). At the same time, he got it himself. " Who was drunk and who was sober?

Nevertheless, by 11.30 a.m., more than 5,000 fighters of assault detachments with 20 guns and mortars turned out to be on the shore. Over the next 3 days, the fleet transferred

159

to Feodosia, the personnel of three rifle divisions: 23 thousand soldiers and officers, 151 guns and mortars, 34 tanks, 326 vehicles and tractors, 1550 horses, more than 1000 tons of ammunition and other cargo. Having driven the Germans out of the city by the end of January 29 (at the same time they killed 160 wounded in the hospital, many were simply thrown out of the windows in the frost) "and having thrown back the Romanian brigades that had come up, units of the 44th Army began to develop an offensive in the Northern direction.

The next day, the 51st Army liberated Kerch and moved west. Or rather, Soviet scouts entered the city and found out that it had been abandoned by the enemy. Zeisral Shpokek, fearing to be cut off, despite the categorical order of the army headquarters to hold the line, ordered his troops to clear the Kerch Peninsula,

The withdrawal of the 46th division was more like a flight, all units, having abandoned most of the artillery and military equipment, retreated in a forced march to the Ak-Mo Naysky isthmus (for unauthorized withdrawal, Count Shpo Nek was tried by a military tribunal and later shot, an alinic composition 46th Infantry [Hitler forbade nomination for any kind of awards).

As a result, the German army was in critical

which situation. As Manigeyn admitted: "If the enemy took advantage of the situation that had arisen and quickly began to pursue 46 infantry divisions (pshtnaya division. - Auth.) from Kerch, and also struck decisively after the Romanians retreating from Feodosia, then a situation would be created that was hopeless not only for this newly emerged section ... The fate of the entire 11th Army would be decided. A more resolute adversary could have been swift. they were photographed by the correspondents of the "red evels". the path of "the fabrications of Goebbels' iropledida - about that. that the Russians do not take prisoners. So, Mekhlis reported to Stakes from Kerch: "The blood runs cold from

anger and desire for revenge. I order the fascist prisoners to finish." (See "Novzian Recent History", No. 3/2000, article "Mekhlis in the Crimea").

160

Nitsina or tra-
Sometimes, first, in
order to refute:

to paralyze the entire supply of the army with a breakthrough on Dzhankoy... But the enemy did not manage to use the favorable moment. Either the enemy command did not understand its advantages in this situation, or it did not decide to use them immediately. In the meantime, it took at least two weeks to transfer the German troops from Sevastopol to the newly emerged front.

The 51st Army, which was advancing through Kerch, pursued very sluggishly, and Pervushin's troops, to Manstein's surprise, moved from Feodosia with joint forces not to the west, but to the east, towards the 51st Army. "The enemy clearly saw only his tactical goal in front of him - the destruction of our forces on the Kerch Peninsula - and completely lost sight of the opportunistic goal - the crossing of the main vital artery of the 11th Army." This allowed the Germans to create from the exhausted 46th division, one fresh infantry regiment and Romanian units, an unstable front covering 32 km long at the turn of the spurs of the Yaila-Sivash coast west of Ak-Monai. To reinforce the Romanian units, all officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers were sent, whom they could scrape together in the rear units, including from the army headquarters.

Kiskhod On January 2, 1942, Soviet troops advanced 100-110 km and cleared the Kerch Peninsula of the Germans. However, the main tasks were not completed: to destroy the German grouping and break into the depths on the shoulders of the defeated enemy.

Crimea failed. The situation required the immediate development of active operations by the Caucasian front, while Manstein had not yet managed to create a solid defense, the weakness of his forces in this sector created exceptionally favorable conditions for the development of the offensive. Sgavka pointed out to General Kozlov the need for an early exit to Perekop, as well as delivering strikes to the rear of the enemy's Sevastopol grouping.

& Year 1942 - sound 161

But the commander of the front, under the pretext that the army was not ready, delayed the transition to offensive operations. His doubts can be understood: during the landing operation, more than half of the troops participating in it were lost - 41,935 people, of which about 32 thousand were killed, frozen and missing, 35 tanks, 133 guns and mortars. In a document dated January 2, Kozlov reported that the offensive could be appointed no earlier than January 12. Then the offensive date was changed to the 16th, but it did not take place, although by that time Kozlov had 18,000 soldiers and officers at his disposal.

Even having a triple superiority in forces, the Soviet generals did not decide on a deep operation and wanted to accumulate more forces. For example, the 138th Mountain Rifle Division of the 51st Army, having arrived on the peninsula in the second half of January, received an order to move five positions west of the Semisotka station and spent a month in absolute inactivity.

He recalls the former political instructor of the 1st company of the 344th mountain rifle regiment N.P. Plotnikov:

"Revenge is open, not a bump, not a beam, not a tree. Naked, flat steppe ... And the enemy is all east and neg. Communication with the headquarters of the regiment - only through the messengers, before him as to damn kulichsk. What to do next?

The soldiers asked why we were sitting still, why we were not advancing on Vladislavovka, on Dzhankoy. And what could I answer if the regiment did not know. Yes, and our entire 138th division stood still, although it met no resistance.

Only seven days later an enemy arrived here. The previous night was over, everything was quiet, calm, but in the morning I looked: the Nazis had already dug in ahead of us, Nobody - neither we nor they - was advancing. From time to time the Persians fired, at night the Germans launched rockets - and then the whole war was in our area. Moreover, after some time the enemy calmed down: apparently, he was exhausted, maybe the ammunition ran out.

Surprisingly, the headquarters of the division, regiment (the last

sits seven kilometers from the front line, messengers run there along the rain-soaked steppe), having arrived in the combat area, does not even try to reconnoiter the situation, find the enemy, and when he, "looks", he himself showed up - to find out his strength, to probe the defense, organize surveillance, take the "language" or at least establish communication with their own units. No bossy tasks are set. All the thoughts of the fighters of the 344th regiment are busy resolving one problem! searching for food and firewood, since "the foreman could not deliver either a thermos with food or dry rations. We are thriving... Again we are sitting without food." During the day, "reconnaissance groups" go to their own rear to hunt hares. at night field kitchens are melted by quinoa and wormwood.

The lack of experience in conducting large-scale landing operations led to the complete disorganization of the rear of the landing troops. Detailed planning was carried out during preparations, the sailors did not receive exact information from the front command about the composition of the landing force and what cargoes were to be transported. Therefore, the need for maritime transportation arose unexpectedly, often changed, which led to the cluttering of loading and unloading points with excess property.

Not enough attention was paid to such an important question. as an organization of strictly centralized use of limited resources of floating facilities. On the. the peninsula was transported not only really necessary cargoes, but also bulky front-line institutions, reserve regiments and even front-line courses for command personnel, air divisions at that time did not have enough food, artillery and ammunition.

There was not a single medical institution, the nearest hospital was in the Kuban. The wounded soldiers, having received the initial dressing in the regimental dignity of the company, were taken from their positions to Kerch, from there they independently reached Novorossiysk on steamboats.

16%

ska; for all this time they saw not a single doctor or orderly.

In providing for the troops operating on the Kerch Peninsula, the port of Feodosia was to play an exceptionally important role, in which ships of large tonnage could be unloaded. Meanwhile, when planning the operation, the Soviet command did not provide for equipping the harbor with air defense systems - anti-aircraft guns were not delivered, and the port turned out to be practically defenseless against enemy air raids, which, naturally, sharply reduced its throughput.

Until January 4, in this area, under the bombs, were killed

5 transports: "Krasnogvardssts", "Tashksit", "Zyrya nin", etc. The cruiser Krasny Kavkaz, which finally delivered a separate anti-aircraft artillery division, received the most severe damage in Fso dosia. Having received 5 holes below the waterline and sinking water to the most aft towers, the ship barely made it to Tuapse. After being towed to Poti, the ship was put into overhaul for a long time.

The rear of the front was brought into a relatively satisfactory condition with great delay and was able to more or less normally carry out its tasks only by the end of March 1942—i.e. With. almost three months after the completion of the landing operation!

Delaying the start of the offensive from day to day, Kozlov's headquarters, like the commanding stations subordinate to the SMU, did not take measures to organize the defense, to consolidate on the lines reached. The troops did not only build the simplest engineering structures, but did not even organize a fire system. Likewise, the management was adjusted. And in Kerch, and in Sevastopol, military leaders of all levels were in euphoria from their successes and twirled holes for orders.

General Petrov received marching reinforcements and two fresh rifle divisions by sea. | January 1942, 20 thousand antitanks were delivered to Sevastopol

164

mines and 25 thousand anti-personnel mines, 200 swamps of explosives, as well as an operational group of engineering barriers led by the chief of staff of the engineering troops of the Red Army, General I.P. Galitsky. The latter, having inspected the defensive lines of the Primorsky Army, noted that they were equipped "very primitively", the infantry dug in "somehow", and in general, "... the troops defending Sevastopol now do not show much zeal for the engineering equipment of positions, although they suffer because of this: they are mercilessly cold and wet, they suffer unnecessary losses ... Many in the Primorsky Army believe that they will soon be ordered to attack. Hence the conclusion: why equip positions if you have to go forward?

Having moved to the Kerch Peninsula, General Ilitsky observed a similar picture): "There was no echelonpanis in depth. The army rear line was not even thought to be built. The Ak-Monai positions represent a thin line of 30% destroyed from an anti-tank ditch (built back in August-November 1941) and wire fences with a small number of pillboxes ... Separate rifle cells were opened in the subdivisions ... The leading edge of the mines not covered ... commanders under-

divisions and often believe that there is no need to dig in, since soon they will have to go on the offensive.

The commander of the 44th Army, in response to the quite reasonable considerations of military engineers that it would be nice to use the lull to devote time to defense equipment, said: "There is no need to do this. We are preparing to attack in the near future."

Fools, as you know... are taught.

zhzhz

The position of the German 11th Army at the beginning of 1942 was indeed unenviable: in the east, the front was held by meager forces; near Sevastopol, in order to prevent the withdrawal of troops from this sector, incessantly

165

Petrov's army attacked vigorously; in Evpatoria on January 5. Another Soviet landing force landed nearby, recapturing the southern part of the city from the Germans. It was not possible to transfer additional reserves to the Crimea, the German command was not possible, because all the forces of the army group "South" were shackled by the active actions of the Soviet troops in the Rostov direction,

In this situation, General Manstein showed the qualities of a real commander. First of all, he liquidated the Yevpatoriya landing force within a day. (If the latter had succeeded, it would have been possible to launch an attack on Simferopol from the west, over the level steppe, from this bridgehead. There were no doubts about the rise of the Soviet command, < the first echelon for the restoration of Soviet power in Yevpatoriya were landing parties: leaders, employees of the NKVD and the police. Od: however, a protracted storm and heavy fire from the shore did not allow the landing of reinforcements on the Evpatoria bersg, and the reinforced battalion of naval infantry captain-lieutenite G; Buzinov, numbering 700 people, was here at full strength, and the landing force itself was listed as "distracting". Similar unsuccessful landings took place in Alushta and Sudak.) Then a covert transfer of two divisions to the Fsodosiya region began, four infantry divisions and a Romanian mountain brigade were defended on the Sevastopol front.

On January 15, the Germans suddenly went on the offensive, delivering the main blow at the junction of the 51st and 44th armies in the Vladislavovka area. Despite the quantitative superiority of the Soviet troops and the presence of their armored pikes, the enemy broke through ... well, it's better to call it "defense", say, the positions of General Pervushin - the headquarters of the 44th Army was destroyed by the first air raid,

the commander was seriously wounded, a member of the Military Council of Commissars was killed, the administration was disorganized - and on January 18 he recaptured Feodosia.

According to Manstein, the Russians lost 6,700 men, 10,000 prisoners, 177 guns, and 85 tanks.

166

cov. In battles, the assault battery of the 190th battalion of three 5aS Sh was especially distinguished, knocking out 16 Soviet T-26s from close range. German aviation sank several transports in the port. The troops of the Caucasian front were forced to leave their positions and retreat behind the Ak-Monai Isthmus.

As a result of the loss of control and communication with his divisions, the commander failed to organize a counterattack and recapture Feodosia, as required by the Headquarters. The loss of the largest of the available ports could not but affect the already stupid organization of the rear. True, to continue the offensive Manstein is not a risk, due to the small number of his forces and the complete absence of tanks.

Exasperated, Stalin sent a telegram to the commander of the Caucasian Front: "...Immediately arrest the acting commander of the 44th Army, Major General Dashichev and send him to Moscow. Immediately take measures to someone to immediately bring the troops of the 44th Army into full order, stop the further offensive of the enemy and keep the city of Feodosia behind him ... "

The army was led by Colonel S.E. Christmas, but it didn't make her fight better. (The colonel was soon replaced by General S.I. Chernyak, who "looked very brave". It was he who argued with Alitsky about improving the defense, and the saddest thing is that this happened on January 27, i.e. literally 10 days after the surrender of Germans of Feodosia.)

The Soviet Headquarters also condemned the actions of General Kozlov and his staff and demanded immediate action to create an impenetrable defense on the Ak-Monai positions. But at the same time, Stalin emphasized that the task of liberating the Crimea from the Caucasian front was not removed and gave instructions on preparations for a conquest operation. Simultaneously, a number of measures were carried out to facilitate the fulfillment of these tasks.

167

On January 28, the Stavka decided to allocate

troops operating in the Kerch direction, into an independent Crimean Front under the command of General Kozlov, with the Sevastopol defensive region, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla, as well as the North Caucasian Military District subordinate to him. Front was reinforced with new rifle divisions, tank units and artillery. At the beginning of February, the 47th Army of Major General K.S. crossed the strait and became part of the front. Kalga is new.

At the same time, Moscow decided to "strengthen" the headquarters of Kozlov and the commander himself. In Kerch, accompanied by a group of officers, L.Z. Mekhlis is a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, deputy people's commissar of defense, people's commissar of Toskontrol and others, one of the main guardians of the ideological purity of the army ranks and just a person close to Stalin,

"Mekhlis, according to his custom, instead of helping, began to shuffle the leading cadres. And above all, he replaced the chief of staff of the front, Tolbukhin, with Major General Eternal, "S.M. reports to the Generalarmy. Shtemenko. Konechpo, General F.I. Tolbuhin is a clearly suspicious figure for Mekhlis: he is a former staff captain and, moreover, is married to a countess. However, Leo Zakharovich's departure farther away will have the most favorable effect on Tolbukhin's career - in 2 years he will become a marshal, but General Lieutenant Kozlov will finish the war and go into reserve in 1954, all in the same rank.

The primary task of the front was to prepare and carry out an operation to unblock Svastopol. Especially for his "generals" the Supreme Commander sent out the "Decree on the organization of an offensive operation and battle." Stalin demanded "to replace in practice the thixarmies and fronts of action with separate divisions

168

by the actions of shock groups concentrated in one direction; to radically improve the use of artillery in support of advances by infantry and tanks; carefully and comprehensively organize the interaction of troops and ensure their reliable command and control during combat and operations.

The Supreme High Command approved the date for the start of the operation on February 26-27, 1942, [with Hial Kozlov assured the Headquarters that by this time most of the issues related to organizing the rear and providing the troops with everything necessary would be resolved. By the beginning of the offensive, the Crimean Front had twelve rifle divisions, one cavalry division,

several separate tank battalions with heavy KV's and among the T-34s and artillery units of the RGK. Of the total number of troops, 9 divisions were part of the first echelon of the front.

Manstein was able to oppose them with 3 German infantry divisions and the 18th Romanian, which Marshal Antonovsk threw under him. The EU was placed on the wrong flank with the expectation that, resting against the Azovskos Mors, the Romanian soldiers would be able to hold the position, "because the swampy terrain in front of the EU front made it unlikely that the enemy would use large forces." Another Romanian division covered Evpatoria. General Pstrov, in the Sevastopol defensive region, had seven rifle divisions and three brigades against four German infantry divisions and one Romanian mountain brigade. Thus, the Soviet troops in the Crimea had sufficient superiority in forces to successfully complete the assigned task. .

The offensive of the Crimean Front began on February 27 and developed very slowly: incessant rains began to charge, the ground was soaked so that even tanks got stuck in the mud. At the same time, the Primorsky Army from Sevastopol launched strikes in the Northern and Eastern directions, trying to break through the ring

169

environment. The Germans managed to repulse all attacks against Nick. Only the 18th Romanian division could not resist, in the northern sector of the isthmus the Russians were able to break through to Kiet, the left flank defenses arched menacingly to the west. Manshtein had to throw his only reserve into battle - the 213th Infantry Regiment and headquarters units. Stubborn fighting continued until March 3, and then the Soviet divisions exhausted their shock forces. The troops of the Crimean Front achieved only minor successes, mainly on their right flank. In the south, the advance was 400-800 m. It was not possible to break through the enemy defenses to the full depth, defeat the enemy and open the gates to the Crimea.

The reasons for the failure of the Soviet troops lie on the surface. The least of all was the weather. Take for example the same 344th regiment. All preparations for the offensive operation in it were reduced to the delivery of ammunition and the enlightenment of the party meeting.

Ivot: "On February 27 at 9.00 the artillery preparation began. Frankly, we expected a lot more. But the artillery hit for only half an hour, and even then somehow sluggishly.

Two red raksts soared up - a signal of attack ... It was very difficult to run: mud, fog, frost. In our regiment they installed: company commander, political instructor, who

the mandirs of the platoons raise their personnel and go on the attack first. We did just that (of course - a courageous act, but the consequence of this decision was that in the very first battle four-fifths of the command staff were out of action. - Auth.) ...

In our area the Germans shot every meter, although they seemed to be behaving rather calmly. The entire company came under heavy barrage enemy fire. I had to lay down. The shambles lasted a matter of minutes. The company again rushed ahead again unsuccessfully ...

The enemy retreated. Ahead - at hand - Kayasap Russian. The soldiers rushed there. But the outskirts bristled with mortar fire. And artillery in our rear

170

for some reason was silent. And the 5th company lay down. There would be a link to ask to open fire from our guns. But there was no telephone line. We didn't even know where the headquarters of the regiment, where the headquarters of the division, where the artillerymen...

... The enemy stepped up the shelling. He literally drove us into the Crimean land. Moreover, on the flanks, counterattacks were plowed. Here they could be surrounded. He sent messengers to find the headquarters of the regiment, report the situation and ask for reinforcements. Time is running. The fire of the enemy is getting denser. We're holding on with all our might. We are waiting for liaisons, but there are no petit. s

On the right, the 3rd company lay down under mortar fire. Don't wait for help, you need to help yourself. And the neighbor on the left somewhere lagged behind or moved to the side ... We, tired to death and suffered heavy losses, could not continue the attack.

What do we have here?

An infantry regiment on an attack as flat as a table. a fortified enemy point without the support of artillery, tanks and aircraft. Messengers make 14-kilometer crosses, keep, so to speak, in touch with higher authorities. What can be commented on here?

It was this fate that became the reason for the dismissal of General Tolbukhin. On March 10, he was relieved of his post and recalled to Moscow,

In the period from 13 to 19 March, the offensive was resumed, but this time, too, it gave very insignificant results, although the regiments of the 46th German division had to beat off from 10 to 22 attacks in 3 days. On March 24-26, our troops tried part of their forces to capture strongholds in the Koi-Asan region, with the same success.

Kozlov's last attempt, made on April 9-1, was parried by Manstein without much difficulty: the enemy ran out of steam, and reinforcements began to arrive in the 1st Army and, finally, the 22nd Panzer Division appeared in its composition - 180 tanks.

Thus, the Crimean froit from his momsnit

171

creatures were marking time, despite a significant superiority in forces, they did not achieve any of their goals and lost another 181,680 people. A "debriefing" followed: "The main reason for the unsuccessful offensive operations of the front was that the front commander and his headquarters, as well as the commanders of groups of troops and commanders of formations, did not penetrate the essence of the instructions of the Supreme High Command on the methods of organizing and conducting offensive combat, did not properly organize the offensive and did not teach the troops subordinate to them the correct methods of conducting an offensive battle.

In short, it was clearly not enough to gather a lot of people and equipment to defeat opponents, even if they were obviously inferior in numbers: one also had to be able to fight. However. science was difficult for the majority of Soviet volunteers, for the training of soldiers in the Red Army there was always enough time - either political studies, or household work, and then, you see, harvesting or mastering the tslipa. Therefore, the main "method of conducting an offensive battle" remained the same until the end of the war - he gathered a lot of people and equipment. Before the Victory, the slogan "you will get weapons in battle" and the principle of "self-learning" of survivors in their first attack remained relevant.

At a meeting held on April 17 by the Military Council of the front, the commanders established (indeed, that widow who exalted herself) that reconnaissance before the offensive was poorly organized and the enemy's defense system had not been studied. Neither the infantry nor the artillery knew the true mark-front line (!). Therefore, during the period of artillery preparation, the enemy fire system was not suppressed. There was no interaction between infantry and tanks by artillery, and most of the first-echelon rifle subunits did not have forward artillery observers. The infantry did not know how to advance behind the fire shaft and actually

172

didn't go after him. Artillery in the troops for the offensive in infantry combat formations and firing

direct fire was used,

The infantry was not accustomed to start approaching the enemy under artillery cover while the cannons were nailing the German positions, and the battalion moved from its original position (from a distance of 800 m) only after the artillery preparation had ceased. The interaction of artillery with infantry actually ceased from the moment of the throw after the attack. And what kind of interaction can there be if, for example, the staff of the Northern Group of Forces planned to move artillery only in time, regardless of the actual advance of the infantry battle formations - like this: General Lvov is sitting at the headquarters of the "commander", and in front of him is a battle schedule and commander's watch,

But having broken through the enemy positions, the units did not know what to do next, and their commanders quickly lost control. The strongholds of the Germans, created by positions in the depths of defense, the infantry tried to take frontal attacks, without the intervention of the main force. When advancing forward, the Soviet subunits did not consolidate on the reached lines and, as a result, they were successfully driven back by enemy counterattacks.

Somewhere, tanks drove by themselves, planes flew, the latter were used unplanned and dispersed. The Crimean Front had 580 planes (not counting the aviation of the Black Sea Fleet) against 110 German ones (including 40 fighters). However, less than 25% of sorties were made in the ground forces. In accordance with the pre-war theory, only army aviation operated over the battlefield, while front-line aviation was used to carry out strikes deep behind enemy lines. At the same time, bomber regiments often flew out on missions without fighter escort and cover. Not because there weren't enough fighters, but simply "none of the higher commanders thought about it."

173

The control of the battle was poorly organized. When setting tasks, as well as organizing interaction, the main attention was paid to written orders or numerous schemes, without the commanders' mediocre work on the ground. Combat orders for an offensive were given with a great delay, the troops receiving them actually had no time to prepare. Besides, most of the chiefs preferred to lead without getting out of the dugouts

God have mercy, all this bunch of "military" was able to do at least something. How to shoot in the bright light, crack the password and walk in formation? And then you have to "show heroism", lie down under the tracks and "tspara-

fingering" armor. It is worth noting that the 44th and 47th armies are not some kind of reservists OR "people's militias", but full-blooded divisions,

General Kozlov turned out to be too "intelligent" for his position. It is possible that, as a former teacher of operational art, he did not fight well on the maps, but the real war was very different from the armchair. For the leadership of the Red Army, "Zhukov's" qualities were needed: willfulness, ruthlessness, contempt for other people's lives, the ability to break someone else's will - this is the only way to manage the ineffective fsodal-serf system.

With the arrival of the aggressive and trusted leader Mekhlis, Kozlov actually handed over the reins of government to him, finding himself in the role of a "military man" under the supervision of a maniacally vigilant commissar. At the front, 2 autonomous headquarters immediately arose: Mekhlis set his personal headquarters on the commander's headquarters, looking everywhere for "enemy intrigues" and "treason". There was an unhealthy situation of slander, denunciations and boltology. Meetings, meetings, reporting and election meetings, party activists, etc., followed in a continuous succession. n. According to Valentin Pikul:

174

"Music bureaucracy hovered over the army." The created dual power pulled and disoriented the troops.

"The presence on our front of the representative of the Stavka L.Z. Mekhlis affected the work of the Operations Department of the Headquarters of the Air Force of the Front, primarily in the fact that, at his request, we prepared certificates-reports on the combat activities of the aviation of the parties three times a day, again and again deciphered the photographs of the four-lane defense of the enemy produced by the swindlers every other day (compare with your defense . - Auth.) in the direction of the Ak-Monai Isthmus, they mounted them on huge tablets with the obligatory condition that they "looked beautiful," writes Aviation General S.N. Grechko. "A lot of time was spent on all this, and therefore there was enough time for a thorough and purposeful preparation of the Front Air Force for the upcoming offensive."

Simonov: "I did not talk about this at all in order to once again commemorate Mskhlis with an unkind word, who, by the way, was a man of impeccable personal courage and did everything that he sent out of the intention of personally becoming famous. He was deeply convinced that he was acting correctly, and that is why, from a historical point of view, the actions of the group on the Kerch Peninsula are fundamentally interesting. This was a man who, during that period of the war, without entering into any

position, considered anyone who preferred a comfortable position a hundred meters from the enemy to an uncomfortable one fifty meters away as a coward. He considered everyone who wanted to simply protect the troops from possible psudacha - Paniks rum; considered everyone who realistically assessed the strength of the enemy to be unsure of his own strength, Meklis, with all his personal readiness to give his life for the Motherland, was a pronounced product of the atmosphere of 1937-1938.

And the commander of the front, to whom he came as a representative of the Headquarters, an educated and experienced military man, in turn, also turned out to be a product of

175

the atmosphere of 1937-1938, only in a different sense - in the sense of fear of taking full responsibility, fear of opposing a reasonable military decision to the illiterate onslaught of "all and everything - forward", fear of risking for oneself transferring one's dispute with Mekhlis to Headquarters,

From a historical point of view, the difficult Kerch events are interesting in that both halves of the consequences of 1937-1938 are screwed together, both the one that was presented by Mekhlis and the one that was presented by the then commander of the Crimean front.

Tom Kozlov.

f+*

Unfortunately, possessing full power and magical qualities, he is a graduate of the Red Institute. professionalism in military affairs was absolute zero.

"Having taken over the command," recalled N.S. Khrushchev, - Mekhlis actually deprived Kozlov of the opportunity to command ... Kozlov did not show his character as commander of the troops. He began to obediently listen and carry out the orders and proposals that Mskhlis made ... He, as a commander, showed them to some extent both unscrupulousness and spinelessness. '

LJ"

}} In mid-April, the Headquarters issued an order to temporarily stop attempts to continue the offensive and proceed to "active (2) defensive (2?) actions." At the same time, it was pointed out that the task of liberating the Crimea remains in force, but, "preparing for its implementation, the tax at the same time create a solid defense." But it was not possible to create a defense, all the more durable,

the Soviet statutes simply did not provide for it, and the Supreme Commander did not send any special "instructions" in this regard. In fact, the front was preparing for a new offensive, which was planned in the middle

May.

176

Meanwhile, already at the end of April, the front headquarters began to receive information about the preparation of the enemy for active actions in the Kerch direction; in the very first days of May the data became quite definite. The commander simply brushed off this information, his chief of staff, General Vechny, believed that Manstein was stuck near Sevastopol, Mekhlis, a consistent fighter against "defencist sentiments", ordered "not to panic." To the newly arrived chief of the engineering service of the front, General LuA.F. Khrenov was given the task of "providing engineering preparations for the offensive... to prepare column tracks and bridges, to work out actions to delimit."

That's why; "going on the defensive," the Soviet troops continued to maintain battle formations designed to conduct offensive operations. At the same time, they were overpacked: the divisions occupied areas up to 2 km wide, and sometimes even 500 m wide. The reserves were located in the immediate vicinity of the advanced units. one cavalry division.

The rest of the units, including heavy artillery, were placed in one line on a 27-kilometer front in open terrain. Even the regular artillery of the reserve divisions was withdrawn from them to reinforce the front line. The second line of defense was available only on the right flank. Control points were located near the forward edge, and in the event of an enemy offensive, enemy artillery strikes inevitably hit. Anti-tank reserves were not created at all. Not a single line in the depths of the Kerch Peninsula was prepared for defense: the Niarmey rear line, neither the Turkish Wall, nor the Kerch defensive contours,

Even the main strip was not equipped in engineering terms, It consisted of separate arrows

177

kovy boxes, trenches, dugouts, scattered without any system and not interconnected by communication channels. Far from being fully used

anti-personnel and anti-tank barriers. True, after the Phsodossian slap in the face, minefields were set up in some places, but the seashore melted, it rained, the mines turned out to be on the surface and were visible visually - this was of no concern to anyone.

The artillery fire system was not organized, one divisions and batteries opened fire with a great delay, others had no preparatory data. Artillerymen were able to fire at slippers from open positions in a straight line. At the same time, reserve positions of the PS were created, while the main ones were not masked.

Similarly, the command posts of all instances were poorly disguised. During the entire period of the Soviet troops being in the Ak-Mopai positions, the comaid poikts changed their places of tolerable location several times, and therefore they were accurately and reliably established by Pemsk intelligence. The entire control system was based exclusively on wire communication. radio communication was not loved and they knew how to use it. Relevant

was also the organization of the interaction of armies, divi
To.

ziy, roll sun

Therefore, in Sevastopol, the head of the Primorsky Army, General N.I. Krylov: "From the Sevastopol borders to the Ak-Monai positions - some 160-170 km, and sometimes there was a feeling that the Crimean front was somewhere very far away. It was impossible to contact him by telephone (!), nor by direct telegraph wire (!!!)
"- the 22nd Lower Saxon Livizia lay no way. b "direct wire" to Kozlov.

To this we can add that, as the nearest military unit, the rear of the Crimean Front, as well as the entire territory of the peninsula in the strip of main highways and the Kerch region, were cluttered with numerous rear

178

mi institutions, which, moreover, did not comply with the camouflage and logistics. Indeed, some kind of strange atmosphere has developed in this relatively small area of the territory, literally packed with troops
- here there are already 17 infantry regiments, 2 cavalry divisions, 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades, not counting individual battalions and regiments
- a total of 260 thousand fighters armed with 77 guns and mortars, 347 tanks (629 tanks were transferred to the peninsula, many

already lost in bezrs: resultant attacks). Soviet leaders at all levels behave like frightened idiots.

"The most terrible evil," according to an eyewitness, "was the carelessness of the commanders of divisions and regiments. Opie did not attach serious importance to the defense of the counter. tank ditch and minefields. The coast was only not defended, but even the guards were not." This was three days before the German offensive!

All these blatant isdochety ns could not lead to defeat,

* HUNTING FOR BUSTSTOCK»

As we can see, the Soviet strategists in the Crimea showed amazing frivolity. Believing that Maish teip, squeezed between two fronts, was only capable of passive defense, they began to draw plans and schedules for the defeat of the "Hitler warriors" in May as well. Meanwhile, in the last days of April 1942, the German command began preparations for an offensive on the Kerch Peninsula. According to the plan of the OKH, the final expulsion of the enemy from the Crimea, including Sevastopol, was to constitute the beginning of a major offensive on the southern segment of the Eastern Front.

At the beginning of May, preparations for the operation assumed an intensive character: the Germans sharply stepped up their activity in all types of reconnaissance, carried out reconnaissance in a number of areas, sweeping the front line, and regrouped their troops. Four German and one Rumanian infantry divisions remained near Sevastopol; On the Kerch front against three Soviet armies, five infantry and one tank divisions of the 1st Army were concentrated, to which were added three divisions of assault guns, one Romanian infantry division and one cavalry brigade. However, Manstein considered parts of the allies "conditionally fit" for offensive operations,

The attack on the advancing side was complicated by the fact that the froita line in the north and south rested on the sea, excluding a flank maneuver. Simply pushing back the Russians or even making a breakthrough was not enough. The goal of the 1st 1st Army, therefore, was not only to cut the Soviet grouping to the full depth, but above all to destroy the main enemy forces or at least most of them

In this regard, the very carelessness of the Soviet command provided Maistein with favorable conditions. On the southern sector of the front, joint

After the loss of Feodosia, the Russian units occupied the old Parpach line. In the northern sector, as a result of the retreat of the 18th Romanian division, the front deviated in a painful arc to the west as far as Kiyat, going far ahead beyond the old defensive line, and, as we know, no one bothered to equip a new one.

German reconnaissance showed that the enemy had concentrated two-thirds of his forces in the northern sector—the 47th and 51st armies. In the south, the defense was occupied by "the weakest of the three armies" - the 44th. Three EU divisions were in the forward and main divisions, the other two were in reserve. The army also included the 56th and 39th tankovyye brigades, the 124th and 126th separate tank battalions.

180

"This situation was the basis on which the non-Moscow headquarters developed the plan for the operation "Bustard Hunting". The idea was to deliver a forward strike not along the arc immediately protruding ahead, where this blow suggested itself, and therefore was miscalculated by the enemy, but in the southern sector along the Black Sea.

This task was assigned to the 30th Army Corps under the command of General Fretter-Pico as part of the 28th Mountain Rifle, 132nd and 50th Infantry, as well as the 22nd Panzer Divisions. The 170th Infantry, which was supposed to remain in the central sector in order to mislead the enemy, was also introduced into the breakthrough in the far side.

The corps had to break through the Soviet positions, having all three infantry divisions in the first echelon. His immediate task was to seize a bridgehead on the other side of the anti-tank ditch and thereby ensure the possibility of overcoming it by tanks. Then he had to turn to the northeast and later to the north in order to hit the flanks of the rear of the main enemy forces, which had captured the defenses in the northern sector, and surround them in cooperation with the 42nd Army Corps and the Romanian divisions,

The cover of the open flank of the strike force during the maneuver was assigned to the Groddek motorized brigade, made up of German and Romanian motorized units. rear positions for retreating enemy units. On the remaining sectors of the front, a demonstration of the offensive was planned in order to pin down the Soviet divisions "(Manstein E. Lost victories. Smoleisk, 1999. P. 277).

To facilitate the task of breaking through the Parpach line, the command of the 11th Army decided to

conduct a naval landing operation with the help of assault boats. It was decided to transfer at dawn from Feodosia 1 infantry battalion to the rear of the Russians. From the air, the German offensive was supported by Richthofen's 8th Aviation Corps - up to 400 aircraft.

The success of the zalumina operation, according to Manshtein, "depended on two preconditions. Firstly, on whether it will be possible to deceive the enemy as to the direction of the main attack, namely, that it is allegedly delivered in the northern sector, until the Russians miss the opportunity to get out of the encirclement or transfer their reserves to the southern section. Secondly, with what speed will 30 ak (army corps. - Auth.) And in particular 22 TD (tank division. - Ayat.) move northward.

The Germans provided the first prerequisite with an extensive system of measures aimed at misleading the enemy. In addition to demonstrating preparations for an offensive by conducting false radio communications, false artillery preparation was also envisaged in the northern and central sectors, as well as the movement of troops in the same sectors. "Apparently, these measures were a complete success, 'as the main reserves of the enemy were behind the northern flank until it became late."

Thus, realizing that there was no way to hide the transfer of troops in the bare steppe, Manstein literally advertised his preparations for the offensive. The sole purpose was to confuse the enemy as to the direction of the main attack. Acting in accordance with all the rules of military science, Manstein, one might say, even tried too hard: he could concentrate his troops openly - in the headquarters of Kozlov and Mekhlis, they still "did not believe" the smug. Both headquarters "obviously underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy and, carried away by internecine squabbles, did not pay attention

182

attention to the preparations of the Nazis for the offensive.

According to Colonel General A.F. Horseradish: "... chief of staff P.P. The Eternal considered our trembling to be exaggerated. "The Germans are bluffing," he said, "Manstein is not up to the offensive, he has Sevastopol like a bone in his throat."

a different assessment of the situation, as much as influence from above - Mekhlis adhered to this opinion. I also tried to convey my thoughts to both Smu and Kozlov. But the commander simply did not take us into account, and Mekhlis began to object temperamentally: do not panic, they say, in vain, do not take the false maneuvers of the enemy for the truth, you yourself see. "that the preparations for the offensive are going according to plan, in mid-May we will start it in the best possible way ... Preparations really did not stop, moreover, a directive came from Moscow obliging us to go on the offensive."

The troops of the Crimean Front by this time had more than 2 times superiority in the number of infantry and tanks, significant in artillery and approximate equality in aviation.

Therefore, all the lower authorities did not take measures to suppress the defense, the combat formation of the troops did not change, their command posts remained in their original places, the intelligence received was ignored, and in accordance with the instructions received, they did not react to the "false maneuvers" of the Germans.

"... ah, it's not difficult to deceive me, I myself am glad to be deceived ..."

*and**

Early in the morning of May 8, the Bustard Hunt began. First of all, German aviation and artillery destroyed the previously identified command and observation posts and communication centers, quickly and effectively paralyzed

18\$

vav the entire command and control system of the Soviet troops. In the very first hours of the battle, the commander of the front, the commander of the 44th Army and their headquarters lost their "direct wires". radio communication was inactive. Attempts to use mobile means of communication (remember, how did Batov and Petrov "run around the steppe"?) turned out to be fruitless, since in the current situation the sent orders or messages either did not reach the addressee at all, or were received by him with such a delay that lost all meaning. Already by the time of the first day of the enemy offensive, the headquarters of the front had virtually no idea what was going on on the stalking flank. It is quite understandable that the troops, having found themselves without control, could not show the necessary stability in the defense, for which they did not prepare.

The 30th Army Corps with a viszap strike on a 5-kilometer sector along the coast of the Feodosiya Gulf overcame the anti-tank ditch and, breaking through the positions of the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division, advanced on

depth of 7-8 km, reaching the area of Arma-Eli. Behind the infantry, the taiki began to advance. The landing force landed from the sea also played its role. As already noted, the coast was not guarded, and the battle, which turned out to be in the rear, took the Russians by surprise. In the northern sector, the 42nd Army Corps began active restraining operations.

On the same day, sensing that it smelled of fried food, Mekhlis in a moment rushed to the "defensist" and knocked (asked - knocked) to the Supreme telegram with the following content:

"Now is the time to complain, but I must report to the Headquarters of the commander of the Froit on May 7th, t.s. On the eve of the offensive against the peak, Kozlov convened the Vospny Soviet to discuss the project for the future: operations to capture Koi-Asan. I decided to postpone this project and immediately give instructions to the armies in connection with the expected offensive of the enemy. In the signed order of the front in pskol

184

In some places he critized that the offensive was expected on May 10-15, and proposed to work out until May 10 and study with all the command staff, commanders of formations and headquarters the army defense plan. This was done when the whole situation of the past day showed that the enemy would advance in the morning. At Mosmo's insistence, the orientation, which was erroneous in terms, was corrected. Kozlov also resisted the advancement of additional forces to the sector of the 44th Army.

Stalin could not be deceived by such a clumsy attempt to shift responsibility from himself, and in response he telegraphed:

"You hold on to the strange position of an outside observer who is not responsible for the affairs of Krymfroit. This position is very convenient, but oh, rotten through and through. On the Crimean Froit, you are not a standing observer, but a responsible representative of the Headquarters. Responsible for all the successes and failures of the front and obligated to correct on the spot the mistakes of the command, you, together with the command, are responsible for the fact that the left flank of the front turned out to be extremely weak. If "the whole situation showed that the enemy would attack from the threat", and you did not take all measures to organize a rebuff, limiting yourself to passive criticism, the totem is worse for you. This means that you have not realized that you were not sent to the Crimean Front as a Toscoptrol. and as a responsible representative of the Headquarters,

You are demanding that we replace Kozlov with someone like Hindenburg. But you cannot know that we do not have Hindenburgs in reserve. Doing you in the Crimea is easy

nye, and you could deal with them yourself. If you had used ground attack aircraft not for side business, but against the tanks and manpower of the enemy, the enemy would not have broken through the front and the sneakers would not have passed. You don't have to be a Hindenburg to understand this simple thing while sitting on the Crimean Fronts for two months."

The catastrophe could still well have been avoided;

185

drank into force. The situation at the end of the first day of the German offensive made it possible to organize a decisive counterattack on the flank of the 30th Corps and restore the situation. The headquarters of the Supreme High Command demanded that the front command urgently prepare such a counterattack, using all available reserves for this. General Kozlov began preparations, counting on the morning of May 9 with the forces of his northern and southern groupings to deliver blows from two sides against the enemy grouping that had penetrated and level the front. To this end, the southern group was to form a "fist" consisting of four rifle divisions. two tank brigades and two tank battalions and concentrate it on the line of Arma Eli. Mount Kabush-Ebe. The concentration of these compounds was completed by 4.30 am. However, the marked counterattack was carried out.

As soon as the formations occupied the indicated lines, as the next commander of the 44th Army, Major General S.I. Chernyak received a new order from the commander, according to which part of the forces of the southern grouping, including one tank brigade, was excluded from the entire composition and sent to the command of the commander of the northern grouping to strengthen its strike capabilities. A copy of this order was simultaneously handed over to the commanders connections. It is easy to imagine what kind of mess such an all-round organization would inevitably lead to.

General Chernyak, taking into account the situation, decided: to ignore Kozlov's advice and strike with all the forces of the group he had created, but the commanders of the formations, having received the direct order from the front commander to regroup to the central sector, independently began to withdraw units from the occupied line on which they, By the way, they were in direct contact with the enemy.

An unexpected withdrawal from the sprinkled positions of some units led to a spontaneous retreat and pumping

186

areas adjacent to them. At that moment, Manstein brought the 22nd Panzer Division into action, developing an offensive against Kerleut and Uzun-Ayak. Thus, the rear of the entire Crimean Front was under threat. General Kozlov could not take any decisive measures that day, almost all of his troops, with the exception of one infantry and one cavalry division, were drawn into the battle and pinned down by the enemy.

Seeing the ineffectiveness of attempts to carry out a counterattack, the inability of the commander to take control of the troops into his own hands and to provide decisive opposition to the 11th Army, and also given the growing depth of the breakthrough on the left flank of the front, the Soviet Headquarters on May 10 demanded that the troops be quickly withdrawn from the Turkish Wall, passing 20-25 km west of Kerch, and stubbornly defending the latter. Stgav ka also indicated that the troops of the right wing should be withdrawn first. Given the style of work of the headquarters of the Crimean Front, Moscow concluded its message with the following words: "Hurry up with the execution of instructions. Time is precious and you are always late."

History gave the Crimean Front one more day, during which his fate was decided. All day on May 10, heavy rains fell, paralyzing the actions of German tanks and aircraft. This, apparently, gave Kozlov some hope of rectifying the situation. In any case, he, as always, was "late in the shaft." Having lost the ability to control the troops by wire communication, commanding the front and armies, their headquarters were unable to use radio and other means of communication.

Failing to understand the enemy's plan, which sought to encircle and then encircle the troops of the right wing of the Crimean Front and therefore did not show much activity in this sector in the first battles, Kozlov did not attach the necessary measures to the systematic and rapid withdrawal of the northern group of troops from the "bag", which vyriso

187

fell out in the area of Kist, Korpsch, Ak-Mopay. The retreat of part of the forces began to pour on the night of May 1, however, the ion was properly organized.

On the morning of May 11, the Yemtsy began to expand, breaking through the Northern Administration, moving to the Chat-house from the district of Parpach to Oguz-Tobse. By the end of the division, the 23rd tank went to the sea: in the ss ANNOM SU KOT le were 8 Soviet divisions. The remaining troops of the Crimean Front randomly rolled back to the east. All attempts to organize a defense on the Turets com shaft are retreating in parts! southern wuxi group

had, because the orders of Kozlov and his 'aba lo troops did not reach. The Germans reached the Turkish Wall on May 13 - the wounded of the 156th Infantry Division from the Froit Reserve - broke through at the central area. Froit Rukhpul. His commander, the digger, lost all ability to influence the promise in one way or another.

It should be noted that the Germans actively used their aircraft from the very beginning to assist the ground forces. Only on the first day of pastuplepie, May 8, she made about 1000 sorties. The strong aviation, which the Crimean front had at its disposal, was used efficiently and pulverized. The Soviet command even tried to use the SS for the passage of massive strikes against enemy groupings. Fighters were brought in to cover the withdrawal of their troops, which were continuously attacked by German aircraft. The inability of the front command to use its aviation expediently prompted the Stavka on May 12 to issue instructions on the subordination of all aviation of the Froit to the commander of the ADD, General A ... Iolovanov. But this is something that could have changed.

In subsequent dii, the Soviet units retreated to the paradise of Kerch, the Pemtsy led a continuous pursuit. By the end of May 14, the Persian units of the 170th Infantry Division of General Zander broke through the southern and western

188

the outskirts of the city, and also went to the areas of Katerlezi Elgigsi on the coast of the Kerch Strait,

"For the soldiers, this persecution left an indelible impression on me. All the roads were clogged with abandoned vehicles, tanks and guns of the enemy, Colonies of prisoners came across at every step, An unforgettable spectacle opened up from a height near the city of Kerch, where we met with the general fop Richtgofep ... In front of the pami was a bersg, on which stood a pemetnos number of different cars,

On May 15, Stalip issued an order: "Do not surrender Kerch," but Kerch had already been surrendered; Soviet troops left the towns and began evacuation to the Taman Peninsula, they managed to transport 116.5 thousand military personnel, 25 guns, 27 mortars and 47 RS installations across the strait. By May 18, the battle was over. Six German divisions defeated three Soviet armies. About 18,000 fighters and commanders stayed in the Ajimush Kai Kamepolomia, then they were gassed out. On the evening of May 23, the Sovipformburo reported: "By order of the Soviet High Command, our troops left the Kerch Peninsula. The troops and materiel have been evacuated. Evacuation

pom okay."

living

The directive of the Headquarters of July 4, 1942 summed up the line:

"The main reason for the failure of the Kerch operation is that the command of the front is Kozlov, Shamanii, Vechny, the representative of the Stavka Mekhlis, the commanders of the armies of the front, and especially the 14th army, hesperol-leutspant Cheriya and the 47th army, major general Kalganov, revealed a complete lack of understanding of the nature of modern warfare (ours used it. - Aat.). They tried to repulse the attacks of the enemy's strike groupings, manned by tanks and supported by strong aviation, by building a line of defense - by consolidating the troops of the first line at the expense of intelligence.

189

depth of battle formations of defense. As a result of such an incorrect formation of battle formations, the commander of the front and the commanders of the armies turned out to be incapable of organizing resistance to enemy groupings in the depths of the defense and delivering strong counterattacks to them.

The command and staffs of the front and groups of troops did not take into account the experience of the war, which confirms the need to ensure uninterrupted and firm command and control of troops in battle and operation. They did not take measures to disguise their command posts and to organize reliable communications. As a result, the command of the Crimean Front lost command of the troops in the very first hours of the enemy's mischief and was unable to restore it at the end of the operation. The command of the Crimean Front also scornfully reacted to such a question as the interaction of troops; failed to organize the withdrawal of its troops and did not guess the map of the enemy; did not comply with the directives to withdraw to the Turkish Wall line. Kozlov started the withdrawal of troops with a delay of two days and carried out the arrangement in an unorganized and disorderly manner - which was disastrous for the outcome of the entire operation.

One of the most important reasons for the failures was also the bureaucratic, paper method of commanding troops. "Kozlov and Mekhlis believed that the issuance of the order ended their duties in command of the troops. They did not understand that the issuance of an order is only the beginning of work and that the main task of the command is to ensure the execution of the order, to communicate the order to the troops, to organize assistance to the troops in fulfilling the task of command. As the analysis of the operation showed, the command

The froita gave its orders without taking into account the situation on the front, not knowing the true position of the troops. On the critical days of the operation, the command of the Crimean Front is on the move. Mehlis, instead of personal communication with the commanding armies and instead of personal influence on the move

190

operations, spent many hours of idle meetings of the Military Council.

Papi Mekhlis, representative of the Headquarters of the Supreme Command Commando, was removed from the posts of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of Glavpur, demoted to Corps Commissar. Lieutenant-General Kozlov and divisional commissar Shamanin were removed from their posts and lowered in rank by one step. The chief of staff of the front, Eternal, was removed from his post. [Major General Chernyak, Major General Kolganov, Commander of the Air Force of the Front, Major General Aviation Nikolaenko, were reduced in rank to colonel. All of them were soon sent to the troops with the recommendation: "... to check on another, less difficult field work. [swarm of the Soviet Union Lieutenant-General G.F. Samoilovich said that when they decided to bring Mekhlis to trial by a military tribunal, he appeared before Stalin and fell to his knees:

Comrade Stalin! Order to shoot this luratsky Jewish head!

"Well, such self-criticism," said Stalin,

Mehlis was forgiven. He remained a member of the Central Committee, went through the war of the PMCs of the armies and fronts, remained the minister of control, and in February 1958 he rested in the Kremlin wall. But the Stavka representative was never appointed again.

In September 1942, General Kozlov received the 24th Army under his command for one month, a year later he again rose to the rank of lieutenant general, but never again received independent command - the teacher of tactics turned out to be a mischievous commander.

The absence of "Hindenburgs" cost the Crimean Front huge losses - more than 176 thousand people, mostly prisoners, over 3400 guns and mortars, about 350 tanks, 400 aircraft. In total, since the landing on the peninsula, the losses amounted to 60-330 thousand people. "The enemy captured almost all of our military equipment and heavy weapons," prizpa

191

article "History of the Great Patriotic War" - and later used them in the fight against the defenders of Sevastopol.

The remnants of the Soviet troops ended up on the Taman Peninsula. Here the 47th Army was placed on the defensive. 51st. having received marching reinforcements, the Persians were on the Southern Front, and the 14th was withdrawn to the reformist vapis. On the basis of the administration of the Crimean Front, on May 20, the North Caucasian Front was formed under the command of Marshal S.M. Budyonny. In operational terms, the entire Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were subordinate to it, the Front received the task of defending the eastern coast of the Sea of Azov, the Kerch Strait and the Black Sea coast to Lazarevskaya.

FORTRESS ON BLOOD

The fall of Sevastopol was now only a matter for me. The German command could concentrate the forces of the 11th Army against him, using, in addition, a lot of captured artillery.

By the beginning of June, the SOR included 7 rifle divisions, 3 brigades and 2 regiments of marines, and a coastal defense regiment. 4 fortress, 1 sapper, 2 tank battalions, 3 companies of flamethrowers, 14 artillery regiments, 100 tons of artillery divisions, 4 separate batteries, 3 companies of anti-aircraft machine guns - 106600 people, 47 tanks, 1 armored train, 1624 guns and mortars, a division of 12 rocket launchers M-8, a special air group with 128 aircraft. In June alone, more than 23,500 reinforcements were delivered to the fortress, up to 15,000 tons of cargo, including 85 guns, 3,000 PPD submachine guns, and 500 anti-tank rifles; about 25 thousand wounded and residents of the city were evacuated. The NKVD on a destroyer squadron carefully took out 456 of their wards.

192

The garrison had half a year at its disposal to improve its defensive positions. Manshtein writes: "The main reason why the fortress of Sevastopol was strong was not the presence of modern fortifications, although they were in some quantity. The main factors were the extremely difficult terrain and the fact that this area was strengthened by a huge number of small defensive structures. It covered the entire area from the Belbek valley to the Black Sea with a dense network. Osobno was heavily fortified area between the Belbek river valley and Severnaya Bay, which was a continuous fortified area.

On the flanks of the defensive area were located the most powerful bersg batars in Sevastopol: No. 30 - Lyubimovka region, Vusts of the Belbek River, No. 35 - in the area of Cape Khersonss, which received from the Germans the title "Maxim Gorky G" and "Maxim Gorky P", Kazhlaya The imsla battalion had four 305-mm guns each placed in 2 armored gun turrets (walls - 305 mm, roof - 203 mm). The guns sent a 471-kg remote grappa to a range of 27,000 m, and a 314-kg high-explosive grenade paired to 45,980 m. The rate of fire reached 2 rds / min. The dominance of the ads by the surrounding area provided the guns with a circular shelling.

The two turret installations of the batarsi were a whole underground gorok, covered with a thick layer of concrete. The volume of concrete work on only one battery was approximately equal to the volume of work during the construction of the Dneproges. Around each tower there were 2 twin and 2 charging cellars. Each house housed 201 shells, in the charger - 402 semi-rounds. In the basement there was a railroad [2 manual wagons, in which the ammunition was delivered to the storekeeper. The lifting of the ammunition, loading, guidance was carried out with the help of electric privoles. The rascheg of one tower consisted of

7 Goal 1942 - training 193

54 people. Turret installations were equipped with fire control devices that received data from the otlanomerny felling, two periscope sights.

Battery No. 35 was commissioned in 1928, Battery No. 30 four years later.

For the first time, battery No. 30 opened fire on October 30, 1941 at the German troops moving towards Sevastopol from Bakhchisaray. The shooting was carried out at an invisible target, therefore, a few days before the enemy approached, on the instructions of the commander of the battery, Captain Alexander, corrective posts were deployed on the commanding heights. Accurate target designation made it possible to hit the columns of German troops, as well as trains, reloading at the Alma and Biyuk Syursi stations from the very first shots. During many months of defense, the tower batteries fired at the enemy, themselves being invulnerable to bombs and shells.

Air cover was provided by 1 (9 aircraft of the 3rd Special Air Group under the command of Colonel Dzyuba, based at the airfields of the SOR. Aviation of the Black Sea Fleet.

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The commander of the 11th Army gathered 8 German and 2 Romanian infantry divisions near Sevastopol. with reinforcements - 167 thousand soldiers and officers, 2045 guns and mortars, 600 aircraft. Soviet sources also indicate the presence of 450 German tanks in the area - the staff of three tank divisions. At the same time, it is reported that more than 100 tanks operated in the 54th Army Corps alone, "mostly heavy" (I would like to know which ones). This, of course, it's a lie: immediately after the end of the Bustard Hunt, the 22nd Panzer Division was transferred to the disposal of Army Group South, and the only thing left for Manstein was three divisions (190, 197 and 249th) 75mm

194

self-propelled gunsturm (about 50 mapgins) and the 300th separate tank battalion under the command of Captain Vaike, which was armed with a little more than thirty tanks-operators Ri.Krÿm.Sh and radio-controlled exploding taikets \$ 54.K 2.301 AchzGA and \$ 9. K {z.302 "SoNa (I". It should be noted that the defenders of Sevastopol were the first to use "land torpedoes" back in February 1942, the Richthofen Air Corps ensured air supremacy and blocked the supply of the defending ships of the Black Sea Fleet.

The final assault, which received the code name "Sturgeon Fishing", was to be carried out along the old muplan. reinforced by an infantry regiment. The total number of troops in the direction of the main attack was 75,500 soldiers and officers. The conduct of the offensive in the southern sector, from the Kamara area across Sapun Gora, was assigned to the 30th Corps - 72nd, 170th and 28th divisions - 54,500 people. The Romanian mountain corps - the 18th infantry and 1st mountain divisions - 36 thousand people, operating between two shock groups of German troops, at the first stage of the operation had to pin down the enemy in front of their front and provide the flags of the German corps. In the army reserve, between Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula, there were another 37 thousand German and Romanian soldiers and officers.

Manngtein used all the weapons at his disposal for the decisive igturm, and the AOKH provided the most powerful weapons. In total, the 54th Corps had 56 batteries of heavy artillery and artillery of high power, 41 batteries of light artillery, 18 mortar batteries, 2 self-propelled battalions

gun mounts \$1mS IT. The 30th Army Corps had 25 batteries of heavy artillery and artillery.

195

high power tilleries, 25 light artillery batteries, 6 mortar battalions, 1 self-propelled gun battalion. The 300th separate tank battalion was also located here, the Romanian mountain corps had 12 heavy and 22 light batars.

Among the cannon batteries of high-power artillery, there were systems of caliber up to 194 mm, as well as a division of 210-mm mortars, two divisions of 240-mm heavy howitzers, four bagarsi howitzers of 280 mm caliber, 815th and 641st divisions of 305-mm mortars (the composition of the last day also included a battery of two mortars M1 caliber 356 mm), 624th division (each of its batteries had two 305-mm mortars Mg (1) and three 216mm Moergger 18), a battery of 420-mm howitzers, a battery of 420 -mm mortar "Satta" (140 t VSS installation, 1020 kg projectile VSS; firing range 14200 m; rate of fire | shots in 8 miles) and a battery of 280-mm railway gun mounts,

In addition, there were 2 special guns of 615 mm caliber and an 800 mm Boga suprgun.

life

The Germans traditionally had a large number of various types of large-caliber guns designed to destroy forts and other long-term iron-and-stone fortifications. For example, the 42 cm artillery system "Sapipa" Moegheg was created before the First World War and was used to destroy the forts of Lszha and Namur, and even worse Modlin. In the 1930s, foreseeing the possibility of a new clash with France, the Wehrmacht command tried to properly prepare for breaking through the powerful Maginot Line, built in 1929-1936, stretching 400 km along the border, where there were more than 5600 long-term fortifications and firing points. To destroy them, the German designers designed a number of artillery systems of high and special power.

196

The first of these was the siege mortar developed by the Rhein Metall company in 1940 under the designation 60 cm Mosgisg, Designed in 1937; the gun was planned to be used in the fight against long-

temporary fortifications. Since the development was led by the head of the Armaments Directorate, General of Artillery Karl Bskker, the system received the official name "Karl" (factory index Segae (040). The mortar barrel had a length of 8.44 calibers (5.1 m).

A 615-mm concrete-piercing projectile weighing 2170 kg had an initial velocity of 220 m/s; This ensured the guidance of a hinged ogy at a distance of 4500 and 6700 m, respectively, the angle of elevation of the barrel was 70 °, the horizontal firing sector was 4°. Guidance was carried out by manual drives. The low speed of the projectile made it possible to observe the CR in the air.

For transporting ammunition and loading mortars, a special vehicle was used on the chassis of the R? Kre \ 1U tank. 2 such conveyors were attached to each mortar. Instead of a bashia, an armored cabin for four 615-mm shots and a winch for lifting the pairs to the breech of the gun were mounted on their hull. The priming system of automated loading significantly accelerated the process of preparing for a shot. Nevertheless, the combat rate of fire was low - | shot in 10 minutes. After 35 shots, it was necessary to replace the shot barrel.

The total mass of the artillery system reached 126 tons. The mortar was placed in an open area. To ensure at least minimal mobility, a tracked propulsion unit was used, driven by a 12-cylinder Daimler-Benz diesel engine and allowing speeds up to 10 km / h. Thus, "Karl" became the largest and heaviest self-propelled guns

197

in the world. However, caterpillars were used only for limited maneuvering in a firing position, due to the large magnitude of the recoil force, the vehicle lowered its bottom to the ground before firing, since the undercarriage could not absorb the recoil force of 700 tons, In the stowed position, the mortar was transported by rail, between two 5-axle platforms equipped with special trusses. On the highway, the artist was transported on trailers, assembled in 3 parts.

The crew of "Karl" consisted of 15-- [7 people. Artillerymen's workplaces, located at a height of two meters above the ground, were equipped with a forest fence. All cars were equipped with radio stations. The total number of personnel assigned to each gun mount, including the crew of vehicles for bosp-

ripas, railway special staff, restless observers, spotters and signalmen, amounted to 109 soldiers and officers.

In total, 8 edipits of gigait self-propelled guns were built. Following the "Adam", put into operation in November 1940, within six months, followed by "Ema", "Trog", "Ot", "Go" and "u". The first four self-propelled guns became part of the 8383rd heavy artillery division, in which two 2-gun batteries were formed: Thor and Odin were included in the 1st, Adam and Eve were included in the 2nd. The new system was used for the first time in 1941, when "Adam" opened fire on the forts of the Brest Fortress. A projectile jammed in the barrel of "Eva" at the first shot, and the entire installation had to be transported to Dusseldorf. "Adam" produced 16 pairs. The 1st Battalion - "Thor" and "Odin" took part in the shelling of Lvov, and the latter immediately failed as a result of a breakdown of the undercarriage, "Thor" fired 4 shots.

In June 1942, it was the 1st battery that was transferred near Sevastopol.

198

LJ:

The most large-caliber and heavy-weight artillery system used in military operations was the 800-mm experimental railway installation "Dora" K (E), created at the end of 1941. The initiator and ardent supporter of this weapon was Hitler himself, who adored such projects. Work at the Krupp AG design bureau began in 1935. The Armaments Office ordered 3 giant cannons, the construction of the first of them began in the strictest secrecy in 1937. Due to technological difficulties associated with the processing of a 32-meter barrel, test firing could only be carried out 4 years later.

Orudis used shells of various lengths and weights: armor-piercing (weight 7,100 kg, landing speed 720 m / s) and high-explosive (4800 kg and 820 m / s). The range was 38 and 48 thousand m, respectively. Bosvaya

the rate of fire of this monster reached a record low value - 1 shot in 20 minutes. Despite these shortcomings, the cannon was fully consistent with its intended purpose: the destruction of the powerful fortifications of the Maginot Line by the commanders. Concrete-piercing shells easily pierced an armor plate with a thickness of 1 mtr and an 8-meter layer of concrete. In dense earthen grout, the ammunition penetrated to a depth of up to 32 m.

The gun carriage rested on a special platform

me, occupying two parallel railway tracks. The combat weight of the installation was 1350 tons. The fire could only be fired strictly parallel to the axis of the railway track on which the weapon stood - any deviation of this axis under the influence of the recoil force threatened to turn the colossus on its side. In addition, the mass of the artillery system, approaching critical, did not allow the introduction of horizontal aiming devices into the carriage design. Therefore, guidance in the horizontal plane was carried out by laying out the light at the desired heading angle.

199

ki railway, on which the composition with the gun began to fuss.

Smithop projectiles and powder shots from the transporter to the breech of the gun raised 2 specks installed in the tail section of the platform. The complex that accompanied the Dora, in its entirety, had a power train, a railway service train, a train with bosprinas, 2 mobile anti-aircraft batteries, small guns, etc. - up to 60 locomotives and wagons with a staff of several hundred people. Such a diverse range of support units made it necessary to allocate a remote cannon to a separate military unit - the 672nd railway artillery battalion, formed in January 1942.

The Dora was not able to be used on a direct pasichopia - Franzia capitulated before the gun was put into operation. The main christening of the gun was participation in the operation "Sturgeon Fishing". According to Hitler's mission, "Dora" was to play an important role in the ambassadorial mission of the Russian seaside fortress. At the end of April 1943 (as it can be seen, Mapiteip was not at all aware of his victory over Kozlov's armies) trains with soldiers of the 6732nd division and a disassembled cannon arrived in Simferopol.

The Ogiev position for the Dora was chosen 2 km east of Bakhchisarai. The equipment took 4 pedals. The work involved about 1,500 local residents, up to 1,000 employees of the "Organization Todt", under the division of sappers and a group of specialists from the Krupp factories. Bolynos vpimanis paid attention to the safety of the Dora. Security was assigned to a reinforced anti-aircraft artillery battalion of up to 400 people, two Romanian security companies with a total number of 300 people, the 40th special gendarmerie platoon and a factory of prosodiists with dogs. The whole area around was covered with barbed wire, and the gun itself was covered with camouflage lines. In order to misinform the Soviet intelligence

200

Apitation, five kilometers west of the real qing position, the construction of a false one was deployed. Together with two squadrons of the Luftwaffe - fighters and spotters, almost 5,000 people provided the Dora's field work near Sevastopol. On May 26, the gun was put into position, the installation lasted 3 years.

The main task of the super-powerful guns was to destroy Soviet close-range batteries. And initially. the main strike was planned for battery No. 30, which was considered one of the main nodes of the defense of the North Side and which the Isms decided to take first of all,

In general, in the Second World War, the Pemtsy never reached such a density of artillery use as near Sevastopol - an average of 36 guns and mortars per kilometer of the front, and on the main strike directions - from 74 to 110 barrels. Well, this is Ugerman caot poverty! In 1942, the Red Army reached a density of 120 guns and mortars per kilometer of front, and in 1945 brought the village to 250 barrels. But nowhere, except for Sevastopol, in the course of the war, the consumption of artillery pairs exceeded the consumption of rotary and automatic cartridges.

Ms.

Thus, in July 1942 goals near Sevastopol, the classical ratio 3 was not observed: | between attackers and defenders: the Germans had twice as many fighters, approximately the same number of artillery and bropetshiki. The decisive factor in this situation was the more than 6-fold quantitative and indisputably qualitative superiority of German aviation. The besieged fortress pa- ramulo recorded a lot of naval acts, the volume of which, after the defeat of the Crimean front, gradually decreased.

From the age of 20, Richthofen's legions began a purposeful activity to gain dominance

20!

in the air near Sevastopol. From dawn to dusk, from 3 to 6 Ismetsky fighters continuously patrolled the city, which immediately called alarm es from the air. rily at every launch of a Soviet aircraft. And: during the short nights, the transports going to the fortress found themselves in the danger zone during daylight hours and were subjected to isprium agacs>

Telsky aviation.

High-speed warships could still break into Sevastopol (since mid-June, the heavy burden of delivering military cargo fell on destroyers and cruisers), according to Opi, they were not able to meet the needs of the 100,000-strong garrison. In addition, the Germans concentrated in the Crimean in ports, patrol and torpedo boats - 6 "shell boats" of the 1st flotilla of the corvette captain Heinz Birnbacher and 5 Italian MTUMs under the command of the captain at the 1st rank Milibelli or the 10th MAZ flotilla. In Yalta, there were 6 Italian dwarf submarines of the SV type, and at airfields - up to 150 mountain aircraft of pedos and dive bombers, pseudo-necked from the Mediterranean theater of operations.

About the latter, Admiral Basisty wrote: "Perhaps, for the first time we met such persistent enemy pilots. Do not retreat, climb into the fire! On June 10, the all-Stopol base, attacked by 15 Junkers, the destroyer Svobodpy was lost;

All this forced the command of the Black Sea Fleet to more actively involve submarines as transports. They transported supplies, food and jet fuel. Submarines made the transition by sea in the surface position at maximum speeds. Immersed only in case of evading enemy attacks. unload)! they made a poch, C1 trying to hand over the goods and receive the evacuees before dawn. In case of delays, the boat lay down on the ground for a day.

202

In May-June, 24 submarines of all available types were involved in transportation, which made 78 trips and delivered about 4,000 cargo to Sevastopol residents. More than 1300 people were taken back by return flights. A particularly dangerous undertaking was the transport of gasoline in boat tanks; op destroys rezip seals, and fumes, leaking into compartments, poison personnel, create a danger of ignition from sparks of operating electromechanisms. On several "babies" there were serious accidents caused by explosions of gasoline vapors and subsequent fires, [© with each dism, the opposition of the enemy also increased.

zhh*

Starting from July 2, for five days, the Germans conducted a continuous artillery caponade and aircraft

bombardment of the Sevastopol defensive region. Airplanes carried out attacks on the port, rear areas, airfields, communications and the city, in which there were still 35 thousand inhabitants. Russian artillery in response made ogian pallets at the places of accumulation of enemy troops; their shooting was corrected by special groups of observers landing on the coast.

On June 5, at 5.35 am, the first ston-piercing projectile on the SS of the right part of Sevastopol was fired by the Dora installation. The next 8 shells flew into the area of battery No. 30. The columns of smoke from the explosions rose to a height of 160 m, but only one hit on the armored towers was achieved, the accuracy of the monster's gun from a distance of almost 30 km turned out to be, as expected, very small. Another 7 shells "Dora" that day fired at the so-called "Fort Stalin", only one of them hit the target.

The next day, the gun fired 7 times at Fort Molotov, and then destroyed a large ammunition depot on the northern shore of Severnaya Bay,

208

dug in an adit at a depth of 27 m. This, by the way, caused dissatisfaction with the Fuhrer, who believed that the Dora should be used exclusively against heavily fortified fortifications. In a span of three days, the 672nd division used up 38 shells of rows, 10 remained. Already during the assault, 5 of them [of June] were fired at Fort Siberia - 3 hit the target, the rest fired on June 17. Only on the 25th, new ammunition was delivered to the position - 5 high-explosive shells. Four were used for a test shot and only one was fired towards the city.

Shit at the end of the battle, on July 2, the deinstallation of the Dora began. In comparison with the efforts expended on ensuring its bossy activities, the use of the supergun turned out to be very good. Who, because of the slowness and linkage to the railroad track, was vulnerable to apiation?

At the beginning of 1943, the second puui ka of this type was put into operation, but in the hostilities they did not appear anymore. Both were destroyed by the Germans themselves in the last days of the war. On the whole, the otssika justified itself, giving the prosktu by General Halder back in December 1941: "An unusual supergun, but useless",

The greatest success near Sevastopol was achieved by the artillerymen of the 833rd artillery division. Having spent from 5 to 14 June 172 concrete-piercing and 25 high-explosive 615-mm sleep-

rows, the "carls" managed to destroy both towers of the 30th battery with direct hits.

LJ

On June 7th it was time for the assault.

At 0300, all German and Romanian artillery opened fire on the positions of the defenders. An hour later, after the fire had been moved into the depths, the German divisions attacked. Fighting from the first day took on a fierce, bloody character. In their

204

The drawing shows the scheme of the evacuation of the Sushigtopol garrison - the same evacuation that was not

in the course of the German regiments were reduced to several hundred people, because the Russian soldier, according to Mapshteypa, "really fought bravely enough", showing an example of "incredible stamina".

For five days, the defenders of the city successfully repulsed the attacks, but by mid-June they began to feel acutely short of ammunition. On June 17, the German infantry surrounded the 30th battery. At that time, in addition to the molar composition of the battery, about 300 Red Army soldiers from the retreating rifle units took refuge in the casemates. Part of the Pskhotins and sailors broke through to theirs, and the rest took refuge in underground premises, where the fighting continued until June 24. The Germans brought flamethrowers, explosive charges, gasoline, and, according to some sources, poisonous gases, as a result, they managed to take 40 fighters in the field. On June 26, Alexander with several sailors escaped from the concrete block through the drain, but the next day he was captured and subsequently shot in the Simferopol prison.

205

On June 18, at the cost of heavy losses, the Nemps managed to reach the North Bay, Inksrman, and Sapun Mountain. On June 26, the last replenishment arrived in Sevastopol on two destroyers, the leader "Tashkent" and two minesweepers - the 142nd rifle brigade. The ships unloaded and received the wounded in Kamysheva Bay, which was outside the city limits. On the opposite side of Aytodor, enemy bombers sank the destroyer Imperfect. Ammunition, fuel and foodstuffs were now in small quantities only by submarines and transport

tnymi aircraft 2S-3.

Captain 1st rank A.K. Evsesv wrote in his diary: "After the fall of the North Side, the bombardment from the air intensified even more, reaching its climax. There were so many planes and it was so close to maneuver in the air that there were isolated cases of German planes colliding with each other, which fell to the ground with a roar ... Our anti-aircraft artillery was completely suppressed ... Our fighter aviation almost no longer rose into the air.

On June 29, with the fall of the Inkerman heights, the fate of the fortress was decided. There were 800 soldiers left in the Soviet rifle divisions, and 400 in the brigades. Only the 9th and 142nd brigades were almost fully manned. Due to the lack of ammunition, rare artillery fire could provide purely moral support to the defenders. On the night of June 30, units of the 22nd division of General Wolf and the 24th division of General Foz Tettana, covered by artillery and smoke screens, crossed Severnaya Bay in motor boats. This operation was accompanied by concentrated blows of the German-Romanian forces in all directions. The infantry of the 170th division, with the support of rocket-propelled mortars, assault guns and goliaths, stormed Sapun Mountain, followed by Malakhov Kurgan. On the evening of June 30, the remnants of the SOR troops became

206

depart from Sevastopol to Streletskaya, Kamyshevaya, Kazachya bays and Cape Khersonss. The agony of the Primorsky army began.

The official Soviet history reports that "on July 3, the Soviet troops, on the orders of the Staeka of the Supreme High Command, left Sevastopol and were evacuated by sea ... (our italics. - Author). In order not to give the enemy the opportunity to interfere with the evacuation, the cover units in the area of Sevastoyol and on the Chersonesos peninsula held back the enemy's offensive, and then, at night, ships were boarded. The following shows the "evacuation scheme" of troops and

population.

In fact, the evacuation of Sevastopol was never planned, and on June 30, after the enemy occupied the Ship Side, it became simply impossible. Therefore, in the evening | July, after the report of Admiral Oktyabrsky that all the possibilities for the defense of the city had been exhausted, at Moscow's whim, only the highest commanders and commissars of the SOR - Getseral Petrov with headquarters, division commanders, commanders

The fleet, the party leadership and the ranks of the NKVD - a total of 498 people, as well as about three tons of documents and valuables. That same night, all the serviceable watercraft at hand sailed - they were also imprisoned according to the lists, they delivered 304 people to the Caucasian ports.

These generals are the epacked troops, and the party fighters and their relatives are the population. All the rest - infantrymen still fighting, and the wounded in the basements and adits - were all left on the shore ("cover troops"!). The last 18 serviceable combat aircraft flew to Anapa, and about 2,000 ground servants went to the trenches.

The remaining soldiers, led by the commander of the 10th Infantry Division, Major General P.G. Novikov

207

(Crimean Tatar) was given an order: "... fight to the last opportunity, after which ... break into the mountains, to the partisans." They kept sshs 2 dia.

On the night of July 2, personnel blew up battery No. 35: the boskomplekt was completely used up. The last arrival of two minesweepers, two submarines and five sea hunters took out about 650 more people.

Engineer A.N. Sharov, who had risen to Chersonese until the last day, recalled: "Thousands of soldiers accumulated on the bersgu, When the ship approached, people rushed to the wooden pier, ion rukhiul under the weight of bodies, It was impossible to make out who died and who got out from under the logs. Storm wave, The ship moved away from the shore. People are jumping in. The sailors lower the ropes to help the soldiers climb onto the deck. The picture was striyany... Along the coast under the rocks, as far as the eye could see, lay dead soldiers. The narrow edge is literally strewn with bodies."

The remnants of the Primorsky Army - more than 30 thousand people who did not have ammunition, food, fresh water, all hospitals and medical battalions - tried to hide in caves located in steep slopes, waiting in vain for their evacuation. Nobody knew yet that there would be no more ships.

By July 4, organized resistance at Cape Khersones had been broken, and by the 10th, its last pockets had been eliminated. Almost no one managed to break through into the mountains; another 750 fighters were sent to the Caucasus on small ships and vessels. A few managed to get away by sea on boats, rafts, car cameras; some of them were intercepted by enemy boats, some were picked up by Soviet submarines. In just 3 diy, you-

a little over 2,000 people were carried. The rest fell to death and plsn.

To console the Soviet citizens and raise the morale of the Red Army, the Sovinformburo s00b shielded that the military defenders of Sevastopol only

208

but over the last 25 days of the assault, the 22nd, 24th, 28th, 50th, 132nd and 172nd German infantry divisions and four separate regiments, the 22nd tank division (2) and a separate mechanized brigade, 1st, 4th and The 18th Romanian DIVISION "and a large number of units from other formations" - everything that was and was not. "In this short period, the Germans lost up to 150 thousand soldiers and officers near Sevastopol, of which at least 6000 were killed, more than 250 tanks, up to 250 guns. More than 300 German planes were shot down in air battles over the city. For all 8 months of the defense of Sevastopol, the enemy lost up to 300 thousand soldiers killed and wounded. (This seemed not enough and later they began to claim that Manstein "lay down" 300 thousand only killed by us, and the writer Karpov even calculated arithmically how high the wall would be if all these corpses were laid out along the 30-kilometer defensive perimeter, given that "Each soldier, shod in boots, with a helmet on his head, was about two meters tall." - Auth.). In the battles for Sevastopol, the German troops suffered huge losses, but they acquired ruins ... The enemy failed to capture any trophies, valuables or property of an oxen ... By fettering a large number of German-Romanian troops, the defenders of the city confused and upset (?) plans of the German commando

vaniya".

Fantastic figures could not hide the fact that now the entire Crimea was in the hands of the Germans. [The German command highly appreciated the successes of the 11th Army. Manstein received the chip of General Field Marshal Lai and leave in the Carpathians. For the participants in the assault, Hitler established the Crimean Shield badge of honor. From the operational point of view, the 11th Army, "completely defeated" by the Soviet Information Bureau, freed itself just in time to participate in the big offensive of the Wehrmacht on the southern sector of the Eastern Front; people killed and wounded.

209

The troops of the Sevastopol defensive region from October 30, 1941 to July 4, 1942 lost more than 200 thousand soldiers and officers, including 156,880 irrevocably. When performing combat missions in the Seva-

the cruiser "Chervona Ukraine", 4 squadrons of turnip destroyers, 4 large transports, submarines S-32 and Shch-214 were killed in the stopovers; | the leader and \$ of the destroyer received heavy damage, not counting the small warships. Having captured the fortress, the Pemians captured 622 guns, 758 mortars and 26 tanks as trophies.

95 thousand Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner. Leave them, it always happens in war.

But they were betrayed, having declared traitors themselves, THOSE who were left on the shore by their command will go through captivity and concentration camps and will live with a stigma in their biography. Interrogations, suspicions, accusations will fall on their heads - all in accordance with the leader's instruction: "We keep prisoners of war!"

A few examples from the article by Lyudmila Ovchiinikova:

"About what they experienced after the war ...

The officer, who was taken prisoner, was wounded, after the war he was sent to camps. When he returned, smog mouth. swarm only as a stoker in the boiler room.

A former nurse who survived in a concentration camp, she was afraid for 10 years to cross the threshold of the personnel department so as not to let her husband down, who worked at a defense plant.

A soldier from Sevastopol entered the pedagogical department. The student was nominated for a nominal scholarship. The special officer called him: "How did you get here? You, being captured, will you teach our children?"

Of course, the medal "For the Defense of Sevastopol", established on December 22, 1942, was not intended for them.

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On the whole, the incompetently failed defense of the Crimea cost the Red Army nearly 600,000 men.

210

HOW ONE BAGHRAMYAN RUINED TWO FRONTS

The consequences of our defeat at Kharkov were reflected later at Stalingrad. Once you think about it, you come to the conclusion again and again how much

great responsibility of the military

the chief who makes the decision on this or that operation. How necessary here is a comprehensive knowledge of the enemy and a sober assessment of one's own forces, the choice of place and time for striking!

Army General M.I. Kazakov

In May 1942, simultaneously with the fighting in the Crimea, active hostilities began in the Kharkov region. Here the obs sides prepared for the offensive.

In the second half of March, Vosiny Soviet of the South-Western Direction - Commander-in-Chief Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, PMC N.S. Khrushchev, head of the opsrativny group, General I.Kh. Bagramyan - turned to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief with a proposal to carry out an offensive operation by the forces of the Bryansk, South-Western and Southern Fronts in order to defeat the enemy's opposition groups and reach the Gomel-Kiev-Cherkassy-Pervomaisk-Nikolasv lipia. As a result of the Barvenkovo-Lozovskaya operation at the junction of the Southwestern and Southern fronts, the Soviet troops managed to penetrate deeply into the enemy's disposition; south of Kharkov, the so-called Barvenkovsky or Izyumsky ledge was formed up to 90-100 km deep, from where a direct threat to the flank and deep rear of the main German group that occupied the Donbass and the coast of the Sea of \u200b\u200bAzov was created.

up

Timoshenko believed that the Germans in the South-Western direction had suffered serious losses in manpower, weapons and combat equipment, and that without a sufficiently long respite and receiving large reinforcements from the deep rear, they were not in a position to move on to decisive action. Given these circumstances, the marshal believed that if the Headquarters significantly reinforced his command with reserves and equipment, then, by undertaking a series of interconnected offensive operations, he would liberate Kharkov and the Donbass from the enemy.

To achieve the set goals, the headquarters of Timoshepko requested, in addition to the existing 92 divisions and 480 tanks, another half a million fighters and 1,500 tanks. Army Group South at that time had 64 divisions and 450 tanks. "As for the degree of possible strengthening of the main groups against the nickname ... due to reserves from the depths [of Yermapia, our forecasts were based more on guesswork than on real information," Marshal Bagryamyan admits.

On March 27, the discussion of the plan in the Kremlin was extremely curious, where the Supreme Commander called for a report on the command of the South-Western direction. Along the way, Stalin gave a lecture to the two marshals and two generals present in the cabinet on the basics of operational-tactical art.

"Stalin explained to us how pado to use artillery when breaking through the enemy's defensive line (by the way, Timoshenko was considered the hero of breaking through the Mannerheim Line, but apparently the Commander-in-Chief knows the value of his talents. - Auth.) ... more than once in the course of the report and during the discussion, he also explained to us (!) How best to use the combat qualities of personnel, tanks, aviation in the upcoming summer operations of the Red Army, "Bagramyan recalls.

Enchanted by the knowledge of the leader in military affairs, the "commanders" left the Kremlin "in the power of new military forces," once again unconvinced that "at the head

212

of our Armed Forces is not only an outstanding political figure of our time, but also a military leader well trained in matters of military theory and practice.

However, Stalin did not give the reserves requested by Tymoshenko; he had bigger plans. Most of the Soviet forces were concentrated in the Moscow direction, and there were simply not enough trained troops to carry out such a large-scale offensive in the south. A day later, Timoshenko's headquarters, having somewhat reduced the scope of the operation, presented a new plan, taking into account the decision taken by the Headquarters to withdraw the Bryansk Front from the South-Western direction (as we remember, to conduct an independent operation in the Kursk region), but the revised plan was also rejected for the same reasons.

Finally, they made a decision that satisfied everyone on a narrower operation, which was supposed to be carried out only by the forces of the Southwestern Front. The goal was to capture the city of Kharkov, then regroup troops and attack from the northeast to capture Diepropetrovsk and Sinelnikovo. From the reserves of the Stavka, 10 rifle divisions, 26 tank brigades, 18 artillery regiments of the RGK were transferred to Timoshenko's disposal. Stalin believed that this was quite enough to defeat the 6th Ismetsky army, and then the front of General Kozlov, "who defeated Manstein", should have come out from Crimea to meet Timoshenko.

The command of the South-Western direction of planning

it was planned to deliver 2 blows in converging directions to Kharkov - from the north-west, from the Volchaisk region, and from the south - the Sbarvenkovsky ledge.

The first stage of the operation provided for a breakthrough with the Soviet troops of the first two lines of defense, the destruction of the tactical reserves of the enemy and ensuring the introduction of mobile groups into the breakthrough. The total depth of the offensive is 20-30 km, the duration of the stage is

213

three days. The second stage was planned to be carried out within 8-4 days with the advance of the advancing troops to a depth of 24-35 km. In the course of it, it was envisaged to destroy the operational reserves of the enemy, to go out with the main forces of the shock groups of the front directly to the approaches to the city, and with mobile troops to complete the encirclement and defeat of the Kharkov grouping of the enemy - the 6th Army of Paulus, whose forces were estimated at 13 divisions, including numbers | tank.

From the Volchansky district, bypassing Kharkov from the north and northwest, the divisions of the 28th Army, Lieutenant General D.I. Ryabyshev. Taking under his command a fresh full-blooded army consisting of the 13th guards, 244th, 175th, 169th, 162nd and 38th rifle divisions, the 6th guards, 84th, 90th and 6th tank brigades, the general noted that its soldiers "They were armed with machine guns, had anti-tank rifles and anti-tank artillery. Artillery units were equipped with guns according to the state. However, by the beginning of the operation, all the armies of the front, with a shortage of personnel that had become trawling, were 100% provided with weapons and military equipment.

As a mobile group, Ryabyshev was attached to the guards cavalry corps, Major General V.D. Kryuchenko. To secure the flanks of the strike force, part of the forces of the neighboring 21st Army, Lieutenant General V.N. 1st Ordov and 38th Army Major General K.S. Moskalenko. In total, the northern "fist" consisted of 13 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions, 8 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades.

The 6th Soviet Army under the command of Lieutenant General A.M. Orodnyansky - 253, 266, 1203, 411, 47, 337, 248 and 41st Rifle Divisions, 5th Guards, 37th, 38th and 48th Tank Brigades. To ensure its operations from the south-west from the Barvenkovsky bridgehead, the army group of Major General attacked Krasnograd

214

L.V. Bobkin as part of the 393rd and 270th Rifle Divisions, the 6th Cavalry Corps and the 7th Tank Brigade attached to it.

To develop success at the second stage in the band of the 6th army, were they introduced a breakthrough? The 1st and 23rd tank corps, which launched a strike in the general direction on Lubogii, in cooperation with the 3rd cavalry corps, they had to complete the encirclement of the Kharkov enemy grouping. At the same time, the 21st Tank Corps of General G.I. Kuzmina - 198, 199, 64th tank and 4th motorized rifle brigades - was supposed to develop an offensive on Zmiev and capture Lyubotin on the fifth or sixth day. By this time, the 23rd Corps of General E.G. Pushkin - 6, 130, 131st tank, 23rd motorized rifle brigades - was supposed to go to the Valkov area. The total composition of the forces of the southern shock group: 10 rifle, 3 cavalry divisions, 11 tank and 2 motorized rifle brigades. Under the operational subordination of General Frodniansky were also the 5th and 55th rocket artillery regiments.

Thus, in the defeat of Paulus, twenty-three rifle, six cavalry divisions, nineteen tank (925 tanks) and four motorized rifle brigades of the Southwestern Front were to take part in five. rifle divisions and were supposed to be used to directly support infantry in the first echelon. True, Marshal Bagramai complains that "half of them were light tanks of obsolete types and T-60. "But this is just a habit of such Soviet commanders : since they are hitting our own, it means that there is either little or bad equipment. Meanwhile, all the "light tanks of obsolete types" were lost in 1941, and the Soviet industry, even before the start of the war, completely switched to the production of the latest vehicles. 1942 included 32 T-34 tanks and 2] tank

215

T-60 or T-70. It is not difficult to calculate what makes up the greater half here.

Marshal Moskalenko, on the contrary, recalls that 02-having got acquainted with the data on the composition of the forces that were planned to be involved in the offensive, "I experienced a feeling of great joy. For the first time since the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, I had to take part in an offensive operation in which we outnumbered the enemy in manpower, artillery and tanks, and were not inferior to him in aviation. For example, there have never been so many tanks of direct support on our front.

infantry zhki",

No active tasks were set for the Southern Front. His two right-flank armies were to secure the offensive of the southwestern front of Kharkov against possible enemy attacks on Barvenkovo from the south with hard defensive armor. 57th Army Lieutenant General K.P. Pollas, consisting of five rifle divisions, reinforced by three regiments of the RGK and a separate tank battalion, defended an 80-kilometer front on the southern face of the ledge. 9th Army Major General F.M. Kharitonov - six rifle divisions, one rifle, the 121st and 15th tank brigades, five artillery regiments of the RGK - to the south of the NOM and the South-East. Behind them was the reserve of the commander of the Southern Front: the 5th Cavalry Corps of General I.A. Pliev and the 12th tank brigade.

In addition, in case of necessity, the 57th and 9th Army's military operations could support the reserve 2% cavalry corps, two rifle divisions and the 92nd heavy tank battalion, stationed at the junction of two fronts.

The breakthrough of the German defense and the development of success was supported by the entire front and army aviation of the Southwestern Front - 656 aircraft; in addition, to ensure the offensive of the southern strike force, 233 vehicles from the Southern

front,

216

As you can see, the plan of the Soviet command in the Kharkov operation pursued decisive goals and was supported by serious forces. According to Soviet historians, its significant drawback was that the area from which the main attack was launched was chosen by chance - the flank and rear of the troops advancing from here turned out to be very vulnerable. The enemy, "preparing to deliver the main blow in the south, considered one of his immediate tasks the elimination of the Barvenkovo ledge."

But after all, this danger was predicted during planning, and only to cover the southern strike force from the flank, a total of 15 rifle, 6 cavalry divisions, 3 tank, 1 rifle and 1 motorized rifle brigades were allocated, which were ordered to "create a strong defense developed in depth, with a well-thought-out system of anti-tank protection, with the maximum development of engineering structures, anti-tank and anti-personnel obstacles and a wide adaptation to defense at exiled points.

Vdirstkiva No. 00275 dated April 28, signed by Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagryamyap, in particular, the decrees HAVE BEEN THAT "... an attempt by the enemy is possible to eliminate the Barvenkovo-Lozovsky ledge and at the same time" to launch an offensive in the direction of Kharkov, Kupyansk in order to reach the main communications of our armies operating on the inner wings of the fronts of the South-Western direction. Another thing is that these orders and directives were taken several times a day, and the Soviet plan was drawn up regardless of the enemy; Timoshenko considered the Germans in principle incapable of any active action, and "forecasts were based more on guesswork than on real information."

"Oddly enough, the Military Council of the front did not consider the enemy dangerous," recalls the former commander of the 38th Army, "... I was strongly assured

217

that the opposing enemy is weak and that we need everything for this defeat. The Military Council of the South-West direction was convinced of the infallibility of its assessment of the forces of the opposing enemy.

Readiness for the offensive was appointed by the end of May 4, but due to the untimely arrival of reinforcements and the arrival of weapons, the date for the start of the operation was rescheduled for May 12.

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At that time, in order to create more favorable conditions for the anniversary of the offensive, the German command, in turn, was preparing for an operation to eliminate the Barvenkovo ledge. On May 10, Paulus presented the Friedrichus plan to von Bock. It was to be carried out by the offensive of the 6th Army from the area to Svernes Balaklsi and the Kleist Army Group (1st Panzer, 17th Field Army) from the areas of Slavyaisk, Kramatorsk in the general direction through Barvskovo to Izyum. The purpose of the operation is to "cut off" the Barvepkovsky ledge, restore the front line along the Seversky Donets and seize bridgeheads on the eastern coast in the Izyum area. The German units were replenished with personnel and equipment, new infantry and tank divisions were transferred from France.

At the same time, unlike the Red commanders, the Germans never spared their strength to firmly hold the already occupied lines and to improve the defense. In the Kharkov direction, the main strip of the latter had two or three positions with a total depth of 6-7 km. The basis of each of them was strong points and

nodes of resistance created around settlements. The second defensive line was built 10-15 km from the front line, the rear - 20-25 km along the ruble of the settlements of Zmiev, Chuguev, Liptsy, Chersmshnos. A well-developed system of defense and fire interaction allowed Paulus to keep the entire front of the upcoming Soviet offensive.

218

infantry divisions, the rest of the units were on the rear lines, ready to provide support in any sector.

The Germans, without any reconnaissance, knew the details of the preparations for the Soviet offensive from the numerous transfers. For example, the commander of one of the battalions of the 294th Infantry Division wrote in the disc:

"Today's defector brought information that the Russians want to attack on May 15th. Well, until that time we'll be ready, Let the volumes come...

..Today we had as many as 10 defectors. Of them B Asians and 2 Russians. The latter belonged to engineer reconnaissance, which had the task of finding out the conditions for crossing Babaki with tanks. In Molodova, assault bridges for tanks have already been built. Consequently, we can reckon with great certainty that the Russians will attack our sector.

tanks...

Reports of preparations for a Russian offensive are intensifying. Defectors bring us a lot of important news - often exaggerated, perhaps, but mostly true. The construction of bridges, there are only 7 of them, and one crossing indicate that an offensive will be carried out against our sector. This is only on the site of one German battalion! In addition, the regrouping and concentration of Soviet troops were carried out without observing the measures of secrecy, camouflage, and lasted almost 30 days.

Yuvoryat, Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, leaving the headquarters forever, asked the Stavka to refrain from the Kharkov operation, considering it risky and poorly prepared. But Stalin, according to Vasilevsky; "I gave permission for the passage and ordered Eenshtab to consider the operation a matter of direction, that is, a matter of Timoshenko, and no matter what questions to intervene in it ...". As for Tymoshenko, this commander with a 2-year education is never in anything

219

misvalas and was always ready to fight to the last of his soldiers.

On the eve of the offensive, the commander convened a conference of commanders in Kupyanskss: once again assuring them of the weakness of the enemy, he spoke of the complete superiority of his armies - both in manpower and in technical support. At the same meeting, the following words were heard: "The mere fact that Comrade Stalin, our great friend and teacher, approved the offensive plans of the front

ha, can serve as a sure guarantee in the upcoming success of our offensive!

So, the highest approval has been received - what doubts could there be?

"... In all units and subunits of the armies of the front, late in the evening of May 1, meetings, party and Komsomol meetings were held, at which the combat missions of the troops were brought to the mind of each soldier. The order to switch to active hostilities was met with great reluctance, "Bagramai writes. The forthcoming offensive was proudly called "an operation for the complete and final liberation of Ukraine from the German

Tsk invaders.

"The spirit of optimism ... hung around the command post of the front," recalls Moskalenko.

+%++

The offensive of the shock troops of the South-Western Front began at 7.30 am on May 12, 6 days before the start of the Friedrichus operation planned by the Germans, after an hour-long artillery preparation
tovki.

In the northern sector, 1) rifle divisions were thrown into battle in the first echelon, supported by 7 gun brigades and 20 artillery regiments of the RGK. Literally immediately it became clear that a significant number of the enemy's firing points could not be suppressed, in addition, "there were a lot more of them than expected

220

elk, and this was the first surprise for our troops. As a result, the rifle subunits and slippers of the first echelons were met with dense fire.

An easy victory did not work out, the German defense had to be gnawed through.

advanced 6-10 km. Meiss was successfully advancing by Ryabyshev's "shock" army, which managed to get into the enemy's defense only for a kilometer, despite the fact that here another advancing division accounted for 2.5 km of breakthrough penetration, the number of guns and mips per 1 km was 59.5 units, tanks - 12. Inspired by his success, General Moskalenko proposed to transfer the mobile group of the 38th Army, but the headquarters decided that everything was going well anyway: Ryabyshev's flanks were securely secured and now nothing would stop him from "shoving" directly to Kharkov. It must be said that the 79th and 294th infantry divisions and one infantry regiment of the enemy's 73rd division opposed the troops of the three Soviet armies that day.

Things were going well for the southern strike force as well. The Shestsovst divisions, with the support of 200 tanks and 14 regiments of the RGK, broke the resistance of two Ismetsky infantry divisions and a brigade of the Hungarians by noon. In the second half of the day in the Krasnograd administration, the 6th cavalry corps was introduced into the breach with a Mutaik brigade attached. By evening, the troops of Frodiyapsky and Bobkin, on a 40-kilometer sector, wedged into the depths of the German defense for 12-15 km, reaching the second defensive line created on the elevated western bank of the Orsl River. The Germans threw here the SS, which was at hand. including trophy teams and construction units, a general of Orodian pachal, the advancement of two divisions of the second echelon. Tank Corps. remained in place, although they were plowing already 35 km from the Froit line.

The advance of the Soviet troops was favored by the almost complete absence of enemy air

221

tions. The main forces of the 4th Air Fleet were active at that time much more southerly, helping Maniitein to smash the Crimean Front. Therefore, Soviet aviation worked in conditions of clear skies, providing cover and support for both strike groups. Analyzing the results of the first day of fighting, Timoshenko and his headquarters came to the conclusion that, in general, the offensive was developing according to plan,

General Paulus, assessing the situation, began to regroup his forces. The op sent one infantry regiment of the 1st 13th division to the southern sector, at the same time, the 3rd and 23rd tank divisions (Paulus had two of them) and three infantry regiments began advancing from Kharkov against the 38th army. From the Crimea near Kharkov, the transfer of Richthofen's air squadrons began.

On May 13, the Soviet offensive continued. In the southern section, the breakthrough front was expanded to 55 km, and the depth reached 25-50 km. resistance against-

the peak here began to weaken. Favorable conditions were created for the introduction of a mobile group. A swift and powerful strike by two tank corps—about 300 vehicles—could turn out to be quite effective right now. However, the command of the South-Western Front, misled by the data of its own intelligence about the concentration of a large tank grouping of the enemy in the Zmiev area, decided to hold the corps in the sleeves and lead them into the breakthrough with the rifle divisions reaching the line of the Berestovaya River, to which they still had to go 15 km with battles.

In the north, the 28th Army overcame the main line of enemy defense and reached the approaches to Kharkov, the line of heights surrounding the city from the east. Moskalenko's troops in the first half of the day advanced another 6 km. From that moment on, the Soviet "schedule" began to break down. At 1 pm the Germans, having concentrated mobile groups during the night and the first half of the day, struck from two sides at the junction of the 38th Army with its right neighbor. One group included 3rd

272

a tank division and two infantry regiments, the second was the 23rd tank division and one infantry regiment. "The shock group of the 38th Army could not withstand such a strong blow of a mass of tanks with infantry" and was driven back to its original positions.

In order to completely lose the advantageous foothold on the western bank of the Seversky Donets, Timoshenko ordered the 162nd Infantry Division and the 6th Guards Tank Brigade to be transferred from the reserve of the 28th Army to Moskalenko. As a result, the "strike group" of the 38th Army alone consisted of 5 rifle divisions, 4 tank and 1 motorized rifle brigades, about 200 tanks, over 500 guns and mortars, covered from the air by 100 aircraft. Therefore, "despite the multiple (?) numerical superiority (?) of the enemy (who carried out a counterattack by three divisions with about 300 tanks. - Auth.), the soldiers of the 38th Army put up stubborn resistance to him, - according to the official history of the army, - and destroyed 139 tanks in one day.

Right from the corner of May 14, so Bagramyan asserts, German aviation seized air supremacy as soon as the 3rd Fighter Squadron arrived at the theater of operations. Subsequently, the Germans increased the number of self-propelled guns to 580 (including 180 fighters, 310 bombers, 90 scouts).

889 Soviet aircraft (350 fighters, 85 attack aircraft, 444 bombers, 10 reconnaissance aircraft) could not really oppose such an "overwhelming superiority" of the enemy.

Moskalenko's army on that day was "firmly entrenched" and most of all was concerned about maintaining the border between the neighbors, where two German tank divisions continued to attack. Troops of the 21st Army were treading water, laying down soldiers in frontal attacks on fortified points and high-rise buildings defended by the 79th Infantry Division. It got to the point that the commander-in-chief had to explain to General Gordov "not without edification" that the knots of enemy resistance should not be taken head-on, they

223

it is necessary to block and bypass, by all means forcing the offensive. Ryabyshev's divisions advanced another 6-8 km and reached the rear line of the Pemetzky defense, which ran along the Kharkov and Murom rivers.

According to the plan of the operation, the moment came for the introduction of a mobile group into the breakthrough, consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Corps and the 38th Infantry Division. But due to the poor organization of management, these connections failed to concentrate on the starting point. The headquarters of the formations and the headquarters of Timoshenko plowed away from the front line - sometimes they were separated by 20-30 km or more, radio communications worked outrageously. The call signs were often frightened, "and in this general confusion of general enthusiasm, few people guessed that command and control of the troops had already been lost."

In the meantime, from the south, the 6th Soviet Army reached a line that was no more than 35-40 km from the southern suburbs of Kharkov.

Between the fuel lines, the absence of active operations in other areas of the front and the return of Richthofen allowed the Ismetsky squadron to freely transfer their reserves to the places of breakthrough. The commander of the 6th cavalry corps, General Noskov, reported that the enemy had brought in another regiment in the Krasnograd direction, "now two infantry regiments (!) counterattacked the cavalry." It is interesting that our messengers, operating from the Soviet side with divisions, corps and hundreds of talks, count every Pemetzky regiment. Apparently, not in vain, if three cavalry divisions and a sneaker brigade repel the attacks of two German infantry regiments.

On the morning of May 15, Paulus brought into battle against the 21st Army the 168th Infantry Division, which was deployed on auto tires from Belgorod. In the south, after stubborn fighting, the Ismians withdrew to the western bank of the Berestova River and blew up bridges. By the end of the day from Poltava, a fresh 305th division arrived at this line. Thus, for 4 days the troops of the guards of Torodiansky and Bobkin were opposed by 3 infantry divisions of the enemy.

224

For the next two days, the battles of the northern Soviet grouping were mainly defensive in nature. The Germans offered "frantic resistance, having taken several frenzied counterattacks. One more titami: "ours" fight heroically, "enemies" - fiercely. On May 17, "to repel the continuing patish on the 28th Army," General Ryabyshev was forced to engage the main forces of the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps in battle: Now the northern group has used up all its relays, and 17 Soviet divisions and 8 tank brigades "heroically" contain the "frantic" Prague - five infantry and two tank divisions,

In the south, the opportunity to bring a mobile group into battle appeared only by the evening of May 16, when the 266th division of Colonel A.A. Tavantseva crossed through Bersstovaya and captured the bridgehead. But because of the late flood, the river flooded heavily, and the wide swampy floodplain, viscous banks and bottom made it a serious obstacle for tanks. It was necessary to restore the bridges, and General Torodnyapsky postponed the entry of tank corps until the morning. At the same time, Bobkin's group crossed the river and captured Krasnograd from three sides. The Germans, however, were still holding their last line with four infantry divisions.

The offensive of the left wing of the Southwestern Front really put Paulus' troops in a difficult position. But, on the other hand, the German command, having sufficient forces for the offensive, quickly assessed the favorable aspects of the situation that had arisen. Halder convinced Hitler that Kleist's army group could launch a counterattack against the Russians and thereby turn a defensive battle into a German military victory. The Fuhrer ordered Kleist to advance his tank army to shock positions against the southern front of the Barvenkov ledge.

From May 1 to May 16, large forces were advanced into the zone of operations of the 57th and 9th soviet kiharmies, brought together

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in this sector into two army and one motorized corps. The 3rd motorized corps consisted of 5 divisions, including the 14th tank division and the 60th motorized division. The main forces of this formation were concentrated on the 20-kilometer section of Petrovka, Gromovaya Balka, the 44th Army Corps, with four infantry and 16th tank divisions, took up positions in the area of Bylbasovka, Sobolevka. Zapadies housed the 52nd Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions and the 500th penal battalion.

The Soviet razedka overlooked the preparation of the Kleist group. Of course, they knew about the existence and even raised the question of the potential danger of the "Kramatorsk enemy group", but they considered it in a purely speculative plane. As evidenced by Marshal Moskalenko, during the planning of the Kharkov operation, the army group of Kleist essentially joined the race of the city "on its part, according to the opinion of the command of the 57th and 9th armies, shared by the headquarters of the front and the napraleniya, a pellet was to be expected action in the near future. especially to the papravin to the north, "Accordingly - they did not expect, p

Due to the fact that there was a "vegreal threat" from the enemy in the zone of operations of the right wing of the Southern Front in the Barvenkop direction, the troops of the Southwestern Front were ordered on May 17 to continue their offensive against Kharkov. On the left wing, the troops of the 6th Army restored the destroyed bridges on Berestovaya. and from the angle of the komapduk "- the chief tried to put into action the 31st and 23rd taak corps. Slippers penetrated the Ismetsk defenses for 12-15 km and cut the Kharkov-Krasnodar railway in the area of Vlasovka station. Bobkia's group continued to fight for Kra' iograd, it was far behind the rear bases and began to feel the lack of combat rips. No one yet suspected that the battle was already lost

226

The blow of the Kleist oka group was unexpected for the 9th Army and the command of the Southern Front, although it was precisely the reflection of this blow that was the main task of the Geisrals Malinovsky, Kharitopov and Podlas. At dawn on May 17, after half an hour of artillery preparation, the lesmites went on the offensive in the 9th Army zone on two directions: from the Pstrovka area - to Barvsikovo and from Slavyansk - to Dolgenkaya. Already by 8 o'clock in the morning, the Soviet "defense" was propelled in both directions to a depth of 6-8 km. th

The German aviation bombed the auxiliary command post and the army communications center in Dolgepka, here the "direct wire" passed from Malinovsky to Podlas - so there were no more communications from the 57th Army at the Front Headquarters. By noon, Komapdarm-9 moved to the main command post in Kamenka, but there the enemies "cut the wires", and there were enough radio equipment, and now the Kharitopov completely moved to the eastern coast of Doptsa. The headquarters of the 9th Army lost control of the troops, and the military forces were forced to fight in isolation, without interaction between themselves and the reserves of the army and the front.

Here is the time to stop and ask the question, but where, in fact, created by the red commanders of the maidirs "strong defense, fueled in the depths ..." and so on? Indeed, very close by, the German infantry demonstrates that by digging well into the ground with one division, you can successfully hold the defense against three or four enemy divisions, and you will not smoke this pshota out of the ground with any tanks. Of course, in terms of the number of fighters, the Soviet division was inferior to the German one, in terms of the density of the Ismet defense near Kharkov it was 20-25 km per division, and in other places it was even worse. With General Kharitonov, one division held in the middle [0 km of the front, this is not counting the Plisva cavalry corps and three sneaker brigades that walked in the rear of the psgo in the rear of the cavalry corps.

227

The whole point is that although the opponents spent the same time creating their defensive lines, their approach to this matter was different. The Soviet troops built a defensive zone developed in all respects in this way - in fact, it was a system of support points and resistance nodes, poorly equipped in engineering terms, stumps. On the entire 170-kilometer defense front of the 9th and 57th armies, only 11 km of barbed wire were set up, anti-tank barriers were not created at all. The total depth of this squalor did not exceed 3-4 km. There were no intermediate or rear lines.

But that's not the most important thing. General-leitpait engineer of the first troops I.P. Galitsky left wonderful memoirs in which the decrees of the VAL are quite true: "It is well known that without troops, any slick, most perfect defensive line is prepared and has practical value. This is nothing more than an area pitted with trenches, anti-stomp ditches, and fortifications scattered over a large expanse. Only with conspiracies does he turn into a formidable barrier to the enemy.

The defense of the 100% of the Soviet army was this frontier "without troops", as, by the way, without trenches and ditches. According to the initiative of General Kharitonov, approved by the commander of the front, his troops did not defend at all, but from May 7 to 15 carried out their own small offensive with the aim of capturing a strong fortified center of resistance in the Mayakov area. And they got so carried away that significant forces were gradually involved in the co-implementation of this undertaking, including almost all army reserves and the 5th Cavalry Corps, which constituted the reserve of the front (!) - the very reserves that, according to the plan, were intended to eliminate a possible enemy breakthrough on . Barvsikovsky direction. At the same time, Timoshenko and Khrushchev knew about the initiative of their

subordinates, but did not consider it necessary to limit the ipi

228

the initiative of comrades so experienced in military affairs as Malinovsky and Kharitonov. th

As a result, the operation in the Mayakov region failed, the Soviet formations suffered heavy losses (the number of divisions was reduced to 5-7 thousand people, according to sugi. these were already defeated divisions) and at the moment of reholing into the offensive of the Klseist group, they failed to take up the defense.

The notorious "active defense" has in fact again become a "fictitious defense". By 17 o'clock the Germans took Barvsikovo, by evening they advanced 20-25 km. A threat loomed over the rear of the 57th Army and the entire shock group of the Southwestern Front. The commanding officer of the Southern Front, having lost contact with subordinate troops, more or less sorted out the situation and reported the ss to the commander-in-chief only by the end of the day. Thus, only in the evening of May 17, the headquarters of the direction received information about a powerful enemy strike on the southern face of the Barvenkovo ledge. By this time, Kleist, with his tank fist, had not only succeeded in breaking through the tactical defense, but had also achieved operational successes.

Immediately after receiving alarming messages, Marshal Timoshenko informed the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and asked to strengthen the Southern Front with reserves. Moscow allocated one rifle division and two tank brigades and allowed the transfer of another division from the Voroshilovgrad direction, but they could not arrive in the combat area until May 20-21. True Tymoshenko, according to Marshal of the Civil Code. Zhukov, ns reported that there was a real threat of encirclement of the armies. And in general, "The Military Council of the South-Western Direction did not show much concern ...". The current situation required an urgent curtailment of the offensive operation of the Southwestern Front and, together with the Southern Front, to deal with the liquidation of the breakthrough of the German grouping. But the direction headquarters had no real

229

his idea of the situation, could not correctly cordon off the forces and intentions of the enemy advancing in the zone of the 9th army

Acting Chief of the General Staff, General A.A. Vasilevsky submitted to the Headquarters a proposal for an immediate cessation of the offensive.

The Supreme Ambassador of telephone conversations with the Military Soviet of the South-Western Direction, which announced its intention to continue the successfully launched operation and to take measures at the same time to repulse the enemy's Kramatorsk grouping, rejected the proposal of the General Staff,

Vitoga Timoshenko subordinated the 2nd Cavalry Corps of Colonel GA to the Southern Front. Kovalev and ka: General Malinovsky, with the help of two cavalry corps, two rifle divisions and three tank brigades of the 57th and 9th armies, launch a counterattack on the enemy that had broken through and restore the situation. At the same time, the 343rd Rifle Division and the 92nd Heavy Sneaker Battalion moved out of the commander-in-chief's reserve to take up defensive positions on the southern approaches to Izyum. The rest of the troops of the South-Western front were at the casino to continue the offensive in Kharkov.

On May 18 the crisis in the zone of the 9th Army continued to worsen. Tymoshenko's order to carry out a counterattack by the troops of the Southern Front could not be carried out. By the time it was received, General Pliev's corps was already fully involved in defensive battles and was not able to concentrate forces in one direction, Kovalev's corps was driven back by the 60th motorized divisions, General Kharitopov's headquarters completely lost control of its divisions, and Malinovsky's headquarters did not have communications neither with Kharitopov, nor with the cavalry corps. The Germans intensified their strike from Barvenkovo the next morning, broke the resistance of the 5th Cavalry Corps and the 51st Rifle Division, and by 10 o'clock captured Kamenka and the southern part of Izyum. Defeated, units of the 9th Army began to retreat separately to the line of Seversky Dopt, atan

230

ki Kleist began to move west along the right bank of the river.

In Moscow, Vasilevsky again suggested that the Kharkov operation be stopped and that the strike force be turned around to repulse the enemy. And again, this proposal was rejected after Staliy talked < Tymoshenko. Many years later, in a famous report at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev claimed that it was Stalin who stubbornly refused to give permission to the troops of the Southwestern Front to get out of the attack and cross the defensive line.

Apoka and Khrushchev and Timoshenko cheerfully reported that there was no need to divert the main forces of the 6th Army and Bobkin's group to repel Kleist's blow. In any case, in the combat report of the command of the Southwestern Front, signed by Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagramyan, not a word is said about the need to stop the offensive on

Kharkiv. The troops of the southern shock group, in the words of Moskaleiko, "themselves climbed into the bag, into the jaws of the enemy."

Only in the afternoon of May 19, Timoshenko made a belated decision to suspend the offensive of the 6th Army, to gain a foothold on the lines reached, to withdraw the main grouping of troops from the battle and with a concentric strike of the 6th, 57th, and 9th armies to defeat the enemy that had broken through into their rear.

The newly created army group, which included the Bobkin group, under the command of Lieutenant General F.Ya. Kostenko, consisting of five rifle divisions, the 6th cavalry corps and three tank brigades, was tasked with a strong defense to the reached lines to ensure the offensive of troops from the west 57th and 6th armies.

Yurodnyansky's army, consisting of five rifle divisions, two tank corps and the 37th separate tank brigade, was supposed to, hiding behind the Seversky Donets River from the north, covertly deploy the main forces

231

Kutru on May 21 at the turn of Bolshaya Andreevka, Petrovs Kos and Nanssti strike in a general direction to the east.

The 57th Army received the task, covering itself with part of the forces from the west, with three rifle divisions, one tank brigade and the 2nd cavalry corps, to hit the flank of the enemy grouping that had broken through, bypassing Barvenkovo from the south.

The 9th Army was instructed, holding back the enemy at the turn of the Seversky Doists River, to advance with the main forces from the Studenki area to the west. In addition, towards the troops leaving the encirclement, it was necessary to strike a blow to the group, which was headed by the deputy commander of the 38th Army, Major General Gl. Sher stuk. As part of one rifle division and three tank brigades, it was supposed to attack from the east in the direction of Chepsel, Lozovenka, and four Isvof lapgovye divisions of gsisral Moskalenko - to strike at Zmisv. In general, absolutely everything is coming!

"You can't say anything," writes Marshal Moskalenko, "the idea was bold, and it seemed to the authors simple and real. In fact, everything was not so simple. First of all, it was necessary in a limited time to regroup large masses of troops scattered over a large area. A

s ... then still didn't manage to do it properly, "

It is rather strange to sound such childishly direct

stvennye explanations of their vosiny failed. The same Moskalenko studied military affairs for more than twenty years, rose to the rank of general, participated in the Finnish campaign, in the Patriotic War - from the first day on the front (a year is counted here), he commanded a regiment, brigade, corps. And now it turns out that "still doesn't know how" and "ns have enough experience", Geperal Paulus, on the contrary, is a staff officer who never commanded anything (for a short time he "led" an experimental motorized battalion), he was assigned to the 6th Army on 18 January 1942 - and everything is appropriate to do "properly."

232

How much pado to study our generals? Perhaps, it's better to get an education first, and then take on army and front teams? The Germans, it turns out, all this time "... madly rushed forward. And we seemed to expect that they would remain in the positions they had already occupied for the period of regrouping of our troops. They began to carry out the orders of the commander-in-chief on the night of 20 s, and only those to whom it reached.

Meanwhile, Kleist continued to "cut" the base of the Barveik ledge. 2] May, having exhausted and bled the northern Soviet grouping; Paulus transferred the 3rd and 23rd Panzer Divisions to the northern front. The next day they crossed the Seversky Donets and began moving southward. On May 22, the German strike groups joined up 10 km south of Balaklsi, reversing the last communications, linking the troops of the 6th and 57th armies with a rear. The trap slammed shut, and more than a quarter of a million Soviet soldiers and officers were surrounded.

Since the actions of our units and associations were negatively affected by the absence of a unified command, Marshal Timoshenko accepted the decision of the troops of the 6th, 57th armies of the Bobkip Army group to bring together under the joint command of General Kosteiko. The main task of this southern group of troops, as the EU on the Evali, was to strike at Savintsy to break through the encirclement and reach the left bank of the Seversky Donets. At the same time, the troops of the left wing of the 38th Army, reinforced by the consolidated tank corps - these were fresh brigades from the Headquarters reserve - received orders to advance towards the units breaking through from the encirclement.

On the night of May 24, the regrouping and concentration of troops was hastily carried out, but in the morning the Germans again got ahead of us, resuming the pastuple on a wide front, trying to expand the punched cordi dori, to dismember the encircled group into separate

233

other parts isolated from each other. An attempt to deblock them from the outside by the forces of the 38th Army also failed. Until May 29, Soviet formations fought in encirclement with complete domination of the enemy in the air, lack of fuel, ammunition and food. Only small groups managed to infiltrate the eastern bank of the Donets - only about 22 thousand people came out of the encirclement.

Generals F.Ya. were killed in battles. Kostenko, K-P. Podlas, A.F. Anisov, A.M. Yurodiansky, A.I. Vlasov, L.V. Bobkin, 3.Yu. Kutlin and others. The main forces of 20 rifle, 7 cavalry divisions and 14 tank brigades were either destroyed or captured. Losses at the end of May, according to incomplete Soviet data, amounted to almost 280 thousand people (of which 171 thousand were irretrievable), 652 tanks, 1646 guns, 3278 mortars. The Germans trumpeted the capture of 240,000 prisoners, 2,026 guns, and 1,248 tanks, while themselves losing no more than 2 () and a thousand killed and wounded. The Führer awarded Paulus the Knight's Cross and sent a congratulations, in which he expressed "admiration for the success of the 6th Army, which managed to defeat the numerically superior progivnik."

Simultaneously with the liquidation of the Barvenkovsky ledge northeast of Kharkov on the Volchansky direction, the Germans finally bled the troops of Ryabyshev and Moskalenko. The defeated divisions of the 28th and the right flank of the 38th armies returned to the same trenches from which they began their offensive on May 12. At the same time, according to the army general S.M. Shtemenko, the 28th Army "was threatened by encirclement, and it retreated, one might say, reorganized, since command and control of the troops was lost." The commander of the 226th Infantry Division at that time, General A.V. Gorbatov melancholy personally noted: "The second half of May passed for us in defense and fruitless attempts to take height 199.0."

"For the planned German offensive," Tippelskirch summarizes, "an attempt by the Russian

234

Shatemu was only a welcome beginning. The weakening of the defensive power of the Russians, which was not so easy to achieve, should have greatly facilitated the first operations.

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Reporting to the Supreme Commander on the results of the operation, the inseparable trinity (Timoshenko, Khrushchev and Bagramyan) laid all the blame for the failure, as usual, on their subordinates:

"The defeat of the 9th Army was largely the result of the failure of the command of this army to control the Choi in difficult conditions (our italics. - Author). The reconnaissance of all types of the 9th Army and the Southern Front did not reveal the impending strike in a timely manner and thus deprived the commanders of the opportunity to take additional measures to repel the enemy's attack on the 9th Army.

... The command of the afmias and some of the commanders of corps and divisions with their headquarters turned out to be unable to lead the troops in difficult battle conditions (our italics. - Auth.). As a rule, the commanding officers of armies, corps, and divisions did not lead the formations of troops at critical moments in operations and battles, but traveled around the divisions. This was what happened in the group of General Kostenko and the 6th Army during the period of semi-encirclement and encirclement, when the army commander went to one division, a member of the Military Council to another, and the chief of staff to a third.

Approximately the same order followed the command of corps and divisions.

Thus, the centralized control of entire connections was lost and marked actions were disrupted. It should be taken into account that all this happened at the most tense moment of the situation, when it was necessary to make every effort to aim parts of the armies to get out of the encirclement and organize interaction between the branches of the troops on the battlefield.

25

The worthless ones went to our triumvirate of troops. As a result, "the well-conceived and organized campaign of Kharkiv turned out to be largely secured against enemy attacks on the Barvecka settlement."

"Everything was fine in the bays, only there was water."

[: in general, everything written in the report corresponds to reality, with the exception of one addition: in the lists of "insolvent" commanders, the names and positions of the signatories themselves, who so wonderfully misunderstood and organized everything, should rightfully be at the top of the list.

By the way, where was the command of the front and direction "during the period of semi-encirclement and encirclement"? From the diary of the Marchal adjutant, it can be seen that on May 22 and 23,

those. "In the most tense moment of the situation, when it was necessary to make maximum efforts for the nationalist liberation units," Timoshenko was at the headquarters, from the office he was supposed to lead the troops, and in the 38th army and on the front lines across the Seversky Donets. Timoshenko generally has the following habit: in crisis situations, to give up management and leave for nature. Samos is remarkable that here "we met Malinovsky, commander of the Southern Front." And now two ferrymen "control" the crossing near Ivanovka! Spova, we agree with the co-rapporteurs: "Such self-removal from the leadership of the troops of the armies as a whole finally led to the loss of control of the troops. It and gave rise to spontaneity in hostilities nor the field of battle (our italics. - Auth.)".

When Stalin died, and Khrushchev became the head of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, the opportunity arose to bring down the entire papacy. Yes, you could dictate history yourself. Under the close attention of the Secretary General, the 6 volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union" was born, in which the following is told about the Kharkov events:

235

"The Military Council of the South-Western direction decided to stop the further attack on Kharkov and, quickly regrouping the troops, create a strong group to repel the counterattack of the Kleist group. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command did not respond to the situation and, using the forces of the Southwestern Front, continue the offensive against Kharkov, and the 9th and 57th armies of the Southern Front and the reserves available in this direction to repel the enemy's counterattack. Further, it is reported that the perspicacious member of the Military Council N.S. Khrushchev "did not agree with the decision of the Stavka ... addressed directly to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief (and with a proposal to immediately stop the attack on Kharkov (italics ours, -Aut.), and the main efforts of the South-Western to repulse the counterattack of the enemy, but the Stavka insisted on carrying out the orders given earlier." Bosom friend Bagramyan very naturally fit into the editorial committee of fundamental work.

After the Brezhnev coup, Soviet historical science proved that the main commander of the war was the hero of the Malaya Zemli, while Khrushchev, during the Kharkov operation, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief never "directly" communicated and generally did not value his opinion on military issues a penny. I'm already retired, Nikita Sergesovich in his "Memoirs" was offended by Marshal Vasilevsky - he, it turns out, incorrectly informed Stalin:

"... of course, I can't get around my conversation with Vasilevsky. He made a deep impression on me then. I believed that the catastrophe that broke out near Barvenkovo could have been avoided if Vasilevsky had stated the position he was supposed to take. He could have taken a different position, but he did not take it, and thus, I believe, he had a hand in the death of thousands of Red Army soldiers in the Kharkov operation ... Vasilevsky, having acted incorrectly, did not fulfill his

237

his duty as a warrior and did not go with a report to Stalin during the Kharkov operation.

But it will be after.

In the meantime, for the Stalinist "brothers and sisters" Sovin Formburo concocted another nonsense under the title "On the battles in the Kharkov direction." It was reported that the Soviet offensive in the Kharkov direction was undertaken with the aim of disrupting the German offensive against Rostov, which our command learned about in time. At the same time, the capture of Kharkov "was not included in the plans", and now, after two weeks of fighting, "it can be said that the main task set by the Soviet Command - to prevent and disrupt the strike of the Nazi troops - has been completed" (In a letter Stalin pointed out to the Military Council of the Southwestern Front: "If we informed the country in full about that catastrophe - with the loss of 18-20 divisions, which the front survived and continues to survive, then I'm afraid that you would have been treated very coolly" The Supreme Commander gave Timoshenko shais to correct himself.) The Germans, according to the official report, lost about 90 thousand people killed and captured, 540 tanks, not less than 1500 guns, up to 200 aircraft, Soviet troops - "up to 5 thousand killed, missing 70 tys. man", 300 tanks, 832 guns and 124 aircraft. Nassleni, accustomed to read between the lines. THIS news made a depressing impression.

Alexander Werth, a correspondent for the English newspaper The Sunday Times, accredited in the USSR during the war years, also confirms that the authorities tried to present the Battle of Kharkov as a victory for the Red Army, for which "in early June, foreign correspondents were specially taken to a camp : but those 600-700 prisoners who were shown to us were undoubtedly captured at the first stage of the Kharkov operation - that is, during the Soviet offensive on May 12-17. Most of them, although they cursed their "bad luck", held on, in spite of

238

which, extremely cheeky; they insisted that in 1942 Termania would smash Russia and not for once did they agree to believe in the timeliness of the opening of any second front,

But now, after major defeats in the Crimea and near Kharkov, Comrade Stalin really wanted to believe this. It was possible to forget about the imminent return to the Baltic states, the Supreme Command urgently needed military assistance from the Western allies, and Molotov - time was found right away - flew to London on May 90 on a strategic bomber TB-7 to conclude a treaty under discussion for half a year. He was again offered a draft in which there was no question about the borders of the USSR Molotov, considering it an "empty declaration", asked Stalin. The answer was immediate: "Agree without it." And Soviet rule

The government "agreed not to push for inclusion in

agreement clause on the recognition by England of the western borders of the USSR in 1941. The agreement was signed on May 26. Following this, our Foreign Minister sent troops to Washington to negotiate the opening of a second front.

The discussion of the issue ended with the adoption by the USSR and the USA of an agreement dated 11 June, and 'also the Anglo-Soviet communiqué of June 12, 1942. These documents, published in the world and Soviet press, for the first time officially spoke of the intention of the allies to open a second front in Europe. I would like to emphasize that this was precisely a pact of intent, formulated in the communiqué as follows: "... a complete agreement was reached between both straps regarding the urgent tasks of creating a second front in Europe in 1942."

Moreover, in order to avoid misunderstandings, Churchill handed Molotov a memorandum in which he clearly indicated that the British government was not going to embark on military adventures just to get a second Dunkirk: "We are preparing for

239

desaitu nakoitnente in August or September 1942. As previously explained, the main factor limiting the size of the desalination forces is the availability of special desalination aids. However, it is clear that if, in order to take action at any cost, we were to embark on some operation that would turn into a catastrophe and give the enemy the opportunity to be proud of our failure, then this would not benefit either the Russian cause, or the Allied cause as a whole. It is impossible to say in advance whether the situation will be such that it will be possible for the herd to carry out this operation when the indicated

term. Therefore, we cannot make any promises in this matter (italics pash. - Ayat.). But, if the indicated operation turns out to be reasonable and justified, we will not hesitate to carry out our plans.

Quite a sober statement of the question: you can't beat Hitler with declarations. Of course, "our experts" quickly proved that "two million troops were inactive in England," and Churchill maliciously exaggerated the technical difficulties that "supposedly stood in the way of organizing a large landing on the Jewish mainland."

Nevertheless, the signing of the agreements was of great importance. To raise the spirit of the army and the people, this event, as they would say today, was accompanied by an abbot advertising campaign,

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At the end of May, the Soviet Headquarters set before the troops of the Southwestern Front the task of maintaining the koboro not at the turn of Volchansk, Balakleya and Dales along the left bank of the Seversky Donets River, firmly gaining a foothold with the forces of the 21st, 28th, 38th and 9th armies and preventing the development of the enemy offensive from the Kharkov region to the east. From June 5 to 9, the front was reinforced with new reserves - 7 rifle divisions, 4 separate tank brigades, 4, 13 and 24 tank corps. Total for SWF

240

there were 30 rifle divisions and two high rifle brigades, five tank and two cavalry corps, eight separate tank brigades.

The German 6th Army, which opposed them, in the strip from Izyum to Volchansk, had 14 infantry, 3 tank and } motorized divisions. [The German command unit was preparing to conduct two partial offensive operations, which were supposed to create an operationally favorable environment for the deployment of a major offensive.

At first, it was supposed to use the forces of the 6th Army to implement the Wilhelm plan against the 28th and right flank of the 38th Soviet armies. In the course of the second operation, code-named "Friedrichus Piem," the Germans planned to split up the troops of the 38th and 9th armies by strikes from three groupings in converging directions, destroy them on the right bank of the Oskol River, and then seize a bridgehead in the Kupyaiska area along the east nom shore. Paulus concentrated his main forces against the 38th Army of General Moscalsico. Timoshenko's headquarters, foreseeing that the counter-terrorist might undertake

to strike from the Chuguev area to Kupyalsk, narrowed the defense zone of the 38th Army to 60 km (10 km per division) and sent fresh riflemen and tank populations here, including three more tank and two motorized rifle high brigades, three artillery and guards mortar regiment,

On June 10, at 4 o'clock in the morning, after a 45-minute artillery barrage, German strike groups, supported by aviation, attacked the 28th Army in the Volchansk area and the right flank of the 38th Army from near Chugusva. The Germans sought to surround and destroy the main forces of the 28th Army in the area between the Seversky Donets and Veliky Burluk. Unable to withstand the "strong blow of superior enemy forces" - Ryabyshev sat on the defensive behind a water barrier 8 rifle and 3 cavalry divisions in two echelons, | motorized rifle, 7 tank brigades; Moskalenko has 8 rifle divisions, 3 moto

241

rifle brigades and 6 tank brigades - the 28th army began to retreat to the east. The troops of the right flank of the 38th Army succeeded in stopping the advance of the enemy in the direction of Kupyansk, but they were unable to prevent tanks and motorized infantry from penetrating deep along the western bank of the Bolshoy Burlak River to the northeast into the flank of the 28th Army.

Marshal Timoshenko no longer tells stories about the weakness of the enemy, but tirelessly asks Stalin for reinforcements. Chief of the Operational Directorate of the General Staff, General S.M. Shtemenko more than once observed the negotiations of the Supreme Commander with the headquarters of the South-Western Direction:

"We can't give rifle divisions," he told the Military Council of the South-Western Direction during negotiations on a direct wire on June 13, 1942, "since we now have no divisions ready. We'll have to manage on our own, improve command and control of troops.

Since S.K. Timoshenko repeatedly referred to the power of the enemy tank forces, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief pointed out:

— Tankov you more than the enemy. Beavtom that they either stand you, or go into battle dispersed, in separate brigades. Headquarters will suggest that you concentrate the actions of the 22nd Tank Corps, the 23rd Tank Corps somewhere in one place, say. in the region of Veliky Burluk, and strike at enemy tank groups. If our tank corps had acted concentratedly and in large numbers, you would not have had the picture that was given...

The commander-in-chief of the direction ... still persistently asked for infantry and weapons. To this, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief once again, already in writing, had to answer: "... the Headquarters does not have new divisions ready for battle ... Our armament resources are limited, and keep in mind that in addition to your front, we also have other : hyefronts ... It is necessary to praise not by number, but by skill.

242

But the non-commissioned marshal does not succeed either in numbers, or skill, or even "concentrate in one place."

In order to prevent the advance of the enemy, who was trying to encircle the main forces of General Ryabyshev, Timoshenko decided to organize a powerful counterattack on the German grouping that had broken through, consisting of three tank and one motorized divisions, with the main forces of the tank corps. For this purpose, an operational tank group was created consisting of the 13th, 22nd and 23rd corps and two rifle divisions under the overall command of General E.G. Pushkin.

However, in practice, it was not possible to unite the efforts of the corps included in the group in time and place. Tank formations conducted combat operations on isolated axes and without interaction. The 22nd tank corps of General A.A. Shamshin entered the battle with enemy machine tools that broke through the emergency formations of the 38th Army. By counterattacks, parts of the corps forced the enemy to abandon the offensive on the Kuryan direction, but they themselves suffered considerable losses.

"The tank brigades dealt their blow to the forehead. Meanwhile, roundabout maneuvers were quite possible, which would undoubtedly have given a better result. But they were not pre-planned by us, "- this Commander-38 is also not yet appropriate. Much later, he will figure out that "... not only the skillful organization of an offensive is important, but also the ability to see certain trends in its development during the operation, recognize the signs of an emerging threat and prevent it in time. Unfortunately, during the described period of the war, we still did not always have such a skill and were only accumulating that precious experience, which later played a huge role in defeating the enemy.

13th Tank Corps of General P.E. Shurov and the 23rd Corps of Colonel A.M. Hasina fought in combat as part of the 28th Army. The hulls were used in

243

novpom in the second echelon in order to repulse the attacking enemy from positions prepared in advance by ogyem taiki from a place that bore fruit. This tactic inflicted more losses on the enemy than counterattacks. The tankers delayed the advance of the Ismetsky units and provided the army with the opportunity to retreat in an organized manner and move back to a new defensive line. For 4 days of battles, Shurov's corps lost 72 tanks out of the 126 vehicles available, chalking up 119 tanks, 33 guns and 76 enemy vehicles.

The 4th and 24th sneaker corps were plowed in the reserve of the Southwestern Front. The corps often regrouped from one area to another, but did not take part in the defensive battle. By July 14, the Germans were stopped 35 km from Volchansk, for a short time there was a lull at the front.

On June 20, Timoshenko again called the Headquarters at least one rifle division, to which Stalin replied; "If the divisions were sold on the market, I would buy 5-6 divisions for you, but, unfortunately, they are not sold." At that time, the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the 1st Staff were tensely waiting for the attack of the Army Group "Zepr" on Moscow to break down.

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In the 1960s, when Stalin had long since died and his "cult" had been debunked by Khrushchev, prominent Soviet Muslims began to "boldly" assert that the Supreme Commander had made a big mistake in the spring of 1942 by concentrating the main reserves in the Moscow direction. Reconnaissance every time recorded the regrouping of the German troops and warned that the enemy was going to strike the main blow in the south.

But, firstly, does it really matter what the enemy planned, if they were going to preempt him with their "powerful blow".

Secondly, Stalin had reason to believe that the Germans would again try to take the capital. In the group ar

244

The Center mission still had more than seventy divisions (Hitler did not have the opportunity to replenish them with personnel, but he forbade disbanding formations, and the figure looked quite formidable). 94 divisions were concentrated in the south, but almost a third of them were much less capable than the German formations of Weigria, Romania and Italy. According to Marshal Vasilevsky, "this gave the Headquarters and the Fenshtab grounds

believe that with the beginning of the summer period, the enemy will try to strike a decisive blow precisely in the Central direction. This opinion, as I well know, was shared by the command of most fronts.

Who, in order to hide the preparation of a major offensive in the southern wing of the front and mislead the Soviet command about their plans, the German General Staff developed a plan for a fictitious operation "Kremlin", which aimed to create the appearance of preparations for a powerful offensive in the Moscow direction ,

As part of this operation, the troops of the Army Group "Center" received the "Order to advance on Moscow", signed by Field Marshal Kluge on May 29, in which they were charged: "To defeat the enemy troops located in the area west and south of the enemy's capital, to firmly capture the territory around Moscow, surrounding the city, and thereby deprive the enemy of the possibility of operational use of this area. The order set specific tasks for the 2nd tank armies, the 4th, 9th field armies and the 59th army corps.

"The enemy disinformers stopped at nothing to confuse the Soviet command," Bagramyan reports. - The plan of this operation was, in particular, provided for aerial photography of the Moscow defensive lines, the outskirts of Moscow, adjacent areas, to organize a

245

diode disinformation, to increase the transfer of agents through the line Tula, Moscow, Kalinin, etc. etc."

So the Supreme Commander received different, sometimes directly opposite reports from his intelligence and had reason to think that the German attacks in Krymu and Kharkov were just private diversion operations, even when on June 19 a plane crashed in the location of the Soviet troops with the head of the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division and a briefcase with documents revealing the essence of the "Blau" operation fell into the hands of our command, Stalin did not believe in this "misinformation".

Moreover, even in November 1942, when the Germans stormed Stalingrad and the Caucasus, the "greatest commander", so that no one would have any doubts about the correctness of his "brilliant strategy", in a report dedicated to the 25th anniversary of the October Revolution, placed dot all the 1s, announcing that Hitler's main strategic goal was... to bypass Moscow from the east:

"What was the main goal set by the German strategists. opening his summer offensive on our front? Judging by the responses of the foreign press, including the German one, one might think that the main goal of the offensive was to occupy the oil regions of Grozny and Baku. But the facts (2) decisively refute such an assumption. The facts show that the movement of the Germans towards the oil regions of the USSR is not the main, but an auxiliary goal.

What, then, was the main goal of the German offensive? It consisted of bypassing Moscow from the east (here it is - the clairvoyance of hepium! - Auth.), cutting it off from the Volga and Ural rear and then hitting Moscow. The German advance to the south towards the oil regions had as its auxiliary goal not only and not so much the occupation of the oil regions, but the diversion of our main reserves to the south, the weakening of the Moscow front, so that it would be easier to achieve success in an attack on Moscow ...

246

... The main goal of the summer offensive of the Germans was to bypass Moscow from the east and attack Moscow, then the advance to the south had the goal ... to divert our troops away from Moscow ... These calculations of the Germans did not materialize.

The leader cannot be wrong. Even 10 years after the end of the war, among the many trophies we find all the documents of the German General Staff (however, even today, few people have seen them), Soviet historians based their "scientific" research on the Stalinist version and drew maps of "bypassing Moscow from the east".

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By June 21, the German command had finished preparing the second private operation. 13 divisions from the 6th field and 1st tank armies were to take part in the IS. The main blow was delivered from the area to Chugusva on the right flank and center of the 38th Army. Here, in the Kupaish direction, a strike force consisting of three tank, three dog and one motorized divisions was involved. The second grouping, counting 3 infantry divisions, prepared in the Balakli area. Another 3 divisions concentrated south of Izyum against the 9th Army.

At the disposal of General Moskalenko this time there were 7 rifle and 1st fighter divisions,] motorized rifle, 6 tank brigades - about 200 guns, 15 regiments of the RGK. At the rear line of the army along the Oskol River, the 52nd field fortified paradise was deployed:

He. as part of six artillery and machine-gun bugs. The 16th Special Forces Engineer Brigade of the RGK was also operating here, "equipped", among other things, with dogs - tank destroyers. "The political agencies and party organizations worked hard these days... And they fought for even greater combat readiness of units and subunits."

As Moskalenko himself claims, "we knew where a new offensive was being prepared ... we installed and

247

lenis of the main attack, prepared by the enemy", It is also very important that the general had extensive knowledge of military affairs, for example: "The principle of defense is simple: stand to the death. So the shooter, the machine gunner, the mortar man, every soldier had to stand ... His comrade was killed, the commander was killed, but he must still do everything to destroy the enemy, He must not take a step back. This is the order... Yes, we had to fight to the death,"

True, as for every other little thing, well, there to equip positions, install barriers, then, as always, "... there was not enough time ... jesuspali."

On June 22, after an hour of artillery preparation and air strikes, the German divisions went on the offensive. Moreover, they attacked somehow especially terribly: an avalanche of drunken, wildly yelling Nazis rushed to the Soviet positions. Together with the infantry, tanks went on the attack in large numbers (also, paverno, with drunken crews - Adt.). One after another, groups of fascist planes rose into the air (with drunken pilots, you might think. - Auth) ... With a chain of heavy losses, literally pave their way with corpses and wrecked tanks, the advancing half-days were able to force the Veliky Burluk River.

Therefore, Moskalenko's troops and the general himself "stood to the death" for a very short time. Already by the end of the day, the 38th Army was dismembered and driven back from its positions, a day later, all units, in order to avoid the final encirclement and defeat, began to cross over to the eastern Beregrsky Oskol. The three high left-flank divisions retreated separately and without control, they had to cross the river in the daytime, under bombs and by swimming, leaving behind heavy aircraft and weapons. By June 26, the right flank of the 9th Army had to be withdrawn beyond Oskol. True, the Germans failed to capture the bridgehead: Tymoshenko still had Z-tank corps in reserve.

Paulus did not manage to organize "boilers" on the right bank of the Oskol, but the army did not

248

the dubious defeat of the troops of two Soviet fronts, significantly improved its operational situation and took advantageous positions for subsequent operations.

Shaming the Nazi strategists, Marshal Moska Lenko, who had accumulated "precious experience", points out that the main goal of the Friederichus P operation was not achieved by the Germans - they did not seize bridgeheads on the eastern bank of the Oskol River, "and the stamina of the Soviet troops, the defense forces, prevented this calculations of the German fascist command".

Meanwhile, on June 24, 1942, Halder noted with satisfaction in his diary: "Operation Friederikus I has been completed, the goal has been achieved." Having achieved their goals in the Southwestern Front zone, the Germans began to transfer the tank and motorized divisions of the 1st Panzer Army to the Donbass to prepare an offensive in the Rostov direction,

Marshal Moskalenko was echoed by Marshal Bagramyan: "The enemy's attempts to dismember and destroy our formations, force Oskol and seize bridgeheads were thwarted." That's where optimism is, that's where the attitude towards life is positive! In any situation, our marshals were able to discern something good, in any good - their merits. Under the leadership of Timoshenko, Khrushchev, Malinovsky, Kharitonov, the South-Western and Southern fronts suffered huge losses in men and equipment, but the enemy troops were "were bloodless by us", the German command was "losing precious time". According to Bagramyan, if he and Timoshenko had not handed over to the Germans a quarter of a million of their battalions, then the "Wehrmacht bosses" would have launched an offensive a month earlier and would have reached the Urals. ..

But General Müller-Gillebrand claims that the "very successful" battles on the southern flank of the Eastern Front prompted the German command to start offensive operations prematurely, without completing the replenishment of the units with personnel.

249

The situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German Front changed dramatically in favor of the Wehrmacht. The victories in the Crimea and near Kharkov produced such a strong vischatletsis on Hitler that on June 28 he summoned Shpser to him and demanded that "the production of consumer goods be resumed at the same volume as before"!

What does Bagramyan have to do with it? Moreover, Comrade Sta-

line, in his line, also "figured out" the guilty one. It turned out to be Gsial Bagramyan!

"Comrade Bagramai," the Supreme Commander wrote in a directive letter dated June 26, 1942, "is satisfied with the call only as a chief of staff, called upon to strengthen communication and leadership of the arias: by them, he will satisfy the Headquarters even as a simple informant, obliged to honor and to report truthfully to Headquarters on the situation at the front, more than that, Comrade Bagramya was able to learn from the outcast catastrophe that broke out in the South-Western Front. In the course of some three weeks, the South-Western Front, thanks to his frivolity, not only lost the Kharkov operation, which was half won, but managed to create 18-20 divisions to the enemy.

The most competent of the leaders of the direction was removed from his post and sent with a position, well - not under the tribunal. Timoshenko and Khrushchev, of course, made "mistakes", but so far the Stavka has been miraculously stolen.

After the war, there were another culprits of the defeats of the Red Army - the former comrades in arms, the Anglo-American imperialists: "As a result of the inaction of the allies (!)," writes V.L. Israzlyan, "the Nazi army managed not only to avoid a catastrophe, but to go on the offensive in the spring of 1942, to reach the banks of the Volga in the south."

250

FROM OSKOL TO DON

I can be scolded for pachalt during the war. But the year 1942 is a sad period of war. Starting from Barvenkov, Kharkov. Io Simoy Volga rolled. And no one writes anything, And they, together with Tymoshenko, slobbered. They brought one group of Germans to the Volga, and another group to Kav A iu were subordinated to the South Western, Southern Front. This was a sufficient force.

Marshal G.K. beetle

By mid-June 1942, the German command had created the prerequisites for a major offensive in the southern wing of the Eastern Front. Army group

under the command of Ssperial-Oberst Maximilius von Weichs, as part of the 2nd Field and 4th Panzer German Armies, as well as the 2nd Hungarian Army, in cooperation with the 6th Army of Paulus, were aimed at carrying out Operation Blau. Yes, the plan boiled down to delivering two blows on converging directions on Voronezh: one from the Kursk region and the other from the Volchansk region to Ostrogozhsk. As a result, it was supposed to encircle and defeat the Soviet troops west of the city of Stary Oskol, move to the Don in the area from Voronezh to Novaya Kalitva, after which the 4th Panzer and 6th Armies were to turn south, towards Kaptemirovka - to the rear of the main to the forces of the South-Western Front Marshal Ty Moshenko. .

At the same time, the second shock group (1st tank and 17th field armies) from the Slavyansk region was to break through the Soviet front and strike at Starobelsk, Millerovo to complete the encirclement of the troops of the K)th Western and Southern Fronts.

251

Ultimately, the German command expected to encircle the main forces of the two Soviet fronts, capture the right bank of the Don at the bend, break through to the Volga, intercept this important waterway in the middle reaches and develop an offensive into the Caucasus.

In order to achieve their goals, Germany and its allies concentrated 96 divisions on the southern flank of the Eastern Front, including 10 tank and 8 motorized divisions. They included 900,000 men, 1,260 tanks and assault guns, more than 17,000 guns and mortars, and 1,640 combat aircraft. Of these, 15 divisions were to the Crimea as part of Manstein's 11th Army. Army Group South's reserves consisted of two German infantry divisions and six Allied divisions, but the latter had not yet arrived at the front. Air cover was provided by 1,200 planes of the 4th Air Fleet under the command of Wolfram von Richthofen.

The main forces of the Weichs army group, which had been sharpened in the Shchigrov area, included 12 infantry, 4 tank and 3 motorized divisions. The strike force of Paulus in the Volchansk region consisted of nine infantry, two tank and one motorized divisions. In total, the Germans had 31 divisions in the Voronezh direction, about 900 tanks. These figures are the same in almost all sources, but they all originate from one thing - the official "History of the Second World War". Some mistrust is caused by her constant confusion of arithmetic. According to the same History,

In June 1942, 450 tanks of Army Group South stormed Sevastopol. Then, by a simple subtraction for all other "measures", 810 cars remain. If all of them were in the Voronezh direction, then what was left for Kleist's tank army, which was preparing to attack Voroshevolgrad?

252

As for the Soviet forces, the situation here is also confusing. Since there are ours, then the enemy must have an overwhelming advantage. Therefore, the "History of the Great Patriotic War" reports that by July 1942 the Bryansk, Southwestern and Southern fronts had 655 thousand people, 740 tanks, 14200 guns and mortars, 1000 combat aircraft. Further, for the dull ones, there is an explanation: "Consequently, the general balance of forces was not in favor of our troops. In terms of the number of people and military equipment, they were inferior to the enemy by an average of one and a half times.

Generalarmy S.M. Shtemenko, keeping pace with the party, confirms these data. However, Marshal A.M. Vasilevsky gives completely different figures - 1,715,000 people per day, 2,300 sneakers, 16,500 guns and mortars, but only 758 combat aircraft.

Marshal is more truthful. Only the Southwestern Front had 5 tank corps, 3 of which had not yet taken part in combat, and 13 separate tank brigades. As for the Bryapsky front, it was actively strengthened by the Headquarters from the middle of spring. In it, in addition to five combined arms armies - 3, 13, 48, 40 and the "roaming" 61st (a total of 29 rifle, 6 cavalry divisions, 11 rifle brigades), there were 2 tank corps: and 9 separate tank brigades. In addition, the Stavka reserve was located in the front line: the 5th tank army (only in it - 480 tanks) and the 17th tank corps. All together, this amounted to over 1,500 combat vehicles on the Bryansk front alone. These considerable forces were being prepared by the Soviet General Staff for an offensive that never took place in order to defeat the German group in the Orel and Kursk region.

General F.I. Yulikov commanded the Bryapsky Front - intelligence officer, diplomat, commander, political worker and informer - a storehouse of talents with a minimum of education: military propaganda courses and advanced training courses for senior command personnel.

253

In total, as part of the search for Bryansk, Yugo-

On the Western and Southern fronts, there were 81 rifle and 12 cavalry divisions, 38 motorized rifle and rifle brigades, 9 fortified areas and 62 tank brigades.

As for the Avi-shi, air support for our three Fronts was provided by three air armies - the 2nd, 4th and 8th. Only in the latter in mid-June, there were 9 air divisions and 7 separate air regiments. having 836 aircraft: 596 combat. 124 transport, 116 auxiliary aviation (so the Germans also had more than 30% of the total number of aircraft fleet; port, reconnaissance and communication vehicles accounted for more than 30%).

The effectiveness of the use of Soviet aviation was slowed down due to the insufficient number of people and the recently created associations. lack of radio communication, poor communication, poor training of pilots and adherence to small tactical waggles. As a result, in air battles, fighters acted crowded, without camouflage, dispersed along the heights, they were not able to fight vertically. Having discovered the enemy planes, the allied forces simultaneously rushed to the attack in a "swarm", dividing into attack and reserve groups. At the same time, neither attack aircraft, nor bombers, nor exterminate the heli were able to support their ground troops directly on the battlefield. For this, neither organizational nor material-technical prerequisites were created.

Like in other branches of the military, the weak point was the organization of communications and control: "The connection with the aerodromes, paratroop troops and their command posts was carried out in the main only by laying out special, well-marked sign panels on the ground, lighting fires in a certain order, and passing identification marks on moving objects. Pilots with epochs of aircraft

254

or by launching missiles of different colors, they confirmed the prism of the signals given to them and acted in accordance with them."

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Direct participation in the battle from the Soviet side was taken by 74 rifle divisions, 6 tank corps, 37 tank brigades, 6 fortified units and the Doya detachment of the Azov military flotilla with a total number of 131) thousand people. These are the figures for the beginning of the so-called Voronezh-Voroshilovgrad defense

initial operation, taking into account the introduced later reserves of the Rate.

Thus, according to none of the indicators, the advancing side did not have any significant quantitative superiority over the defending side, and in terms of tanks it was inferior to the army.

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Nine days before the German offensive, a staff plane landed at the location of the Soviet troops, having lost its orientation in the dark. Major Reichel, an officer of the operations department of the 23rd Panzer Division, was in the NCM, and the most valuable information on Operation Blau was with the NCM. Hitler, upon learning of what had happened, was furious. He demanded that the commander of the division, General Foy Boineburg, the commander of the 40th Sneaker Corps, General Shtumms, and the chief of staff, be judged by a military man and insist on execution. However, Staliy did not believe these SVS depies, considering them disinformation, and the Wehrmacht commander did not begin to change the offensive plan: the regrouping of troops would delay the Ular for a few more weeks.

The official Soviet propaganda, summing up the results of the first year of the war, on the 22nd of June through the mouthpieces of the Sovinformburo announced:

255

his army, poured into the army and a certain amount of human and material reserves. But for this, the Hitlerite bosses had to take all the remnants of people under the whisk. capable of holding weapons in their hands, including those who are limited in age and have large physical abilities. During the winter, the Hitlerite command repeatedly promised the German population in the spring to launch a "decisive" offensive against the Red Army. The Vespa passed, after which decisive offensive of the German army took place ... The German army of 1942, this is not the same army that was at the beginning of the war, The selected German troops in their bulk were killed, The regular officers were often exterminated by the Red Army , partly decomposed as a result of robberies and violence against the civilian population of the occupied districts. The junior command staff, as a rule, has been killed and is now being mass-produced from untrained soldiers. Now the German army is not able to carry out offensive operations on a scale like last year (our italics. - Auth).

As confirmation of these theoretical assumptions, fantastic figures of German losses were cited: 10 million people, of which less than 3.5 million were killed (in fact, the Germans lost so many during the entire Second World War on all fronts taken into account; on June 20, 1942 In 1999, losses on the Eastern Front amounted to 1.3 million people, of which approximately 332 thousand were killed and missing), 24 thousand tanks (German industry has not yet produced half of this figure), 20 thousand aircraft. Soviet losses were estimated at 4.5 million soldiers and commanders (if only prisoners), 15 thousand tanks (actually twice as many), thousand aircraft (actually 22 thousand annually).

256

VORONEZH-VOROSHILOVGRAD OPERATION

Early on the morning of July 28, the German letiss offensive began. On this day, the Vsikhs group hit the junction of the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front. The main attack was carried out by the 4th Gap Army of General Colonel Germap Yuta south of the Kursk-Voro Iszh railway with the task of reaching the Don. th Army Corps.

Throwing on the 45-kilometer section of the front against three Soviet rifle divisions three tank (24, Ei 11th), three infantry and one motorized division, "limited fit" Germans easily broke through their defenses and, wedged in at 10-15 km, left to the rear Tim, south of the city of Livny. The next day, despite their "major physical handicap", they deepened the breakthrough to 35-40 km. Despite the fact that, according to the statement of General M.I. Kazakov:

"From the directive of the commander of the 40th Ismian tank corps, which we seized, we learned that the enemy intends to launch an offensive ... The front headquarters, army headquarters and troops were preparing for this. Interactions were carefully practiced, especially on the 13th and 40th first days (italics ours. - Auth.).

Commandarm-40 M.A. Parsegov was an addictive person, sometimes he ran out of patience for a detailed analysis of the situation. Mia still remembers one of his conversations with the commanding front.

- How do you rate your defense? asked F.I. [= faces.

"The mouse will not slip through," the commander answered confidently.

"Having worked out the interaction," the headquarters of the Bryansk Front calmly continued preparations ... for the offensive. Therefore, the defense of the Soviet troops was again.

Goal 1942 - tutorial. 257

"active": even the first line of defense did not have time to be fully equipped, the second line, as a rule, was not at all (Gsisral Gorbатов wrote about the current situation: , ist and defenses"). Artillery and reserves were evenly distributed along the entire front. It was supposed to repel the possible enemy's mischief by counterattacks by tank formations. Since it was believed that the Pemtsy, like in 1941, would strike in the direction of Misisk, Tula, the most powerful grouping of Taiks - the 5th shoe army plowed on the right flank of the Froit and prepared for the slander of the coitrular according to the slang variation - pa Chern . The possibility of an enemy attack on the Kursk-Voronezh administration is seriously not under

understood.

The same Kazakov reports that he spent the night of June 28 developing the plan for the Oryol offensive operation: "We got used to this plan so much that sometimes we imagined its various variants as real events"

In the morning, really real events unfolded.

The "carried away" General Parsegov with his headquarters went deep in the rear in the Bykopo area and did not show much concern. Neither he nor his deputies have ever visited their rifle divisions, which were engaged in a heavy battle. Even for the two tank brigades that arrived from the reserve, the army commander did not set tasks personally, but did this through communications officers. The next day, Pemsy slippers arrived in Bykovo. Parsegov finally lost contact with the troops and hastily drove off to Kastornos. So, "leading" Goth's divisions, the general quickly found himself in Voronezh. The command and control of the divisions of the 40th Army had to be taken over directly by the Iggab of the Bryapa Front.

The first successes of General Weichs, although they complicated the situation on the left wing of the Bryansk Front, did not yet pose a particular threat. To eliminate the breaking through grouping of the 4th Panzer Army, on the night of June 29, General Yulikov was transferred to the 4th and 24th

tank corps of the Southwestern Front and the 17th Slipper Corps from the Stavka reserve. The reserves of the Bryansk front were also sent to the breakthrough site - the 1st and 16th tank corps, the 1155th and 116th tank brigades. These forces numbered over 1,000 combat vehicles and, frankly, if they were used correctly, they could radically change the 06-setting. the reasons for the failure, in my opinion, were vlrug: in inability.

The headquarters of the Supreme High Command recommended Yulikov to concentrate the efforts of the tank corps for the ralgron of the enemy grouping, which had broken through into the Rshechnoye area. The 4th and 24th tank corps were to strike from the Stary Oskol region to the north. and the 17th tank corps from the Kasgornos area in the southern direction. All three corps were combined into an operational group under the command of General Lieutenant Ya.N. Fedorenko, head of the Main Armored Directorate, who specially arrived at the front to assist in organizing combat operations of tank formations. To strike at the left flank and rear of the advancing German grouping, the 1st and 16th tank corps were aimed. Thus, the Bryansk Front had sufficient forces to not only stop the Weichs group, but also to defeat its main forces.

Knowing the talents of his military leaders, on June 30, Stalin personally designed Golikov:

"Remember well. You now have more than 1000 tanks at the front, and there are no enemy tanks even 500 tanks.

259

This is the first and second: on the front of action of three enemy tank divisions, you have gathered more than 500 tanks, while the enemy has 300-350 gunks at the most.

Everything now depends on your ability to use your powers and manage them humanly. Got drunk?

No, they didn't understand! The front command failed to organize a timely and massive strike on the flanks of the German grouping. Everything was done in the best traditions of the summer of 1941: the corps entered the battle at different times and in parts, without interaction with artillery and aircraft, without reconnaissance and communications, while the opi were used not so much to solve active tasks to destroy the anti-grip, but to plug gaps in the defense of the common skov army!

On June 29, the 16th Tank Corps of Major General M.I. Pavelkina started stubborn battles in order to eliminate the enemy's bridgehead on the left bank of the Kshen River in the Volovo region. On another day, on June 30, the 1st Panzer Corps of Major General M.E. went on the offensive from the area south of Livna along the left bank of the Kshen River. Katukov. Fierce battles unfolded in the interfluvium of the Ksheni and Olyma, Katukov managed to advance south by only 5 km, then he was stopped by German artillery and air strikes and took up defensive positions at the junction of the 13th and 40th armies. Brigadiers Pavelkipa bypassed the enemy from the south and cut off the enemy's communications; for 3 days of fighting, the 16th tank corps lost more than a hundred combat troops, and the 109th tank brigade was surrounded by the enemy.

The former commander of this brigade, Colonel-General V.S. Arkhipov recalled that the battles on the Kshep River were remembered "especially strongly because of the numerous opportunities we used (italics ours. - Auth.) ... Instead of knocking the enemy off the bridgehead with a blow from a tank fist, we tried to push him with our finger. On the first day they were thrown against twenty German tanks and two battalions of submachine gunners who had mastered

260

New Village, about the same number of shooters, but twice as many tanks. On the second day - 20 of our tanks against 40-50 fascist ones, and so on. The counterpike, building up its forces, was ahead of us, and if on the first day of the battle for the bridgehead we had a general superiority in tanks, we did not use it in attacks. Then by the fourth day this superiority had already passed to the enemy. This is what it means to use tanks with caution, with the crushing of tank brigades and battalions in order to "close the gaps."

Marshal of the Armored Troops M.E. Katukov cites another way of using tanks - "without looking back": "I set a task for the commander, and he went to do it. Two or three hours later, the head of the operations department, Nikitin, transmitted messages from the left flank:

and the Tank Brigade, having suffered heavy losses, withdrew from the battle. The commander was sent to the rear. He has a severe nervous shock.

What happened?

...After all, how did the tank crews' sappers usually act when performing such a task? Preparing for an attack, they first of all sent forward combat reconnaissance; so that she would call fire upon herself. The commanders of tank crews and subunits at that time were located in shelters, observation posts and spotted fire weapons that discovered themselves. A.

then the command "On vehicles" was given, and the tank crews rushed forward, knowing exactly what targets they would have to suppress with fire, destroy, crush with caterpillars. It is clear that preliminary reconnaissance did not ensure the detection of all targets, but nevertheless it greatly facilitated the fight against enemy weapons. .

And on that day in the Don region, the brigade commander, without any reconnaissance, led the tank battalions to a large bare hillock and opened fire on the supposed (!) positions of the Nazis. Undoubtedly, he hoped to crush the enemy defenses (?), open the way for tanks and

261

infantry. But everything turned out differently. The German artillery, well camouflaged in rye bread and other shelters, remained invulnerable, and the tanks on a bare hillock became a good target..."

The commander of a tank brigade is a general's position, and an officer with the rank of not less than a colonel received it. I understand that a soldier who has no idea about reconnaissance, battle formations, the use of terrain, and camouflage can be given general epaulettes. But to entrust such a man with a brig of dutanks? Involuntarily, you will remember the American: "A fool cannot be our boss, it is economically feasible." How much did the Red Army cost just one brigade commander, who killed fifty tanks in a couple of hours? Let us add here the funds spent on its maintenance during twenty years of service and on the treatment of the "first shock". Although the mention of "worn-out tankers" suggests that other brigade commanders learned to fight in exactly the same way, only their nerves were stronger.

In the second half of June 80, a major tank battle began on the left flank of the 40th Army, between the divisions of the German 48th Tank Corps and the tank corps of the Fedorenko Task Force. 4th Tank Corps Major General V.A. Mishulina, going on the offensive from the area of Stary Oskol, by the end of the day reached Gorshechpogo, defeating the advanced units of the enemy here. 17th Corps Major General N.V. Feklenko also attacked Orshechnoe with the forces of one brigade from the Orekhov region. The rest of the formations and units of the corps were still advancing to the starting area for the offensive. 24th Tank Corps of General V.M. Badanov, instead of going on the offensive together with Mishulin's brigades, received the task of defending the Stary Oskol region and preventing the enemy from breaking through to the south.

The counterattack of the 4th and 17th tank corps did not hit the flanks and rear of the 48th tank corps

262

tivnik, but by its reconnaissance and forward units. This put the Soviet corps, which had entered the Orshechnoe region, in a difficult position, since they themselves were under the threat of encirclement. | July, the enemy, bypassing Gorshechnoye with the main forces from the north and south, by the end of the day reached the line of Orekhovo, Yassenki, Bogoroditskos. In the Orshechnoye area, the 102nd brigade of the 4th tank corps and the main forces of Mishulin's corps were surrounded. The tankers fought in the ring for another two days, cut off from the rear by the enemy and under the complete dominance of his aircraft. On the night of July 3, the remnants of the brigades broke through to the east.

As expected, General Yulikov and his staff were unable to organize a powerful mass attack on the flanks of the Weichs strike force. Moreover, the leader of the front decided to withdraw units of the 40th Army to a new frontier. The headquarters forbade this and at the same time pointed out the impermissibility of the lack of communication with the 40th Army and tank corps. That is, in fact, no one controlled these corps, and their commanders, also not yet "Hindenburgs", but only learning.

Marshal Vasilevsky writes like this: "The commanders of the tank corps (major generals of the tank troops M.E. Katukov. N.V. Feklenko, M.I. Pavelkii, V.A. Mishulin, V.M. Badanov) did not have sufficient experience" ta {?}, the amas did not help them much with their advice and instructions. The tank corps behaved indecisively: they were afraid to break away from the defending infantry of the general military armies, and therefore, in most cases, they themselves acted according to the methods of the rifle troops, not learning their specifics and their capabilities ... Examples: Katukov (1st shopping mall) instead of a quick kill during the day, the infantry of the enemy was engaged in the encirclement of two regiments ... "

And Katukov agrees with his senior comrade: "... like any experience, combat is also not given immediately. All these thoughts are already coming to us, the participants in those events, as a result of the experience gained in subsequent battles.

263

How so?

After Katukov received a tank division in November 1940, in July 1941 he participated in a counterattack on Lutsk, Dubno, in the battle near Moscow his brigade earned the rank of the 1st Guards, the general was considered a specialist in organizing tank battles with superior enemy forces.

1st Badapov pa froits from the first diy, komats added a taik division and a brigade.

General Feklenko started the war on July 22, 1941 in Ukraine as commander of the 19th mechanized corps, papos the blow to Rovno, Dubio

General Mishulia, commanding the 57th tank division, in which there were twice as many tanks and fighters as in the current corps, participated in the battle of Smolensk, already in July 1941 he was awarded the title [of the swarm of the Soviet Union "skillful leadership of combat mi actions."

How much more experience will they have, and when will they gain this experience? And if the germanist fights "according to the template", then how long will it take to learn it? Almost a year and a half of the war, terrible defeats and losses unprecedented in history took the red commanders in order to stop inventing prolstar ox science and start adopting "templates", that is, the basics of the enemy's military affairs. dalsko isssm.

By the end of July 2, the Ismds had cut the Kastornos-Stary Oskol railroad, and a bit later, the "Panzer Readers" of the 24th Panzer Division reached the Don,

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In the meantime, the troops of the 6th Ismetsky Army and the 40th Taik Corps, who went on the offensive on June 30 from the Volchansk region, by 14 o'clock broke through the defense at the junction of the 21st and 28th armies of the South-Western Front and, having passed 80 km in three diyas, went to the areas of Stary Oskol and Volokonovka.

264

Commanding the 21st Army, Major General A.I. La Pilov to avoid encirclement. decided to withdraw troops to the eastern bank of Oskol. Task. covering the retreating formations was assigned to the 34th 3rd Rifle Division of Colonel P.P. Chuvashov and the 13th tank corps attached to the army. By this time, the last day was polsn to the staff strength, had in its composition 158, 167, 85th tank, 20th motorized rifle brigades, 2? rocket artillery battalion. There were 180 tanks in the brigades. This is a fairly powerful fist. However, the association did not have anti-aircraft artillery, reconnaissance units and evacuation and repair units. In the conditions of retreat, every tank that was knocked out or broken down fell into the category of irretrievable losses. Waste accompanied-

Xia continuous attacks of the enemy, nasty bombing aircraft and the lack of support on the part of their own artillery and infantry. The tankers suffered significant losses in military personnel and personnel, General P.E. was mortally wounded. Shumov, the commander of the 20th Infantry Brigade, Major P.I. Turbin and the commander of the 85th Panzer Gsneral-May OrA.A. Aseychev.

Formations of the 28th Army were thrown over the pale-yellow bank of the Oskol River. At the same time, according to the memoirs of the commander: "Our aviation was not in the air. We did not have information about the position of our right neighbor, the 21st Army, and the north-flank formations. Nothing could be reported about it by the Yggab Front, referring to the lack of connection with the unification. We didn't receive any responses to our requests by radio, but we had aircraft for communication." Dalss Ryabyshev complains that the front command doubted absolutely accurate information", rejected orders that "did not correspond to the current situation", in particular, ordered the forces of the 23rd tank corps to strike at the front and get in touch with the 13th tank corps of the 21st th army. "not knowing its exact whereabouts."

265

The usual story: if there are many fathers in victory, then defeat is an orphan. On the other hand, in the archives of the FSB of Russia, a memorandum from the special department of the NKVD dated July 18, 1942 addressed to the Commissar of State Security of the 3rd rank Abakumov, which is entitled: "On shortcomings in the combat operations of the 23rd tank corps for the period from } to | July 0, 1942". It stated, inter alia, the following:

"The continuous transfer of parts of the 23rd Taik Corps from one line to another, their incorrect use in battle - exhausted the material part, not reaching the song,

In 1!) days, parts of the corps made a march with a total complexity of up to 300 kilometers (on July 1, 85 tanks remained in the corps, - Auth.).

By order of the command of the 28th Army, units of the 23rd Tank Corps on 1 July 1942 concentrated in the area of Kozinka, Kaznacheevka, Konoplyanovka with the task of destroying the enemy advancing eastward in the direction of Volokonovka and enabling units of the 28th Army to retreat across the Oskol River and back defense.

The first and main zalacha was not completed.

On July 1, 1942, the 6th and 114th tank brigades started on the steps, having no data on enemy forces, without organizing interaction with infantry and artillery

aviation,

As a result of such disorganization, the tanks were met with active artillery fire from the enemy in cooperation with aircraft, which immediately disrupted the battle order of the advancing our tanks (here are polishes, special officer, and they understand tactics better than many of our commanders - this is because more often than not, he didn't become a leader or classic: "Everyone imagines himself a strategist, seeing the battle from the side"? - Author).

As a result of an ill-conceived offensive, parts of the corps lost about 30 tanks in only two days of battle and retreated with a fight to the eastern bank of the Oskol.

260

Thus, the task of stopping the enemy by the 23rd Panzer Corps was not completed due to the mismanagement of units by the commander of the 28th Army, General-Lieutenant Ryabyshev and a member of the Vosin Soviet brigade commissar Popel, and the enemy managed to force the Oskol River and advance to the east, (In the presentation of Popel himself, this looks somewhat different: "In order to disrupt the self-confident plan of the Nazi General Staff officers, the front commander will throw a tank corps to Volokonovks, now General Khasin. The tanks must hit the German flank and go to the Siverskyi Donets. Forces enough for such a strike - Khasin has a maximum of 80 tanks, of which a good half are old T-60s - "tractor with a gun". But the order must be carried out ... One of the brigades really acted successfully, moved forward at first. But then was to retreat, having lost more than half of the tanks ... "It is not clear, what is the self-confidence of the "Hitler General Staff"? - Auth.).

With the transfer of parts of the tank corps to the eastern bank of the Oskol River to take up defense in the area of Prinsivka, Psski, Terskhovo, Khokhlovo and Koloskovo, it was established that the infantry of the 13th Guards SD, which was supposed to take up defense in this area, was absent.
shaft.

The command of the corps went to the member of the Military Council of the 28th Army, Popel, with a report on the situation,

Popel, instead of taking appropriate measures, took the card and declared:

"... On my map, the infantry of the 13th Guards Rifle Division is on the defensive. You don't know anything. Go ahead and don't panic."

All the same, amazing metamorphoses are produced with the consciousness of a Soviet and post-Soviet person by a leading chair! In July 1941, the same corps

267

The commissar Vashugip taught Popel himself to fight on the map and "without panic", and now our hero has become a big man, after all - a member of the Military Council of the Army.

The American science fiction writer Robert Hyline, visiting the Soviet Union in the 60s, very accurately took revenge that Soviet citizens understand democratic communication: "In the USSR you are either above or below - but never equal", and therefore "...the worker of 'Inturista', having remained nasdiiss and a foreigner, cannot choose a position in any way. Is he a subordinate or a boss? Usually there is something like a quick test of strength, then this or that role is slowly assumed ... In this case, you need to model your behavior according to the worst model of an angry fit - you happened to see him during Khrushchev's speech; they will understand that. In the USSR, only the boss behaves like that ...

In "Invincible and Legendary," this priest was taught by the aphorism known to every military servant: "I am the executioner, you are shit; you're the boss, I'm the shit." But we believe in Hasin's corps.

"By the end of the day, on 3 July 42, the enemy scored. using the lack of firepower, he redirected the submachine gunners through the Oskol rsko and occupied the Koloskovo settlement.

Due to the lack of infantry, our tanks, which were in ambush in this village, were forced to chase la separate machine gunners (!), knocking them out of the village's silt. The village of Koloskovo was again in our hands.

On July 4, 1942, the command of the 23rd Gunnery Corps received an order from Major General Pushkin to immediately withdraw parts of the corps and set up a new line of defense on the Vala River!

"... Start retreat slowly. By the evening of 5.7.42 be ready to fight at the Valuy Rsks."

The command of the corps carried out Pushkin's order, their units withdrew and occupied the line on the Valuy River, leaving the defense area without covering niche units (our italics. - Auth).

268

On July 3, the army of Paulus, with its left flank, joined at Stary Oskol with the Hungarian units from the Weichs group that had broken through there. Part of the formations of the 40th and 21st armies, the 13th tank corps were surrounded, 40 thousand people were taken prisoner. After that, the main forces of Weichs rushed to Voronezh, Paulus - to Ostrogozhsk, covering the right flank of the 28th Army. On the same day, General Ryabyshev received an order to surrender command to the commander of the 3rd Cavalry Corps, General V.D. Kryuchenko and, together with Popel, leave at the disposal of the Headquarters.

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The threat of a German breakthrough to the Don and the capture of Voronezh became quite real. Stalin paid special attention to the Voronezh region. He assumed that, having broken through here, the German troops would cross the Don and begin a bypass movement behind Moscow's rear. In an effort to strengthen the position in the Voronezh direction, the Stavka ordered that the left bersaglieri of Don Army - 60, and 63rd be put forward from the reserve. In the area from Zadonsk to Kletskaya, 22 fresh rifle divisions and 1 rifle brigade were deployed. The 18th and 25th tank corps were thrown into the Voronezh area. General Golikov was also ordered to go there and take over the personal leadership of military operations. At the main command post, the front commander was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant General N.E. Chibisov.

At the same time, the 5th Tank Army, which included 3 tank corps (2nd, 11th and 7th), the 19th separate tank brigade and one rifle division, was transferred to the disposal of the Bryansk Front. Together with the tank formations of the front, it was supposed to carry out a counterattack on the flank and rear of the grouping of German troops advancing on Voronezh. In total, the command of the Bryansk Front received, in addition to the available forces, a total of 23 more riflemen.

269

military divisions, 1 rifle, 5 motorized rifle and 16 tank brigades - near their tanks.

On the night of July 3, the corps of the 6th Tank Army, commanded by Major General A.I. Lizyuzhov, completed their concentration south of Yelets. Their immediate and decisive strike against the enemy, who was rushing towards Voronezh with a fist of 530 combat vehicles, accompanied by motorized infantry, could drastically change the situation in favor of the Soviet side, especially since the main forces of this German group, having suffered losses and stretched out on a wide front, were connected to-

yami. However, Lizyukov did not receive any tasks from the front headquarters. General Golikov, having departed for Voronezh, did not instruct anyone in particular to organize the reception and entry into battle of the 5th Panzer Army, and the deputy commander of the front, General Chibisov, and the head of the army, General Kalakov, were in no hurry to take the initiative.

Therefore, on July 4, the Chief of the General Staff A.M. arrived in the Yelets region. Vasilevsky personally placed a guard to Kazakov and Lizyukov: with a simultaneous strike by all the imminent forces west of the Don, intercept the communications of the Gotta tank group, which had already broken through to the Don, and disrupt the crossing across the river. With access to the Zemlyansk-Khokhol region, the 8th Army, with the support of the thinned corps of Pavelka and Katukov, was supposed to help the troops of the left flank of the 40th Army break out of the encirclement. The operation was ordered to begin no later than 15-16 hours of the next day, without waiting for the full concentration of all forces.

By the appointed time, only the 7th tank corps of Major General P.A. reached the starting line. Mystrov's mouth. The main forces of the army were still on the way: one of the reasons for their slow advance was that the commander, saving motor resources, decided to transport tanks by rail (and this is time to concentrate in the loading area, loading, unloading

eo

ka, exit to the indicated area), although the distance to the paradise of hostilities did not exceed 100 km. As a result, it was not possible to bring the main forces of the tank army into battle at the same time. The corps were brought into action on the move, without preparation. The army headquarters did not have specific data on opponents.

On the morning of July 6, the Rotmistrov brigade went on the offensive. In the area of Krasnaya Polyana, a meeting of the corps with units of the 11th Panzer Division of the enemy took place, as a result of which the Germans were stopped and pushed back 10-15 km across the Kobylia River Again. The next day, the 11th Panzer Corps was introduced into the battle on the move. General Major A.F. Popov and a separate 19th tank brigade. In fierce battles that lasted four days, the formations of the two Soviet corps managed to push the enemy another 4-5 km and reach the Sukhaya Vereika River by the end of July 10. Only on this day did the 2nd Panzer Corps, Major General I.G., go on the offensive. Lazarev.

Nevertheless, the Soviet troops could not achieve significant successes. The divergent entry into the battle of the corps of the 5th Panzer Army made it possible to resist

there was no way to pull up reserves and organize a strong defense at an advantageous natural line along the Sukhaya Vereika River, as a result of which the further advance of Lizyukov's troops was stopped. The Germans in the area of Zemlyansk organized a tough defense, tightly covered by anti-tank artillery and minefields, which they failed to break through.

The same Marshal Vasilevsky points out: "... the 6th Panzer Army did not complete the task. Her command, having no experience in driving such tank formations, at first acted not entirely confidently, the front headquarters did not help him and, in fact, did not direct his work; there was no support from front-line reinforcements - artillery and aviation.

27

Because of this, it was not possible to achieve a simultaneous powerful strike on the flank and a rear-strike grouping of the enemy.

At the same time, the tank corps operated along the lines of the main attacks, and sang the offensive on a wide front, like combined arms formations, with indications of lanes and demarcation lines - with wide grassy fingers. True, the German command post was forced to send the 9th, 1st Panzer, and three infantry divisions, as well as strong aviation forces, to repulse the Ulars from the north. This weakened the pressure of the Germans on Voronszh and allowed the troops of the Bryansk Front to win a few foxes to organize the defense on new lines.

Let us also note the wonderful organization of the supreme administration. During the period described, the Bryansk Front was simultaneously commanded by the Geisrals Tyulikov and Chibisov, each on his own flag. Periodically, they were mocked by the head of the General of the Igtaba, Gsieral Vasilevsky, who was clearly in his place and was in his own business. Here is the head of the operational department of the Geeitaba, Geperal Vatutin. And who in Moscow was in charge of the "brain of the army" at such a crucial moment? Headquarters Commissar Bokov!

On July 6, mobile formations of the Vsikhs group (SS division "Great Ermatia"), capturing the destroyed bridge, crossed the Don and broke into the western part of Voronezh; trams were still running along the streets of the city, the gap between the Bryansk and South-Western froites reached 300 km wide and up to 170 km deep.

The former clerk of the headquarters of the Bryansk Front of the General Army M.I. Kazakov, leaning "over the map of past battles," refers to the statement of Tippslskirha that "it was not possible to achieve successes in the west of the Don region ...", and reports: "In all you-

it seems that we have no reason to take action in the current situation at that time" (!!!). Notut, on the other hand, self-critically admits that "with the balance of forces that has developed in the Bryai Frop-

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272

that (especially in terms of the number of tanks), the attacking troops could not only thwart the plans against the Viik, but also carry a crushing defeat on his main strike group (*italics pash.* - Auth). Why didn't this happen? Here, as already noted above, serious mistakes in command and control of troops had an effect ... a lack of experience in command and control of troops in difficult conditions. This, in the first place, explains almost all of our mistakes at that time. It is now clear to me how they could have been avoided."

On July 7, the Headquarters "in order to improve the management of the search areas" divided the Bryansk front into two - Bryansk under the command of General N.E. Chibisov, who was soon replaced by Rokossovsky, and Voronezhsky, under the command of General Golikov, was later replaced by General Lieutenant N.F. Vatutin. The Voronezh Front included the 40th, 60th, 6th combined arms armies, the 4th, 17th, 18th and 24th tank corps and the 2nd air army, which received the task of holding the eastern bank of the Don at all costs.

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In the same laziness, the German command began to carry out the second stage - Operation Clausewitz. Paulus' troops and the 40th Panzer Corps turned south, developing an offensive along the right bank of the Don to Rossosh, Millerovo and going to the rear of the Southwestern and Southern fronts. In the afternoon of July 7, the 40th Panzer Corps of General von Schospoepburg and the 8th Army Commander Geitz zaiya Rossosh. The main forces of the 4th Panzer Army, due to the slow approach of the infantry divisions, which had to change while they were delayed under. Voro Nezhsm, repelling Soviet counterattacks.

For the convenience of control, from July 9, Hitler divided the troops in the south into two army groups. The command of Army Group South was renamed the command of Army Group B; fsl dmarschall von Bock under

273

the 6th German, 2nd Hungarian, 8th Italian and the 3rd Romanian army, which was in the process of formation, were repaired. They received the task of continuing the offensive, while organizing defense at the turn of the Don River. The newly created command of Army Group "A" took over the 17th field, 1st and 4th tank armies; Field Marshal Wilhelm List was entrusted with the leadership of operations for the offensive against Stalingrad from the southwest,

On July 8, Klseist's 1st Sneaker Army struck from the area of Slavyansk, Artemovsk through the Donets, and the 17th Army from Artemovsk to Voroshilovgrad.

It so happened that the Imsino at that time Timoshenko completely disorganized the management of his own front. The fact is that the new head of the titab of the front, General P.I. Boliya fell "is to the court."

"The new chief of staff, however, was not favored by either the commander or a member of the Froit Military Council," writes General of the Army Shtemenko. — Disagreement did not benefit the cause, especially since the situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front was becoming more and more menacing. On July 6, 1942, the commander of the South-Western Froit and a member of the Military Council, without warning the head of the titab, left for the VPU - an auxiliary control point - in Yurokhovka. This TPU was poorly provided with means of communication; there was not a single operational worker there. The incomprehensible departure of the front commander arbitrarily weakened his influence on the course of hostilities. P.I. Bodin was forced to hastily send funds to orochovka. communications and officer-operators.

At the most tense moment of the retreat from the Southwestern Front to Tenshtgab, reports on the situation ceased to arrive - they were absent for a whole day. And the enemy was already advancing near Rossosh, where our troops were trying to organize defense along the southern bersg of the Chernaya Kalitva River. The operators of the General Staff were knocked off their feet, trying to

274

find out if it was possible to stop the enemy, if he crosses the river, then his breakthrough to Kants miroka is possible, and then the bypass of the main forces of our K) th-Western Front will become a fact with all the ensuing consequences.

This is the situation: General Bodin sends out liaison officers in cars and planes to get bits of information, negotiates with Headquarters; Marshal Timoshenko is still in command of the armies, but has no connection either with Moscow or with his boss

headquarters. The vigilant Khrushchev even "had bad thoughts," but isn't the marshal going to surrender in order to avoid responsibility?

On the morning of July 8, the German units advancing from the north captured Olkhovatka and captured the bridgeheads on the southern bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River. Thus, while units of the 28th Soviet Army were on the left bank of the Oskol, in the area of Volkonovka and Valusk, the enemy went far to the east and, cutting off rear communications, set his sights on Kantemirovka. The long-suffering 23rd Tank Corps again received order to launch a counterstrike:

"7/7/42 at 18-19 hours. during the combat operations of the corps units in the area of the villages of Lyubomirovka-- Novo-Aleksandrovka, the command of the 28th army, not knowing the actual position of the corps, enemy forces, its location, issued a chirp: "K.2.00 8.7.42, regardless of what losses, to drive the enemy out of Rossosh, to seize the right *.

At the same time, it is indicated that the enemy in the Rossosh area has only machine gunners.

The command of the corps, having received such an order, the region was not outraged, declaring: "This is a gamble," because. there was no physical possibility for the specified time to withdraw the brigades from the battle, concentrate them and direct them to the task,

When using all the possibilities for the shortest execution of the order, the corps collected the remnants

275

brigades only by 10.30 8.7.42 and concentrated them in the village of Rzhevka. All the remaining slippers of the corps brigades (40 pieces) were attached to the 6th Guards Brigade.

It should be noted that the command of the 23rd Guards Corps reacted blindly to the data of the 28th Army on the enemy's strength and movement in the Rossosh region, not having double-checked this with their capabilities, and at dawn on 8.7.42, when the brigades were not yet fully assembled, part of the corps headquarters was sent to the newly elected command post in the village. Yekaterinovka,

Upon the arrival of the headquarters at the indicated place, the command post was attacked by enemy tanks and submachine gunners, as a result of which they lost 8 anti-aircraft guns, several vehicles and about 20 people killed and wounded. The rest of the Itaba personnel fled. Staff documents destroyed.

It should also be indicated that the command of the 6th Guards

The Deisky tank brigade carelessly, without any proper reconnaissance, led the guns in the direction of Rossosh, they stumbled upon the tanks and artillery of the wiper, having lost several tanks, retreated to the village. Krivono
scoop.

Our source ... on this issue ... said: "About 9.00 on 8.7.42, the commander of the corps, Colonel Khasin, set a basic task for the commander of the 6th Guards Sneaker Brigade. At that time, it turned out that some of the tanks, due to the lack of oil and fuel, were lagging behind and were on the way, the other part of the tanks that had already arrived also had fuel and lubricants and could not solve the combat mission.

Soon they managed to get about a ton of gasoline and oil from the air base, the cars were minimally refueled and at 10.30 the brigade set out from the village. Rzhevka to perform a combat mission.

Before the Rossosh crossing, the tanks had to go about 40 kilometers. It was clear that the tanks, due to the lack of fuel and lubricants and ammunition, could not conduct a long-term battle in the gap and were doomed to death, which

276

the shaft and the corps commander himself, but the order of the 28th Army demanded sacrifices.

I consider the decision of the command of the 28th Army to send tanks on the offensive against Rossosh to be completely wrong. the offensive of tanks began at the moment when the enemy quickly spread from Rossosh to the southeast, and our units hastily retreated.

'
In essence, the tanks of the corps went on a deep raid without infantry and combat support, which threatened them with encirclement.

The tanks, as was to be expected, did not fulfill their task of managing the crossing. They did not reach Rossosh, having met stubborn resistance from the enemy, having lost several tanks, they were forced to withdraw to the Krivoposovka region.

One of the reasons for the unsuccessful actions of the tanks of the 23rd Tank Corps is the fact that the command of the 23rd Tank Corps was not informed by the 28th Army about the existence and actions of the 22nd TC southeast of Rossot and, moreover, from Momsit, as 6 The 1st Guards Tank Brigade went on the attack, the corps command finally lost communications and control of the brigades, and the brigades acted independently.

The command of the 28th Army, not knowing the situation and the actual position of the corps brigades, continues to issue ill-conceived senseless orders.

knowledge. For example: "To the commander of the 6th tank brigade. The commander ordered:

1. Place your tanks to cover the approaches to the Basques, Oskaz along the lines ...

2. Having collected all the tanks, concentrate in the Balkovskaya area and subjugate them, the mobile reserve, in the Konyushen area on the southern outskirts of Balkovskaya ...

This was at a time when the 6th Guards Tank Brigade did not have a single slipper on July 19, 1942.

Due to the misuse of parts of the tank corps, the 6th Guards, 114th and 65th brigades were left without materiel on 10.7.42

277

and at the same time lost a significant part of the personnel.

Some of the tanks were destroyed by the enemy during the battle, and the rest were destroyed by personnel due to lack of fuel, technical malfunction and lack of necessary river crossings.

The weakly controlled formations of the 28th Army failed to organize a defense on the line of Chernaya Kalitla, and they continued to retreat to the southeast, increasing the gap with the neighboring 38th Army. the divisions of which, as before, were deployed by the front to the west. Through this gap, the enemy continued to move south - from Rossosh to Kantsmirovka and from Olkhovatka to Kamenka. Worried about the alarming information coming from this right flank, General Moskalenko contacted Timoshenko and shared his doubts with him, but was accused by the marshal of "instability" and received an order to remain in their previous positions,

The headquarters of the South-Western Front was not guided by changes in the situation, hesitated and lost control of the troops. There was no longer any connection with the 28th Army. As Moskalsiko describes these days: "Communication with the front headquarters was repeatedly and for a long time interrupted, and the latter did not know the position of the troops, and we, in our turn, did not have accurate data on the location of the front command post."

However, both the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff were at a loss regarding the location of the command post of the front. Chief of Staff of the South-Western Front, General Bolin, moved to the new command post. stationed in Kalach, Timoshenko was still in Yurokhovka. Only on July 9, on the direct instructions of the Stavka, did the marshal arrive at the main command post

In a conversation with Stalin, he acknowledged that there really was a serious danger that the strike groups of Goth and Paulus would break out into the deep rear of the two Soviet fronts. The commander believed that due to

278

of its own capabilities, the Southwestern Front is only able to temporarily detain the enemy in the direction of Kantemirovka, Millerovo, but will not be able to give a decisive rebuff, and asked for additional troops, especially aviation.

On the evening of July 9, General Moskalenko, under the threat of encirclement, having no connection with the higher command, made an independent decision to withdraw the divisions of the 38th Army to the east and deploy them frontally to the north in the Kantemirovka area. But the Germans were ahead of the pace, the tanks of Schweppenburg were already bypassing Kantemirovka from the east. By the end of July 11, the main forces of the Southwestern Front, enveloped from the northeast and east and attacked from the west by Kleisg's tank army, found themselves forced to fight hard battles south and southwest of Kantemirovka. A day later, Kleist's 1st Panzer Army crossed the Aidar River to the south of Starobelsk on a broad front and approached Millerovo on 14 July. The main forces of the 4th Panzer Army were also advanced here. At the same time, the 17th Army reached Voroshilovgrad with its northern flank.

In this situation, by order of the Headquarters, the 38th, 38th and 9th armies were transferred to the Southern Front, which was tasked with stopping the enemy advance. However, this order remained on paper, since the Southwestern Front no longer existed. He was divided into separate groups of troops, who independently made their way to the east, Timoshenko had no connection with them and did not control anything.

The remnants of Gordov's 21st Army went beyond the Don. Of the 40th Army, only the brave Major General Parsegov, who abandoned his troops, remained; the hero of the Finnish war almost immediately went to the Far East, away from the front. The bloodless units of the 28th Army went to the villages of Kazanskaya and Veshenskaya, in regiments of 100-150 active bayonets. The 9th army of General Lopatin rolled back to the south Moskalen Troops

279

but, having no connection with their neighbors, they retreated to Kashary on a broad front. Here, Commander-38 received an order by radio to transfer his army to the subordination of the Southern Front, but there was no connection with it either, and Mos-

Kalenko decided to withdraw divisions to the east. On July 16, the 38th Army fought its way to the Don in the Serafimovich area.

The success of the German strike groups was facilitated by the absolute dominance of the Luftwaffe in the air. Despite the fact that the forces of four air armies (2, 4, Bi 8th), 29 air divisions and 12 separate air regiments were involved in the battle from the Soviet side, the "Stalin's falcons" could not help their

ground troops. German aviation was concentrated on decisive sectors of the front and used massively, bombarding simultaneously infantry, tank, and artillery firing positions. headquarters, nodes and lines of communication, roads, bridges, fronts, clearing the way for their armored cops and motorized infantry. In the conditions of "clear skies" groups of dive-bombers, replacing each other, hovered over the Soviet positions for hours. This is remembered by all, without exception, the participants of the July Bosv.

"Enemy aircraft dominated the air. But the losses of our weapons from these actions amounted to 50% of the total losses, and the losses of ammunition from the bombing exceeded by several times the losses from the actions of enemy artillery ... air bombings, lasting five hours without a break, shook the stamina of the guardsmen. Some rats in such a hell became insane, lost the ability to understand commands" (K.S. Moskalenko).

"We were constantly bombed from the air. Squadrons of "chun ksr" came and went, replacing each other. Unfortunately, there was nothing to repel these raids "(E.F. Ivanovsky).

"From the massive bombing, people got some kind of indifference to fear. Many are just

280

spread your cell, your trench on the parapet and looked at the planes ... Because of this mood, the number of killed and wounded increased, including among the commanders "(K.I. Provalov).

The People's Commissar of Defense had to issue a special order, which dealt with the use of fighter aircraft primarily against enemy bombers "to reduce their strike force", the use of attack aircraft for strikes on the front line of the enemy, and the involvement of fighter aircraft to solve bombing missions. on the battlefield.

"After these documents were received by the troops," historiographers of the 8th Air Army report, "

it was categorically forbidden to launch Il-2 attack aircraft into battle without a bomb load, as was done earlier (!) During attack sorties ... "Flyers were also recommended to take bombs for suspension: it turns out that the outdated I-153, and the newest Yak-7 had bomb racks. Since the pilots did not know how to use them, it was necessary to organize "practical testing of techniques and methods of bombing" in front-line conditions.

As financial incentives, cash bonuses were established for each downed enemy aircraft and downhole sorties with a full bomb load. When awarding bonuses, every 2 sorties with bombs were counted as 3 sorties without bombs.

From this one can understand why the Soviet ground troops so rarely saw their own fighter-attack aircraft and what it was doing - mainly shuffling (without bombs!) objects and concentrations of troops behind enemy lines.

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The commander of the Southern Front, General Malinovsky, initially decided to stop the German troops at the turn of Millerovo, Petropavlovsk, Cherkasskoye.

281

But this decision had to be abandoned almost immediately: the more maneuverable units of the enemy were ahead in reaching this line. The southern front had to bend the northern flank to the east in order to prevent the enemy from enveloping this flank and breaking through to the rear. The formations of the 24th Army moved out of the reserve to the Millerovo region had to immediately engage in battle with the German slippers and motorized infantry that had broken through. And although the Germans were completely drunk - General Provalov, who commanded the 383rd Infantry Division, reports that "the fascists, having drunk, went to positions ... in full height, in outward columns, not even hiding behind tanks" - it was not possible to stop them .

By this time, pathological features began to appear in German strategy, caused by the influence of Hitler, who assumed numerous commanding pitchforks. The infallible Führer rs sewed that Timoshenko's main forces were retreating to the south in order to escape the German "pincers" beyond the Don, and decided to arrange for them a giant "cauldron" north of Rostov. To this end, on July 13, he ordered both tank armies to move on an accelerated march along both banks to the south along the Seversky Donets river and turn west along the Don to cut off the Russians.

from crossings, and then destroy the enemy jointly with the 17th Army.

At the same time, the 4th Tank Army, which had crossed the Seversky Donets in the northeast direction a week before, had to cross back. The weight was worth the precious legions' time. The commander of Army Group B, General Feldmarschall Bock, who objected to the hasty change of plans, was removed from his post, and General Weichs took his place.

Thus, the offensive of the tank and motorized divisions on Stalingrad was postponed, and only the 6th Field Army continued to advance east down the Don. According to the German genes

282

Ralov, this was a major mistake of the high command: "Never before and after that the situation was not so favorable for the offensive on Stalingrad. This chance was lost for the sake of carrying out the "battle in the cauldron", although, in fact, there was no one to surround the troika".

Thus, when the German troops reached the middle reaches of the Don, their tank armies turned from the Stalingrad direction to Rostov in order to encircle the troops of the Southern Front in the area north and north-west of Rostov. By the end of July 15, the Germans managed to break through the Soviet defenses between the Don and Seversky Donets in a strip up to 170 km and exit into a large bend,

On July 15, the Stavka ordered the withdrawal of the troops of the Southern Front beyond the Don in its lower reaches and, in cooperation with the armies of the North Caucasian Front, to organize a strong defense along the southern bank of the river from Verkhnekurmoyarskaya to Bagaevskaya. At the same time, the troops of the 28th, 38th and newly formed 57th armies were transferred to the Stalingrad Front, created on July 12, commanded by Marshal Timoshenko.

By the end of July 19, the main forces of the Southern Front withdrew to the Sinigorsky, Zversovo, Dyakovo line.

On July 20, the 1st Tank Army, having crossed the Seversky Donets with battles, launched an attack from the area southeast of Kamensk-Shakhtinsky to Novocherkassk. The 57th Panzer Corps of General Kirchner went over to the offensive across the narrow path from the area north of Taganrog. On July 23, Kleist's forces broke into Rostov, but the "cauldron" did not work out. Malinovsky's troops retreated - fled to the left bank of the Don ("Part of the troops of the Southern Front, following the panickers, left Rostov and Novo-